2013年3月22日 星期五

Ezra F. Voge l" 鄧小平傳“ /《鄧小平時代》中共版少了什麼? 從日本第一Japan As Number One 到中國第一”的旁觀


《鄧小平時代》大陸版少了什麼?

哈佛大學教授傅高義(Ezra F. Vogel)傾十年心力完成的巨著《鄧小平時代》(Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China)於2013年1月由生活·讀書·新知三聯書店出版,在中國大陸首度公開發行了簡體中文版。
《鄧小平時代》一書英文原著於2011年在哈佛大學出版社出版,2012年香港中文大學出版社出版了未經刪節的中文版,譯者為馮克利。港版全書約58萬字,其中注釋6.1萬字。三聯書店的大陸版仍採用了馮克利的譯本,但對內容進行了刪節。

大陸版正文較港版刪節約5.3萬字,其中包括“鄧小平時代的關鍵人物”(Key People in the Deng Era)一文約2.6萬字。附錄部分,大陸版的注釋從港版的105頁縮減為78頁,索引由港版的39頁縮減為11頁。
在給《紐約時報》的郵件回復中,傅高義坦承了他對《鄧小平時代》大陸版的看法。他表示,三聯書店能夠獲准出版《鄧小平時代》中文版並保留了他想表達 的核心內容(占原著篇幅90%以上),令他感到欣慰。他稱讚三聯書店“努力地呈現了所有我想要表達的核心內容”,“當我抱怨我想說的話被省掉的時候,他們 (三聯)有時會想出辦法把(我想說的)話說出來。”
傅高義還確認了他與三聯書店達成的協議,即三聯方面保證將大陸版所有的刪節之處告知傅高義並做出說明,而且不添加傅高義原話之外的任何內容。這一承 諾從《三聯生活周刊》對三聯書店總編輯李昕的訪談中,可以得到佐證。《紐約時報》曾就《鄧小平時代》一書在大陸出版的情況聯繫三聯書店置評,但三聯方面表 示不便就此接受採訪。
客觀地說,大陸版《鄧小平時代》對天安門事件、鄧小平南巡前後對改革停滯的不滿、鄧小平子女的腐敗傳聞等敏感話題並未避而不談。那麼,正文部分蒸發 的約2.7萬字都涉及怎樣的內容?這無疑是一個了解今日中國歷史敘述禁區及出版審查紅線的難得機會。筆者在認真比對《鄧小平時代》英文原版、香港中文大學 版和三聯書店版的基礎上,將《鄧小平時代》大陸版編輯取捨的主要思路歸納舉要如下。
黨內的矛盾和鬥爭
《鄧小平時代》記載了不同歷史時期,中共高層領導人之間存在的矛盾,如毛澤東與周恩來的矛盾,華國鋒和鄧小平的矛盾,鄧小平與陳雲的矛盾等。在大陸版中,對這些矛盾的描寫被不同程度地刪減和淡化。例如:
第2章《放逐與回歸》(Banishment and Return, 1969-1974)中,兩段對毛澤東既不喜歡周恩來,又離不開周恩來的心態的描寫,第5章《靠邊站》(Sidelined as the Mao Era Ends, 1976)中對周恩來去世後毛澤東的冷漠態度的描寫被刪去。
第12章《重組領導班子》(Launching the Deng Administration, 1979-1980)中寫道,葉劍英反對華國鋒去職但最終向多數意見妥協,後來葉帥病重時鄧小平沒有禮節性地前去看望他;以及為了更順利地使華國鋒下台, 鄧小平分階段施加壓力——這些暴露中共黨內分歧的細節也被刪去。
1980年代後期,主張大力改革的鄧小平和主張穩健的陳雲在1984年之後分歧日益明顯。為了弱化這種分歧,第14章《廣東和福建的實驗》 (Experiments in Guangdong and Fujian, 1979-1984)部分刪去了對陳雲保守態度的刻畫,例如“與此同時,廣東的幹部則認為他(陳雲)始終是個讓他們頭痛的人。幾乎所有的高幹都去過特區至 少一次,對特區的成就予以表揚,只有陳雲和李先念不去。陳雲每年都去南方過冬,比如杭州和上海等地,但他總說自己的身體狀況不允許他去廣東。”
類似對鄧小平和陳雲分歧的淡化處理在第14章節中出現了3次,第16章中出現了7次,在第22章(由於內地版將第20和21章合并為一章,所以英文 版和港版是第23章,內地版是第22章)《終曲:南方之行》 (Deng’s Finale: The Southern Journey, 1992)中也刪節了部分有關二人矛盾的內容。不過,在傅高義“鄧小平時代的關鍵人物”一文中,也強調了鄧陳之前合作的一面。他寫道,“鄧小平和陳雲還是 在這種路線分歧中盡量做到了和平相處。”
鄧小平1992年南巡前後,黨內改革與保守路線的鬥爭也成是大陸版《鄧小平時代》努力迴避的一個話題。傅高義認為,鄧小平1992年南巡最重要的意 義在於使江澤民站到了改革者的行列中。有軍方要人出席的“珠海會議”是其中一個重要事件。大陸版刪去了大半有關珠海會議的內容,如鄧小平會上“誰不改革, 誰就下台,我們的領導看上去是在做事,但其實他們沒有做任何有用的事”的嚴厲講話,及“如果江澤民不推行改革,得到軍隊擁護的鄧小平將用喬石來替換他”, “江澤民向時任福建省委書記的賈慶林索要珠海會議錄音”等。不過,大陸版第22章中仍保留了與“珠海會議”相關的一個段落(大陸版第626頁)。
天安門事件的經過和細節
大陸版《鄧小平時代》將原著及港版的第20章《北京之春:1989年4月15日至5月17日》(Beijing Spring, April 15-May 17, 1989)和第21章《天安門的悲劇:1989年5月17日-6月4日》(The Tiananmen Tragedy, May17-June 4,1989)合并為第20章《北京,1989》。
在描述1989年天安門事件時,傅高義英文原著中使用了“鎮壓”(crackdown)、“悲劇”(tragedy)、“災難” (catastrophe)和“人類的苦難”(human suffering)等詞彙,但沒有使用西方世界形容天安門事件的另一種流行說法“屠殺”(massacre)。大陸版《鄧小平時代》對傅高義的表述進行 了弱化,描寫6月4日的“鎮壓”(The Crackdown)一節,標題被改為“清場”。此外,大陸版用“六四”代替了港版中“天安門事件”一詞,來稱呼這場政治運動。
有關天安門事件的內容是大陸版刪節最明顯的一部分(比港版少了約一萬字),不過該事件的大致經過基本得到保留,包括以下十六個標題:“胡耀邦去 世”,“騷動的根源”,“從悼念到抗議”,“‘四二六社論’”,“李鵬和趙紫陽的分歧”,“為戈爾巴喬夫的訪問做準備和絕食抗議”,“戈爾巴喬夫訪問北 京”,“戒嚴令和趙紫陽離職,5月17-20日”,“戒嚴受阻,5月19-22日”,“準備清場解決,5月22日-6月3日”,“籌組新的領導班子,“強 硬派學生的堅持,5月20日-6月2日”,“清場,6月3-4日”,“溫室中的一代和被推遲的希望”,“天安門意象的力量”,“假如”。
下列內容則被不同程度地刪減:悼念胡耀邦的天安門抗議與1976年悼念周恩來的“四五運動”的類比;“四二六社論”加劇衝突,李鵬的生硬態度和趙紫 陽對學生的同情(如“李鵬的態度甚至無法贏得官方媒體的支持”,而趙紫陽在5月3日和4日的兩次重要講話則“像是一個長者去勸說本質還不錯的孩子”);鄧 小平接待戈爾巴喬夫時因為廣場局勢不斷惡化而將餃子從筷子上滑落下來的細節;趙紫陽和一批自由派退休幹部——李昌、李銳、于光遠和杜潤生——為避免暴力鎮 壓做的最後的努力;趙紫陽去職和被軟禁的細節,比如他在廣場對學生說話時“聲音顫抖,眼含淚水”;趙紫陽試圖寫信給鄧小平,解釋他與戈爾巴喬夫說過的令鄧 氣憤的話,並於同一天被軟禁;鄧小平決定使用武力,如何在高層領導中取得一致,如何準備坦克,裝甲兵車,把遠距離的軍隊運送到北京;軍隊在6月4日夜間行 動的經過,等等。
對於1989年6月3日夜至4日凌晨鎮壓的描寫,未刪減的港版有1283字,而大陸版只有325字。此外,對於傷亡數字,原著提供了6種版本:中國 官方估計的200多人,李鵬對布蘭特·斯考克羅夫特(Brent Scowcroft)說的310人,遇害人之一丁子霖的母親截至2008年搜集到的近200個姓名;外國觀察家估計的300人至2600人,外國媒體報道 的,“被嚴重誇大的”的上萬人;以及外國武官的估計和來自北京11所醫院的報告的478人;但大陸版只保留了中國官方報告的200人以及外國媒體的上萬 人,並指出那是“嚴重的誇大”。
對領導人的評說
大陸版《鄧小平時代》中對有關中共高級領導人評價的內容字斟句酌,其中不乏“為尊者諱”的情況。
傅高義用“喜歡報復(vindictive)”、“邪惡狡猾(devious)”等詞語來形容毛澤東,而這些詞語在大陸版中被弱化。他在第2章《放 逐與回歸》中寫道,“毛澤東無論作為個人還是作為領袖,都是個強勢人物。他功高蓋世,整起好同志來也毫不留情;他精於權謀,任何人在對他的評價上都很難做 到不偏不倚”(英文版第54頁、港版47頁)。這句話在大陸版中被改為:“毛澤東無論作為個人還是作為領袖,都是個強勢人物,任何人在對他的評價上都很難 做到不偏不倚”(大陸版第67頁)。序言部分也有類似的刪節,如“在他統治的27年間,毛澤東不僅消滅了資本家和地主,也毀掉了很多知識分子和老幹部”。
針對周恩來的一些負面情節也被大陸版略去。例如,在第2章《放逐與回歸》里,傅高義寫道:“周恩來對文革受害者的幫助是有限的。周恩來在1956年 一次政治局會議後曾惹惱毛澤東,他當時私下對毛說:他從良心上不贊成毛的經濟政策。自從那次受批評後,他在長達15年時間裡一直小心翼翼,避免讓毛澤東找 到理由懷疑他沒有全心全意貫徹毛的意圖。儘管如此,毛澤東在1958年1月還是對周恩來大發脾氣,他說周恩來離右派只有五十步遠,這一斥責讓周恩來進一步 退縮。”又如,第2章中,“並非人人都把周恩來視為英雄,例如陳毅的家人就對他沒有保護陳毅很氣憤,一些沒有得到周恩來幫助的受害者家屬也有同樣的心情, 還有一些人說他助紂為虐,對於文革的浩劫難辭其咎。”(英文版第66頁、港版57頁)
大陸版剔除了第16章《加快經濟發展和開放步伐》中對鄧小平1988年推行物價闖關失敗的批評:“鄧小平宣布進行全面物價改革這一決定,後來被證明大概是他一生中代價最高昂的錯誤”,以及“83歲的他已經遠離了群眾”(英文版第470-471頁、港版420頁)。
不過,與“為尊者諱”相反的是,大陸版淡化了原著對胡耀邦和趙紫陽的正面評價,如在第16章《加快經濟發展和改革開放步伐》中,傅高義寫道:“在智 囊團為趙紫陽工作的人,都十分尊重和欽佩趙紫陽,他們喜歡他毫不做作的隨和作風,不拘一格,廣納賢言的開放態度,以及把想法轉化為推動國家前進的實際政策 的能力。” 這段話在大陸版中被刪去(英文版第455頁、港版407頁)。
港版第20章《北京之春:1989》寫到李鵬“固執而又謹慎”的性格,與“熱情且富有同情心”的胡耀邦,或“超然而具有紳士風度和分析才能”的趙紫 陽形成鮮明對比,而在大陸版中,對胡耀邦和趙紫陽的性格描述被刪去(但保留了李鵬性格“固執而又謹慎”的說法)。不過,在“胡耀邦去世”一節中,對他的正 面評價仍然被保留:“群眾能夠長久被胡耀邦感動,不僅因為他熱情親切,還因為他做人正派,對黨忠心耿耿。他是知識分子的希望,曾為他們做過勇敢的鬥爭。他 是他們心目中好乾部的表率——有崇高理想,無任何腐敗劣跡。他曾長期擔任團中央第一書記,能夠與他所培養和提攜的年輕人打成一片。”(大陸版第567至 568頁)
此外,書的末尾“鄧小平時代的關鍵人物”一文包含了傅高義對陳雲,鄧力群,胡喬木,胡耀邦,華國鋒,李先念,毛遠新,任仲夷,萬里,王洪文,習仲勛,葉劍英,余秋里,趙紫陽的生平和他們個人性格的簡介,而這個2.6萬字的部分在大陸版中被省去。
一些極富爭議的國際人物和事件
對於中國與波爾布特(Pol Pot)的關係、1979年中越戰爭,齊奧塞斯庫(Nicolai Ceausescu)之死及東歐劇變這些極富爭議的國際人物和事件,大陸版《鄧小平時代》也進行了刪節。
第18章《為軍事現代化作準備》(The Military: Preparing for Modernization)寫道,鄧小平為了遏制蘇聯與越南的軍事合作,要通過攻打越南來展示不惜一戰的決心。當越南出兵柬埔寨之後,紅色高棉 (Khmer Rouge)領導人波爾布特請鄧小平派兵幫助柬埔寨。儘管波爾布特的暴政受到西方的強烈譴責,鄧小平依然決定與他合作。第9章波爾布特的名字和第18章對 越戰爭的一些細節(如戰爭之後,鄧小平指示大量中國軍隊在邊境駐紮,對越南人進行騷擾),以及高層領導人對對越戰爭的不同意見在大陸版中被刪去。
第22章《穩住陣腳》(Standing Firm)寫到,羅馬尼亞領導人、中國的老朋友齊奧塞斯庫及其妻子因為向平民開槍被槍決。中國媒體對齊奧塞斯庫的向平民開槍未作任何報道;當齊奧塞斯庫被 槍決兩天後,《人民日報》在第四版下方簡短地發佈了一句話:“羅馬尼亞電視台12月25日宣布,羅馬尼亞特別軍事法庭宣判齊奧塞斯庫及其妻子死刑,這一判 決已經得到執行。”
又如,原著第22章中對東歐和蘇聯社會主義陣營崩潰及中國反應的記載,“波蘭在1989年6月4日以公投的方式選出議會,東德於1989年10月7 日爆發大規模抗議,1990年2月蘇共全會討論放棄黨對權力的壟斷,這些重大事件都被中國媒體淡化和掩蓋。”在大陸版中,中國媒體對東歐劇變的蓄意淡化也 被淡化為兩句話:“通過《參考資料》上每天從西方媒體翻譯過來的材料,中國的官員要比一般的群眾更了解真相”,“儘管中國的領導人在向民眾報道蘇東劇變時 動作遲緩,但很快就根據新的現實調整了其外交政策。”
注釋中的禁書
傅高義撰寫的《鄧小平時代》旁徵博引,其中也引用了一些在大陸尚無法公開出版的著作。在大陸版中,這些涉及禁書的注釋被大量刪減,但也有一部分被保留了下來。
曾在中共中央文獻研究室工作的、周恩來生平研究專家高文謙所著《晚年周恩來》一書,在第2章英文注釋共出現了19次,大陸版中被悉數刪去。
張良、黎安友(Andrew J. Nathan)和林培瑞(Perry Link)編著的《天安門文件》(The Tiananmen Papers) 是很多學者研究天安門事件使用的重要史料,該文件集在英文版注釋中出現了26次,但在大陸版中僅了1次:它與《李鵬六四日記》,另外兩位學者的論文和著 作,《紐約時報》記者紀思道(Nicholas Kristof)和伍潔芳(Sheryl WuDunn)的著作一併出現在第20章的注釋12中。《天安門文件》被刪減的25條注釋中,有12條對應的正文被刪去,其餘13條則保留了引用內容,但 將出處單獨刪去。《李鵬六四日記》英文版注釋出現19次,內地版12次,刪減的7處相應引文均被刪去。
根據趙紫陽軟禁期間口述整理的《改革歷程》(Prisoner of the State),在英文版中出現12次,大陸版出現1次。其中4條注釋被單獨刪去,引文保留,其餘7條則與對應引文一齊刪去。《杜導正日記》在第19章出現了3次,但注釋與引文都被刪除。
原新華社記者楊繼繩的《中國改革年代的政治鬥爭》雖然在第20章中的注釋被刪去,但在第14章注釋7和第19章注釋59中得以保留。
第17章《台灣,香港和西藏問題》注釋102中提到的王力雄著《天葬:西藏的命運》和蘇紹智、陳一咨、高文謙編《人民心中的胡耀邦》也被保留下來。
儘管大陸版刪節了5.3萬字,對於很多大陸讀者來說,它還是披露了大量的細節,許多關於1980年代中國歷史的敘述在大陸公開出版物中都屬首次出 現。讀者仍然有機會從書中領略到歷史及歷史人物的真實和複雜。對於在出版審查中生活,並建立了“自我審查”的筆者,大陸版中許多保留的內容已令筆者感到意 外驚喜。
參考資料:
1. [美] 傅高義(Ezra F. Vogel)著,馮克利 譯,香港中文大學出版社編輯部、生活·讀書·新知三聯書店編輯部 譯校《鄧小平時代》,生活·讀書·新知三聯書店,2013年1月北京第1版;
2. 傅高義(Ezra F. Vogel)著,馮克利 譯,香港中文大學出版社編輯部 譯校《鄧小平時代》,中文大學出版社,2012年香港;
3. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, by Ezra F.Vogel The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 2011
李慧敏是《紐約時報》北京分社特邀研究員,《紐約時報》駐京記者傑安迪(Andrew Jacobs)對本文有報道貢獻。 

書評

鄧小平從未退縮,不論在毛時代還是他自己的時代

Brent Frerck from Bettmann/Corbis
1979年鄧訪問美國期間,觀看休斯頓的一場牛仔競技比賽。

這本關於鄧小平(1904-97) 的傳記巨著以兩個強有力的反問結尾:“20世紀有沒有任何其他領導人在改善這麼多人的生活方面做出更大的貢獻?20世紀有沒有任何其他領導人對世界歷史產 生如此重大而深遠的影響?”答案可以從這部全面、詳實的書中找到,但是並不像哈佛大學社會科學榮譽教授傅高義(Ezra F. Vogel)假定的那樣顯而易見。
1976年毛澤東去世後,鄧成了經濟改革的擁護者,這改變了很多中國人的生活,但不是絕大多數中國人的生活(傅高義注意到,毛的接班人華國鋒是改革 的發起人)。鄧長久以來都是中共的核心人物。傅高義公正地說“文化大革命前的十多年裡”,“沒有人比鄧小平對建立和管理舊體制負有更大的責任”。但是鄧生 活和事業的大部分內容只佔了傅高義714頁陳述的四分之一。
到1978年,鄧已經成了中國“至高無上的領導者”。1967-73年,他經受了漫長的軟禁和流放,1976-77年,他再次被毛從政治舞台上抹 去。但除此之外,毛給中國和中國人造成的極大痛苦,鄧都應該與其共同分擔很大一部分責任。他當然還應對1989年天安門的屠殺承擔主要責任。
奇怪的是,在《鄧小平時代》(Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China)一書中,我們幾乎看不到鄧這個人。他個人性格的某些方面眾所周知:他打橋牌;喜歡麵包、奶酪和咖啡;抽煙;喝酒;使用痰盂。他非常自律。雖然 鄧沒有留下任何個人文件資料,傅高義還是巧妙地講述了一些為人所知的情況。
鄧出生於四川省的一個小地主家庭,孩提時代在當地的學校讀過書,但是他接受正規教育的時間其實只有一年,那就是1926年在莫斯科的中山大學接受意 識形態教化。在那之前的五年時間,他住在巴黎,在幼年時期的中國共產黨內部接受了實用而持久的教育,當時的中共是由年輕的周恩來領導的。
從莫斯卡回國之後不久,他就不再是一位“快樂的、愛玩鬧的、開朗的”小夥子了。他組織了一小支軍隊打擊軍閥,結果被打敗了,可能還逃跑了。最後,他 加入了“毛派”,隨着這個派別的命運起起落落。在1934-35年的長征期間,鄧參加了毛取得最高指揮權的那次會議。1949年共產黨獲勝之後,他就任佔 領西藏的那支軍隊的政委,但是他似乎從來沒去過西藏。1949-51年,他在西南組織了旨在“消滅地主階級”的土地改革運動。毛因為鄧“殺死了一些地主” 而讚揚了“他取得的勝利”(在這場全國性運動中,有200萬到300萬人被殺。作為這場運動的一部分,“一些”這個詞好像不夠充分)。1957年,鄧監管 “反右運動”,這場運動“對55萬持批評態度的知識分子進行的惡毒攻擊”,“毀掉了中國很多最優秀的科技人才”。在1958-61年的大躍進運動中,有多 達4500萬人被餓死,傅高義沒有找到任何證據證明鄧反對毛的這種偏激的政策。然而馮客(Frank Dikötter)編著的資料詳實的《毛的大饑荒》(Mao’s Great Famine)一書,卻表明鄧下令從將要餓死的農民手中拿走糧食,供應城市,出口國外。
傅高義告訴我們,在1966年末,鄧被指控“走資本主義路線”。他被軟禁在北京家中直到1969年,而後被轉移到江西省的一個工廠,每天工作半天。紅衛兵不斷騷擾他的五個孩子,其中一個兒子在被紅衛兵恐嚇或欺負後,從窗戶跳下,摔斷了脊椎。1973年毛批准鄧回到北京。
傅高義認為,鄧在國內流放期間斷定中國的體制有問題:經濟落後,與世界脫離;人民的教育水平很低。在鄧的領導下,中國變成了一個越來越城市化的社 會。鄧認為懲治腐敗會限制發展,因此很多官員“想辦法不僅使中國富裕起來,而且使自己富裕起來”。傅高義說,結果中國比以往任何時候都更加腐敗,環境污染 也更加嚴重。
雖然鄧知道科技很重要——從19世紀末,中國的很多改革者都知道這一點——但是他擔心人文學科和社會科學可能會成為異端邪說的溫床;在懲治知識分子 方面他從來都沒有猶豫過,他認為這些人的異見可能會“引發破壞公共秩序的遊行示威”。很說明問題的是,對鄧來說,“天安門事件”後,共產主義世界裡最糟糕 的發展可能就是1989年12月25日羅馬尼亞獨裁者尼古拉·齊奧塞斯庫(Nicolae Ceausescu)和他的妻子被處決。齊奧塞斯庫是唯一一位下令軍隊向平民開槍的東歐領導人。
傅高義稱天安門事件是一場“悲劇”,還提到鄧的同事提出質疑,說使用軍隊鎮壓起義會惹怒外國人,鄧對此不以為然:“西方人會忘記的。”實際上,年輕 一代的中國人對這次在300多個城市爆發的示威只有模糊的認識,因為他們的歷史課上沒有提到這件事。傅高義對這次鎮壓的描述大部分是準確的,不過他遺漏了 一點:周日早上,很多在廣場邊緣尋找自己孩子的父母被槍殺了。關於這一點,以及其他一些部分,傅高義本可以與當時在場的記者交流一下,而不只是閱讀他們的 記述(作為這些事件的目擊者,我表示願意與他交談)。令人失望的一點是,傅高義提出了這樣的疑問:為什麼“天安門悲劇在西方社會引發了大範圍的強烈抗議, 強度遠遠大於之前在亞洲發生的類似規模的悲劇”?
對此,傅高義引用了另一個學者的觀點,準確地說出了其中一個原因:天安門事件在電視上實時播放。然後他令人費解地補充說,觀眾把他們看到的情況“解 讀為”“對美國神話的一種攻擊,這個神話就是:經濟、思想和政治自由將永遠獲勝。很多外國人將鄧視為罪人,認為他是自由的敵人,他鎮壓了英勇的學生”。更 離譜的是,傅高義認為,對外國記者來說,天安事件“是他們職業生涯中最令人興奮的時刻”。這樣的評論與他嚴肅學者的身份極不相稱。他斷然認為“鄧不是為了 報復”。如果他的意思是鄧沒有下令殺死他的敵人和批評者,那他說的是事實——從私人的角度看是這樣的。但是在致使無數無名百姓被殺害方面,鄧從來沒有退縮 過,不管是在毛的時代,還是他自己的時代。
傅高義的陳述中最有價值的部分是他對鄧的經濟改革的調查。這些改革使很大一部分中國人富裕了起來,把中國推上了國際舞台。但是中共掩蓋了毛澤東執政 的幾十年里成百上千萬人被害死或餓死的事實。最後,從傅高義這本內容廣泛的傳記中顯露出來的,是他那兩個問題的真正的答案:在鄧小平漫長的職業生涯的大部 分時間裡,他為中國做的事,遠遠比不上他對中國所做的事。
本文作者Jonathan Mirsky是專門研究中國問題的記者和歷史學家。
《鄧小平時代》簡體中文版於2013年1月18日由生活·讀書·新知三聯書店出版;此前《鄧小平時代》未刪節繁體中文版2012年4月由香港中文大學出版社出版。
本文最初發表於2011年10月23日。

How Deng Did It

Two mighty rhetorical questions conclude this enormous biography of Deng Xiaoping (1904-97): “Did any other leader in the 20th century do more to improve the lives of so many? Did any other 20th-century leader have such a large and lasting influence on world history?” The answers emerge from this comprehensive, minutely documented book, but not as predictably as Ezra F. Vogel, a Harvard University emeritus professor of social sciences, assumes.
After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng became the champion of the economic reforms that transformed the lives of many, but not most, Chinese. (Vogel observes that Mao’s immediate successor, Hua Guofeng, was the initiator of the reforms.) Deng had long been a central figure in the Communist Party. Vogel rightly says that “for more than a decade before the Cultural Revolution” — 1966-1976 — “no one had greater responsibility for building and administering the old system than Deng Xiaoping.” Yet, most of Deng’s life and career takes up only a quarter of Vogel’s 714 pages of narrative.
By 1978, Deng had become China’s “paramount leader.” It follows, therefore, that apart from his long period of house arrest and banishment during the years 1967-73, and during another year in 1976-77, when Mao again removed him from the political scene, Deng must share the blame for much of the agony Mao inflicted on China and the Chinese. He certainly bears the major responsibility for the Tiananmen Square killings in 1989.
It is a curiosity of “Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China” that Deng the man is almost invisible. There is a well-known list of his personal characteristics: he played bridge; liked bread, cheese and coffee; smoked; drank and used spittoons. He was unswervingly self-disciplined. Though Deng left no personal paper trail, Vogel ably relates what is known.
Deng came from a small-landlord family in Sichuan Province, yet his formal education, apart from his time at a local school when he was a child, consisted mainly of a single year, 1926, of ideological indoctrination at Sun Yatsen University in Moscow. For five years before that, he lived in Paris, where he received a practical, and enduring, education inside the infant Chinese Communist Party, serving under the leadership of the young Zhou Enlai.
After Paris and Moscow, Deng went back to China, and before long had ceased being “a cheerful, fun-loving extrovert.” He commanded a small force against warlords, was defeated and may have run away. Eventually, he joined the “Mao faction,” rising and falling with its inner-party fortunes. During the Long March of 1934-35 Deng attended the meeting where Mao took supreme power, and after the Communist triumph in 1949, he served as party commissar for the army that occupied Tibet, although he seems not to have set foot there. In the southwest Deng organized the land reform program of 1949-51 “that would wipe out the landlord class.” Mao praised Deng “for his success . . . killing some of the landlords.” (As part of a national campaign in which two million to three million were killed, “some” seems an inadequate word.) In 1957, Deng oversaw the “anti-rightist campaign,” a “vicious attack on 550,000 intellectual critics” that “destroyed many of China’s best scientific and technical minds.” As for the Great Leap Forward of 1958-61, when as many as 45 million people starved to death, Vogel provides no evidence that Deng objected to Mao’s monomaniacal policies. Frank Dikötter’s well-documented book “Mao’s Great Famine,” however, shows that Deng ordered the extraction of grain from starving peasants for the cities and export abroad.
In late 1966, Vogel tells us, Deng was accused of “pursuing the capitalist road.” Under house arrest in Beijing until 1969, he was transferred to Jiangxi Province to work half days in a factory. Red Guards harassed his five children, and the back of one of his sons was broken when he may have jumped from a window after the guards frightened or bullied him. Mao permitted Deng to return to Beijing in 1973.
Vogel contends that during his internal exile Deng concluded that something had gone systemically wrong with China: it was economically backward and isolated from the international scene; its people were poorly educated. China under Deng became an increasingly urban society. And following Deng’s view that corruption crackdowns limit growth, many officials, Vogel writes, “found ways not only to enrich China, but also to enrich themselves.” The result, he says, is that China is more corrupt than ever and its environment more polluted.
While Deng believed that science and technology were important — as have many Chinese reformers since the late 19th century — he feared that the humanities and social sciences could be seedbeds of heterodoxy; he never hesitated in punishing intellectuals, whose divergent views could “lead to demonstrations that disrupt public order.” It is telling that for Deng perhaps the worst development in the Communist world after Tiananmen was the execution on Dec. 25, 1989, of the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife. Ceausescu was the only Eastern European leader whose troops had fired on civilians.
Vogel calls Tiananmen a “tragedy,” and quotes Deng brushing aside doubts from colleagues that using troops to smash the uprising would disturb foreigners; “Westerners would forget.” Actually, it is young Chinese for whom the demonstrations in over 300 cities are a dim fact absent from their history lessons. Vogel’s account of the crackdown is largely accurate, although he omits the shooting down on Sunday morning of many parents milling about at the edge of the square, searching for their children. In this, as in other parts of this narrative, Vogel could have spoken with journalists who were there, and not just read their accounts. (I declare an interest; I saw these events.) What is disappointing is Vogel’s comments about why “the tragedy in Tiananmen Square evoked a massive outcry in the West, far greater than previous tragedies in Asia of comparable scale.”
Part of the answer, Vogel correctly says, citing another scholar, was the real-time television in Tiananmen. Then he perplexingly adds that viewers “interpreted” what they saw “as an assault on the American myth that economic, intellectual and political freedom will always triumph. Many foreigners came to see Deng as a villainous enemy of freedom who crushed the heroic students.” Furthermore, Vogel contends, for foreign reporters the Tiananmen uprising “was the most exciting time of their careers.” Such comments are unworthy of a serious scholar. He states flatly that “Deng was not vindictive.” If he means Deng didn’t order his adversaries and critics killed, that is true — as far as individuals are concerned. But Deng never shrank, either in Mao’s time or his own, from causing the murder of large numbers of anonymous people.
The most valuable part of Vogel’s account is his survey of Deng’s economic reforms; they made a substantial portion of Chinese better-off, and propelled China onto the international stage. But the party has obscured the millions of deaths that occurred during the Maoist decades. In the end, what shines out from Vogel’s wide-ranging biography is the true answer to his two questions: for most of his long career Deng Xiaoping did less for China than he did to it.
Jonathan Mirsky is a journalist and historian specializing in China.
****

*****鄧小平說,中國最大的失敗是教育

世煜兄和慧玲女在幾年前介紹中國的異議份子余杰先生,還帶我去去家濃厚豬肉的台菜餐廳。余杰(1973-)先生是劉曉(1955-)先生的隔代知音。我後來都默默注意余先生的被當局修理和反抗,幸虧德國之音和紐約時報等都會報導他們的奮鬥。

其實劉曉波先生在台灣出版的著作至於五本,不過劉曉波先生即使得到諾貝爾和平獎,書不像2000年諾貝爾文學獎般暢銷。

劉曉波先生在電話中向余杰先生說:「你引用了一句鄧小平的話,鄧小平說,中國最大的失敗是教育,這句話引用不當,你知道鄧小平是在什麼情況下說的嗎?是在89年,他說教育的失誤是指沒有加強思想政治教育,他嫌當局對於大學生的洗腦不夠,你連背景都不清楚就在電視上亂說……。」(余杰《劉曉波傳》台北版2012,約頁261)兩本《劉曉波傳》


 .......在他家中,傅高義就這本書及個人的一些經歷接受了筆者的專訪。
問:你一開始的時候是作日本研究的?
答:研究日本是因為我在哈佛大學的博士論文是關於美國社會。當時一個教授對我說,如果你想了解美國社會應該找另 一個社會作比較研究,僅僅研究美國是不夠的。當時美國是現代化國家,所以要進行比較研究的話,應該找另一個現代化社會。日本也是現代化的社會,所以我拿了 去日本的獎學金,開始研究日本。第一年學日文,第二年研究日本家庭。
問:為什麼在1961年開始研究中國呢?
答:1960年到1961年我在耶魯大學當副教授。當時我回到哈佛大學訪問,一個老朋友問我想不想研究中國。我說我沒想過。他說我們現在想培養研究中國社會的學者,還沒有合適的人選能在哈佛教關於中國社會的課程。你已經學過社會學,有基礎,如果順利的話,你可以在這裡任教,我給你三年的博士後獎學金。我想了一天,對他說我接受這個獎學金。
問:當時你已經31歲了,開始一個新的學術領域應該是一個比較困難的選擇吧?
答:困難非常多。我當時已經有家庭了,而且語言也是個問題。當時在哈佛沒有什麼相關的課本,而且我中文也不好。看中文書比較吃力。中文對話能力也很有限,所以當時也確實吃了很多苦。
問:但是你決定接受這個offer只用了一天。
答:我的朋友叫John Pelzel,是哈佛的教授。我跟他說雖然我對亞洲也感興趣,但是我對美國社會更感興趣。但是他對我說,如果只把視野放在美國或者日本,都是不夠的,也沒有前途,要有一個亞洲的整體的視野
當時Pelzel問我要不要作中國研究的那一天,我對他說哥倫比亞大學、耶魯大學都對我發出了邀請。他們要我很快給他們答覆。一般來說要決定是否能 給我這個offer需要一個委員會開會決定,所以Pelzel當時馬上給費正清打電話,費正清又給委員會裡面的其他成員打電話。最後在一天之內決定給我這 個offer。
當時對我來說,費正清已經是中國研究的領袖級的學者了,是特別有名的大教授。而我只是一個小夥子,是他的助手。他的專業是歷史,所以他主要是使用史料,而我是研究現代社會,主要的研究方法是和人談話。我的博士論文也是對美國家庭進行訪談。
問:當時像你這樣研究中國現代社會的美國學者多嗎?
答:不多,可能也就二三十人。當時這方面的研究還不發達。
問:61年中國的三年大饑荒剛剛快結束,整個國家也沒有對外開放……

:所以我1963年去香港作研究,因為當 時香港有很多人跟中國有接觸,有很多了解中國的人。所以我在香港呆了一年。不過我們在研究方法上並不陌生。因為當時很多美國人作蘇聯研究,也沒有機會去蘇聯,只能在蘇聯周邊的地方獃著搜集資料。第二次世界大戰的時候,我們把日本當成敵人來研究。所以學者們通過研究文化和與難民談話的途徑來研究日本。所以我 在60年代研究中國的時候,在方法上是有先例的。
當時我在香港主要是想跟難民談話。我本來計劃選取四個點,兩個中國城市,兩個中國農村。但是我發現找不到這麼多人。但是當時我能看到廣東的報紙,比如南方日報,還有很多難民都是從廣東過來的。所以我想我能寫兩本書,一本是關於共產黨的組織,另一本寫廣東的歷史,從1949年一直到60年代初的南方日 報我都能看到,所以我可以寫出整個廣東的發展。
當時我在香港遇到了一個從大陸過來的小幹部,叫陳中文(音)。1965年,我把他邀請到哈佛來,當時哈佛已經買到了很多中國的報紙,比如南方日報, 廣州日報。所以我們倆每天坐在一起看報紙,一起交流這上面的新聞,討論這些事件的重要性。他對這些事件也有好奇心,我們談得非常開心。所以我用了兩三年的 工夫和他一起看報紙。有的時候我說這個就是宣傳,但是他會提醒我,這個很重要,很快就會有很嚴重的事件發生。
問:這個人是什麼背景呢?
答:他出生在香港。1948年參加中國共產黨領導下的青年團工作,1949年和很多香港的左派年輕人跑到廣東, 60年代受到政治運動的影響,回到香港,他的家在香港。所以他能告訴我很多關於中國共產黨的組織結構的知識。因為很多工作他都做過。他給我作助手兩三年, 然後在哈佛拿到碩士學位,在波士頓附近的一個規模不大的大學教書。現在在波士頓的一個老人院。他兒子的名字就是用了我的名字 Ezra。我們現在還有聯繫。
當時他給了我很大的幫助。他很聰明,判斷力很不錯。我在這個基礎上寫了"Canton Under Communism"(《共產主義下的廣州》)。
問:但是你是直到1973年才有機會到中國大陸。第一次訪問的情形怎麼樣?
答:當時有一個美國科學家代表團,都是自然科學家,只有三個社會科學家,我是其中一個。那次訪問很有意思,但是 現在看起來,感覺當時中國的教授們還是很緊張。比如在北大,周培源招待我們,他說:“我不了解現在的情況,我讓我的同志來給你們介紹。”然後過來一個軍隊的小夥子,給我們介紹文化大革命的各種口號。講了20多分鐘。周培源沒有說話。
問:你這本關於鄧小平的書一出來,我覺得給很多人一個最大的驚訝是,你採訪到的很多人,比如毛毛、朱佳木,這些人就是對中國人來說也不容易有機會採訪他們。你是怎麼作到的呢?
答:我認識毛毛是因為我參加過一個代表團,在北京的時候我見過她。這個代表團是David Lampton(蘭普頓)作美中關係全國委員會(National Committee for U.S.- China Relations)主席的時候組織的。他把毛毛邀請過來的。我們當時只是認識。後來她的女兒,羊羊,從麻省的Wellesley College(威爾斯利學院,美國最著名的私立女子大學之一 ——編者注)畢業。毛毛也來到波士頓。所以我給她寫信,說哈佛想邀請她到哈佛與研究中國的教授們吃午飯,所以她來了。
問:但是你怎麼知道她女兒在威爾斯利學院讀書?
答:當時這個不是秘密,很多人都知道。因為我已經跟她有了聯繫,所以後來我研究鄧小平的時候我給她電話,問她能不能談談她的父親,她同意了。趙紫陽的孫女在哈佛大學商學院學習,我也見過她的母親Margaret Ren。她是搞美術的,我的一個美國朋友,Freda Murck,在北京也是搞美術的,所以我問她能不能幫我介紹一下。所以在她的孩子從哈佛大學畢業的時候,她過來跟我作了一個訪談。我覺得很多中國父母都喜 歡哈佛大學,所以作為哈佛大學邀請他們,他們接受這個邀請,我不覺得奇怪。他們也想了解研究中國的美國人,我覺得這是很自然的事。這個不一定是有目的性 的。
我認識朱佳木是因為十幾年前開一個國際會議,他邀請我寫過文章,參加這個會議。所以在我作鄧小平研究之前,我已經有相關的基礎了。80年代我在廣東 作研究,一開始任仲夷不願意跟我談話,但是後來他退了以後,他答應了。再後來,他孫子在英國念書的時候,給我寫信,說希望到這裡來,我就把他邀請過來作我 的助手。後來他在哈佛大學肯尼迪學院拿到了碩士學位。《炎黃春秋》裏的很多人都是他祖父的朋友,所以他幫我在北京和這些人聯繫很多。
問:好像其他美國學者並沒有你這麼好的人脈?
答:我的機會可能多一點兒。我本來也不是為了什麼特別的目標,我也是想交朋友。但是即便如此,為了鄧小平這本 書,談了這麼多人,也是很不容易的。我主要是想了解鄧小平的時代,所以我在訪談之前都會做很多的準備,找出他們的文章來看,了解他們的背景,搞清楚什麼問 題他們能回答。我不要求了解什麼秘密,所以這也會比較好。
問:鄧小平這本書應該是你花的時間最多的一本書了?
答:是的。寫"Japan as Number One"(《日本:世界第一》)的時候我還 在教書,一邊教書一邊寫,大概花了幾年時間。但是鄧小平這本書我是全面投入,因為我那個時候已經退休了。十年時間裡基本上每天都是要麼看材料,要麼思考, 要麼寫作。一開始我寫這本書的綱要,花了大概兩年到三年的時間。在這個過程中,我發現另外一個特別重要的人是陳雲。所以我也花了一年的工夫去了解陳雲。他 生在上海青浦,我去青浦的博物館,跟博物館的人談話。後來他在延安、以及解放之後的情況,我都去了解了。但是可能作了太多的工作,我寫了一篇關於陳雲的文 章,大概有一百多頁。在這本書里精簡了很多。我對陳雲的看法也跟別人不一樣。我覺得我看陳雲比別人深。很多人簡單的指責他是計劃經濟、“鳥籠經濟”。但我 覺得他是小心謹慎,他永遠考慮錢從哪裡來,這是最重要的。
問:會不會因為你付出了太多,對一個人物有了感情,然後影響你的判斷?
答:我覺得應該是客觀的分析。應該搞清楚他為什麼這麼想,同時客觀分析他的作用和對社會的影響。比如說康生,很多人非常恨他,很多人說他是除了江青之外最壞的人。但是何方在延安的時候和康生合作,他說康生是一個文人,思想也很開放,但是內心非常軟弱,非常害怕很多事情。所以毛澤東利用這一點,讓他作了很多壞事。他的內心也應該是非常複雜的。
問:這本關於鄧小平的書出版之後,你在這本書中對鄧以及中國政府的一些態度也遭到了批評,你如何看待這些批評?
答:對於那些在六四的時候在北京的記者或者其他人來說,他們對鄧有着非常負面的感受,而且他們認為任何試圖了解鄧為什麼做出那些決定的人都對鄧太過同情了。我想這是非常自然的。很明顯,一些批評者並沒有非常仔細的讀我的這本書。Andrew Nathan(黎安友,美國漢學家,哥倫比亞大學政治系教授、東亞研究所主任——編者注)一直致力於推動中國的人權,他在認真讀過這本書後說關於六四那一部分是非常客觀的。很多中國的知識分子認為鄧應該在民主方面更有作為,也認為我應該更有批評性。但是那些認真看過我的書的人說,我對鄧的想法和行為有着清晰的了解,並且用非常中立的態度去講述這些。我確實並沒有對鄧的行為作出道德判斷,因為我試圖去了解他想了什麼,做了什麼,有什麼影響,以及其他在中國的 人如何看待他。
問:為什麼你在鄧小平這本書裏只用了30頁去概括鄧小平前65年?
答:因為這本書當時已經很長了。我寫他的出生到69年,當時已經寫了一兩百頁,但是哈佛大學出版社的人對我說, 這本書太長了。所以我也考慮,這本書的主題是鄧小平傳還是鄧小平如何改變中國?我覺得後者更有意思。這個對全世界的意義更大。雖然我一開始想寫鄧小平傳, 但是太長了。所以前面那部分我精簡了很多。我的目標是找出最能幫助我們了解鄧小平的內容。有人建議我寫一本小書專門講鄧小平從1904 年到1969年。但是我覺得我可能不會再寫了。
問:但是你覺得你這本書的讀者應該是什麼人呢?我感覺這本書並不是一本很純粹的學術著作。
答:我不是寫給專家的。我希望那些想了解中國的人能看懂這本書,他們不一定是專家,但是對中國感興趣。所以我花 了很多功夫在書里介紹很多內容。當然我不要得罪專家,不能讓他們覺得太過簡單。 所以為了實現這個平衡,我也改了很多次。我在美國中西部的小鎮長大,我的很多朋友後來在大學讀書。我就一直考慮他們是否能夠讀懂這本書。出版之後,我送了 一些書給這些高中同學。他們能看懂,但是他們對我說為什麼這麼長,兩百頁就夠了。所以我其實在寫作的時候一直在考慮他們能不能理解這本書。
問:鄧小平這本書更多的是關於精英政治,而你以前的書大多是從社會學角度探討社會發展。這會不會是一個比較大的轉型?
答:《共產主義下的廣州》("Canton under Communism")也是關於精 英政治的。我在哈佛讀博士的時候,我的一個教授叫Talcott Parsons,估計他是當時全世界最有名的社會學家之一。他覺得研究一個社會,要全面的研究經濟、政治、社會、思想。他在哈佛教一門課講美國社會,這個 課就會講政治、經濟、家庭,很全面。我後來教書,也用這樣的一個思路。在寫鄧小平這本書的時候,我也試圖把一個全面的視角融入進來。問:在這本書的前言, 你說你希望通過研究鄧小平,知道中國的發展軌跡。那麼現在你覺得鄧是如何影響中國的發展軌跡的呢?
答:我覺得最重要的影響是正規化,因為在78年的時候中國太亂了。為了中國的發展,他覺得需要一個強有力的組織,把人們組織起來。
問:但是你覺得今天鄧小平的影響還很重要嗎?
答:還很重要。特別是腐敗問題,如果鄧小平還活着,他可能會採取更為強有力的措施。中國還會繼續沿着鄧小平設定的道路走下去,比如經濟發展,選拔能幹的人,還有在對外關係上繼續韜光養晦。我覺得這條路中國會繼續走下去。
問:但是現在很多新的東西和觀點都出來了。比如重慶模式、中國崛起什麼都不是鄧的東西。
答:我覺得雖然重慶用了毛澤東的口號,但是當時薄熙來在重慶仍然是以經濟發展為主,這還是鄧的遺產。這個不是鄧 一個人的,周恩來也提到了,但是能做到的是鄧。雖然韜光養晦一些中國人提出不同的看法,特別是在中國的實力增強之後。但是我覺得對中國領導人來說,這仍然 是他們的選項。
問:最後一個問題,你是否考慮在中國大陸出簡體版?如果是,你是否需要做一些內容上的刪節和妥協?
答:我希望我的書能夠在中國大陸出版,但有關的協商談判還在進行中。做調整和改動是合理的。當然,我是一個外國人,但是我在過去的十年裡做了非常認真嚴肅的努力來理解鄧是如何推行改革開放政策,如何改變中國的。我希望大陸版本能充分展現我這種客觀描述的努力。
(訪問者歐陽斌畢業於哈佛大學東亞系碩士項目,現為專欄作者。紐約時報中文網)




China's President Lashes Out at Western Culture
New York Times
BEIJING — President Hu Jintao has said China must strengthen its cultural production to defend against the West's assault on the country's culture and ideology, according to an essay in a Communist Party policy magazine published this week. ...
與西方價值為敵 可以天下第一嗎
***
從日本第一到中國第一的旁觀
1980年代初 傅高義的Japan as number one 登場 轟動一時
廣東經濟革命時  中國的資本主義化已"勢之所趨"  它的總代價可能只能說七三分嗎
然而 真正的國家實力是什麼呢

  1. Amazon.com: Japan As Number One: Lessons for America ...

    www.amazon.com › ... › Economics - 頁庫存檔 - 翻譯這個網頁
    Ezra F. Vogel is Henry Ford II Research Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus at Harvard University. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition ...
  2. Japan as number one: Land of the setting sun | The Economist

    www.economist.com/node/14861545 - 頁庫存檔 - 翻譯這個網頁
    Japan as number one. Land of the setting sun. Japan's economy was on course to surpass America's. What happened? Nov 12th 2009 | tokyo | from the print ...
  3. Ezra Vogel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ezra_Vogel - 頁庫存檔 - 翻譯這個網頁
    The Japanese edition of his book Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (
1979) is the all-time best-seller in Japan of non-fiction by a Western author. ...

Economics focus

How to get a date

The year when the Chinese economy will truly eclipse America’s is in sight

IN THE spring of 2011 the Pew Global Attitudes Survey asked thousands of people worldwide which country they thought was the leading economic power. Half of the Chinese polled reckoned that America remains number one, twice as many as said “China”. Americans are no longer sure: 43% of US respondents answered “China”; only 38% thought America was still the top dog. The answer depends on which measure you pick. An analysis of 21 different indicators chosen by The Economist (see the full set) finds that China has already overtaken America on over half of them and will be top on virtually all of them within a decade.
Economic power is best gauged by looking at absolute size rather than per-person measures. On a few indicators, such as steel consumption, ownership of mobile phones and beer-guzzling (a crucial test of economic superiority), the milestone was reached as long as a decade ago. Several more have been passed since. In 2011 China exported about 30% more than the United States and spent some 40% more on fixed capital investment. China is the world’s biggest manufacturer, and partly as a result it burns around 10% more energy and emits almost 40% more greenhouse gases than America (although its emissions per person are only one-third as big). The Chinese also buy more new cars each year than anybody else.
The chart shows our predictions for when China will overtake America on several other measures. Official figures show that China’s consumer spending is currently only one-fifth of that in America (although that may be understated because of China’s poor statistical coverage of services). Based on relative growth rates over the past five years it will remain smaller until 2023. Retail sales are catching up much faster, and could exceed America’s by 2014. In that same year China also looks set to become the world’s biggest importer—a huge turnaround from 2000, when America’s imports were six times those of China.
 Find even more indicators and adjust the figures to make your own predictions using our interactive chart
What about GDP, the most widely used measure of economic power? The IMF predicts that China’s GDP will surpass America’s in 2016 if measured on a purchasing-power parity (PPP) basis, which adjusts for the fact that prices are lower in poorer countries. But America will only really be eclipsed when China’s GDP outstrips it in dollar terms, converted at market-exchange rates.
In 2011 America’s GDP was roughly twice as big as China’s, down from eight times bigger in 2000. To predict how quickly that gap might be closed, The Economist has updated its interactive online chart (also here) which allows you to plug in your own assumptions about real GDP growth in China and America, inflation rates and the yuan’s exchange rate against the dollar. Our best guess is that annual real GDP growth over the next decade averages 7.75% in China (down from 10.5% over the past decade) and 2.5% in America; that inflation (as measured by the GDP deflator) averages 4% and 1.5% respectively; and that the yuan appreciates by 3% a year. If so, then China will overtake America in 2018. That is a year earlier than our prediction in December 2010 because China’s GDP in dollar terms increased by more than expected in 2011.
Second place is for winners
Even if China became the world’s biggest economy by 2018, Americans would remain much richer, with a GDP per head four times that in China. But Rupert Hoogewerf, the founder of the annual Hurun Report on China’s richest citizens, reckons that it may already have more billionaires. His latest survey identified 270 dollar billionaires but the true total, he says, is probably double that because many Chinese are secretive about their wealth. According to the Forbes rich list, America has 400 billionaires or so.
America still tops a few league tables by a wide margin. Its stockmarket capitalisation is four times bigger than China’s and it has more than twice as many firms in the Fortune global 500, which lists the world’s biggest companies by revenue. Last but not least, America spends five times as much on defence as China does, and even though China’s defence budget is expanding faster, on recent growth rates America will remain top gun until 2025.
Being the biggest economy in the world does offer advantages. It helps to ensure military superiority and gives a country more say in fixing international rules. Historically, the biggest economy has become the issuer of the main reserve currency, which is why America has also been able to borrow more cheaply than it otherwise would. But it would be a mistake for American leaders to try to block China’s rise. China’s rapid growth benefits the whole global economy. It is better to be number two in a fast-growing world than top dog in a stagnant one.


***2012年02月08日 07:57 AM
 彭定康評《鄧小平傳》Deng and the Transformation of China作者:前香港總督彭定康為英國《金融時報》撰稿
When Chinese historians are able one day to ply their subversive trade without control or censorship, their judgment will surely be that their country should revere Deng Xiaoping way above his predecessor ​​Mao Zedong. Mao led the Communist party to victory over the Kuomintang and the Japanese, and united China in the 1950s. He then plunged his country into the famine and bloody mayhem of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Deng carefully put the pieces of the smashed nation back together again and launched China on its recovery to become assuredly once again the world's largest economy.
如果中國的歷史學者在從事他們具有顛覆性的職業時,能有朝一日不受控制和審查, 他們一定會有這樣的評價:中國人對於鄧小平的崇敬,應遠遠超過毛澤東。毛澤東曾領導中國共產黨打敗日軍和國民黨,並在20世紀50年代統一中國,但他隨後又使國家陷入了大躍進造成的飢荒和文化大革命的混亂。而鄧小平則小心翼翼地重整破碎的山河,使中國充滿信心, 推向了再度成為世界最大經濟體的複興之路。Ezra Vogel's massive biography assembles the case for Deng (1904-97) with narrative skill and prodigious scholarship. Vogel, for many years a Harvard professor, published the bestselling Japan as Number One in 1979. His principal academic interest then turned to China and he spent some time in the late 1980s studying economic reform in Guangdong. The sources and acknowledgements he cites in this book indicate the breadth of his contacts and study, though when required to stray outside the world of conventional western Sinology he is less sure-footed. His knowledge of British and Hong Kong politics, for example, is pretty sketchy.
傅高義(Ezra Vogel)這部厚重的傳記, 寫得很有敘事技巧, 富有高超學術水準,闡明了應當對鄧小平更崇敬(1904年-1997年)的理由。傅高義在哈佛大學任教多年,曾在1979年出版暢銷書《日本第一》 (Japan as Number One),之後他的主要研究興趣轉向中國,並在20世紀80年代花時間研究廣東的經濟改革。書中引述的資料來源和鳴謝對象,都顯示出他交友廣泛、學識淵博。儘管在超出西方漢學的常規領域時,其論述或可商榷。例如,他對英國和香港政治的了解就頗為欠缺。The book is not hagiographical but it does occasionally read a little like the Deng family's authorised biography. Warts are mentioned from time to time but the overall picture presented usually discounts the blemishes. While we learn once again that Deng's time as a young emigrant worker in France in the 1920s left him with a lifetime love of croissants, his later military exploits in the civil war are dealt with pretty summarily. Moreover, Deng's rule in the south-west of China, including his native Sichuan from 1949-52, gets just a page and a half. It was sufficiently brutal to earn Mao's approval. Larger landlords were attacked and killed. One day we will presumably learn more about Deng's methods at this time; they were plainly not for the squeamish.
本書並非充滿溢美之詞,但某些段落讀來確有幾分像是鄧家授權的傳記。書中或會提及鄧的缺點,但給出的總體評價中,展示其瑕疵時卻是手下留情。雖然我們再次得知,20世紀20年代鄧小平少年時在法國務工的經歷,使他終生都愛吃法式羊角麵包,然而對於他後來在內戰中的軍事成就,描述卻十分簡明扼要。更有甚者,對鄧小平1949年至1952年間在中國西南部(包括他的故鄉四川省)的治理,僅一頁半的篇幅輕輕帶過。而鄧小平那段時間的作為足稱殘暴,並贏得毛澤東的賞識,大地主遭攻擊和殺害。有一天我們一定能對鄧小平當時採取的手段了解更多,那絕對不是神經脆弱者能夠承受的。Deng's role as Mao's enforcer during the “anti-rightist campaign” of the 1950s is hardly mentioned. Half a million intellectuals were shipped to labour camps. His careful avoidance of personal trouble during the disastrous Great Leap Forward of 1958-61, which led to 45m or more deaths (he broke a leg playing billiards and used a sick note as an excuse for missing difficult me​​etings) was not heroic. Almost 10m of his fellow Sichuanese starved to death.
在20世紀50年代的“反右運動”中,該書對鄧小平充當毛澤東執行者的歷史幾乎沒有談及。那段時間有近50萬名知識分子被送去勞改。 1958至1961年的大躍進造成了災難性後果,導致4500萬甚至更多人死亡(他在打台球時弄傷了腿,用病假做藉口缺席那些麻煩的會議),鄧小平在這個時期小心翼翼避免個人麻煩的做法稱不上英雄所為。當時幾乎有1000萬四川人餓死。But it is Deng's muddled view of the relationship between economic progress and political freedom that will always attract the most criticism. In his policy battles with the economic hardliner Chen Yun in the 1980s, he was always in the camp that contested the argument that if the party gave up control over the economy it would sooner or later lose control of the state. For Deng and his circle, stepping back from command economics was essential for growth and job creation, and without them the Communist party would certainly lose control of the state . Both propositions are probably true and China's main existential challenge remains the issue of resolving this dilemma.
不過, 鄧小平招致最多批評的,還是他對經濟發展和政治自由兩者關係的糊塗看法。在20世紀80年代,與經濟強硬派陳雲的政策紛爭中,他一直反對如果黨放棄經濟控制權,遲早會失去國家控制權的觀點。對於鄧小平和他圈子裡的人,放鬆經濟控制權對促進經濟增長和創造就業至關重要,而如果不能實現經濟增長並解決就業,共產黨肯定會失去對國家的控制。這兩種說法可能都是成立的,中國主要的生存挑戰至今仍然是如何解決這個兩難局面。The problem was bloodily resolved in 1989 in and around Tiananmen Square, “a tragedy of enormous proportions”, in Vogel's words. It is, maybe, unfair but inevitable that Deng's life will be viewed by many through the prism of this catastrophe. Those of us who were in Beijing just before the crackdown should not have been carried away by the epic romance of what was happening in the streets. We should have listened more carefully to the seasoned hacks who told us it would all end in tears and that Deng's whole career showed that he would never accept such a challenge to the authority of the Communist party.
這個問題曾在1989年,在天安門廣場周圍,以血腥的方式得到了解決。用傅高義的話說,那是“一場異常巨大的悲劇”。許多人看待鄧小平生平時,都是通過這起災禍的棱鏡,這或許不公平,但不可避免。我們當中,在鎮壓前剛好身處北京的那些人,不可能不對北京街頭髮生的史詩般的浪漫運動嘆為觀止。一些熟稔政局者,曾經對我們說過,這一切都會以眼淚告終,鄧小平的畢生經歷都顯示出,他永遠不會接受共產黨的權威受到挑戰。我們本應更關切地傾聽他們的意見。One unnamed provincial first party secretary is quoted, by Vogel, as saying that Deng's view of democracy was like Lord Ye's view of dragons. “Lord Ye loved looking at a book with pretty pictures of dragons but when a rea​​l dragon appeared, he was terrified .” This well-known story about a mythical figure from China's distant past is customarily told to draw attention to the inconsistency between words and actions.
傅高義在書中寫道,一位不願透露姓名的省委書記說,鄧小平看待民主,就像葉公好龍——葉公子高好龍,於是夫龍聞而下之。葉公見之,棄而還走,失其魂魄,五色無主。 “葉公好龍”這則廣為人知的故事,習慣上用來比喻言行不一。Vogel chronicles very well Deng's role in stabilising China after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), in which he and his family had themselves suffered, literally getting the trains running again, making people work together without reprisals, and re-establishing schools and universities. His initial success in preventing China capsizing led to his second ousting by Mao in 1976. The paranoid Mao was suspicious that the younger man would not support unequivocally the case for the Cultural Revolution, was jealous of his growing popularity and feared that he might, on Mao's own death, become the Khrushchev to his Stalin, denouncing the departed tyrant.
傅高義對經歷文化大革命(1966年-1976年)混亂之後鄧小平穩定中國的角色闡述得當,鄧小平和他家人在文革中也承受了苦難。實際上是鄧小平讓火車又開動起來,讓人們沒有互相報復就重新開始工作,還恢復大中小學教育。他開始成功地讓中國免於傾覆,而這個成功又令他在1976年第二次被毛澤東打倒。偏執多疑的毛澤東懷疑比他年輕的鄧小平並不會堅定地擁護文化大革命,嫉妒鄧越來越強的聲望,恐懼鄧會在毛本人去世後像赫魯曉夫對待斯大林那樣,譴責已故的獨裁者。When Hua Guofeng succeeded Mao later that year, he was soon persuaded to reinstate Deng, China's best pragmatic manager. But Hua, who had shown great resolve in arresting Mao's widow and the other members of the Gang of Four, proved no match politically for his wily rival. Deng's sidelining and despatch of Hua is a masterclass in ruthless, though not vindictive, politics. Hua was stripped of authority, humiliated but not imprisoned.
華國鋒在1976年晚些時候繼承毛澤東的權力後,很快就被人說服重新啟用鄧小平這個中國最好的務實派。儘管華國鋒逮捕了毛澤東的遺孀和“四人幫”的另外三個成員,表現出極大的決斷力,但他在政治上卻無法與精明的對手相抗衡。鄧小平排擠和打發了華國鋒,顯示出大師級的冷酷政治手腕。華國鋒被剝奪了權力,遭到羞辱,不過並沒有入獄。Intellectually, it was Deng's bold pragmatism, learning truth from facts, that triumphed over what was ridiculed as the “whateveritis” of Hua – whatever Mao had said or done must be the correct way to act. This approach led to the opening of China to the world, the reform of agriculture and industrial management and the years of stupendous growth. In 1978, the year that really saw the beginnings of change, China exported about as much in 12 months as it now exports in a day.
就思想而言,鄧小平果敢的務實主義,“實踐檢驗真理”,戰勝了華國鋒被戲稱為“兩個凡是”的理論——凡是毛澤東說過的和做過的,就一定是正確的。這條路線使中國向世界開放,引發了農業和工業管理的改革,促成了許多年令人驚嘆的經濟增長。今天, 中國一天的出口額,幾乎相當於改革真正開始的1978年12個月的出口總額。The first experiments were in Fujian and Guangdong, where the father of the man tipped to be China's next leader, Xi Jinping, was provinicial party secretary. Vogel has written before about the economic adjustments and rural reforms in China under Deng, starting with the creation of a Special Economic Zone around the hitherto sleepy fishing village of Shenzhen, just across the border from Hong Kong. Foreign investment was welcomed and foreign technology was brought in, copied and, of course, stolen. The commands of a controlled economy were partly replaced by markets and profits. Vogel tells this story authoritatively, culminating in Deng's journey to the south in 1992 to give heart to the reformers and embolden his successor, Jiang Zemin.
鄧最初的實驗是在福建和廣東進行的,很有可能成為中國下一屆領導人的習近平的父親,曾在廣東擔任省委書記。傅高義以前就曾撰文講述過鄧小平時代中國的經濟調整和農村改革,其開端就是在與香港一河之隔,以前一直沉睡的漁村深圳周圍,建設一個經濟特區。那裡歡迎外資,吸引並模仿境外技術,當然也有盜版。對經濟的指令式控制,在那裡部分為市場和利潤追求所取代。傅高義對這段故事的描寫十分權威,高潮是1992年鄧小平的南巡,讓改革者吃了定心丸,也給他的繼任者江澤民極大的鼓勵。Deng was never an ideologue and, as Vogel argues, it would be unfair to criticise him for failure to set out an overarching philosophy for what he was doing. Sometimes economic activity simply took off once central control was relaxed. Deng himself celebrated the spontaneous emergence of township and village enterprises.
鄧小平從來都不是一個意識形態理論家,正如傅高義所說,批評他未能對自己所做的事業提出一個概括性的哲學理論是不公平的。有時候,只要集中控制一放鬆,經濟活動就會很容易發展起來。鄧小平本人就曾稱讚過鄉鎮企業的自發湧現。How should we describe what has happened? It does not seem to have much to do with socialism, given for example that in the decade of fast growth after 1997, workers' wages as a proportion of gross domestic product fell from 53 per cent to 40 per cent. Whatever the correct economic nomenclature, authoritarian party control was never abandoned. Perhaps it is best described as “market Leninism”.
我們應當怎樣描述發生的這些事件?它們似乎與社會主義並沒有太大關係,例如,在1997年後中國經濟的十年高速增長中,工人工資佔國內生產總值(GDP)的比例從53%下降到40%。無論在經濟學上該如何正確地命名,威權主義的一黨專制從未遭到摒棄。或許最恰當的描述應該是“市場列寧主義”。Describing Deng's art of governing, Vogel sets out a list of the principles that underpinned his rule. Several would have been embraced by other leaders, including his rut​​hless sacrifice of pawns to preserve the position of the king and his throne. First, he cut down the political reformer and party general secretary Hu Yaobang in 1987 for being too soft in dealing with student protests; then he destroyed Zhao Ziyang during the Tiananmen demonstration in 1989. Deng believed above all in preserving his own authority and that of the party. Whether that was essential to transform China will remain the subject of increasingly open debate. Whatever the answer, Vogel makes a strong case for according Deng the prize for lifting more people out of poverty than anyone else in history.
闡述鄧小平的治國藝術時,傅高義列出了支撐鄧的統治的一系列原則。其中有若干條別的政治領袖也會採納,包括為了保護王者的地位和自己的權柄無情地捨棄下屬。鄧小平先是因為黨的總書記胡耀邦對待學生示威過於溫和,而在1987年罷免了這位政治改革者,後來又在1989年天安門抗議事件中解決了趙紫陽。鄧小平的首要信條是保護自己的權威和黨的權威。至於這對於中國的轉變是不是至關重要,仍然會是辯論的主題,而辯論也會越來越開放。無論答案如何,傅高義有力地闡述了這樣一個觀點:因鄧小平而得以脫離貧困的人數,比歷史上任何人都要多,為此他應該得到嘉許。Lord Patten, chairman of the BBC Trust and chancellor of the University of Oxford, was the last governor of Hong Kong
作者彭定康勳爵(Lord Patten)是BBC委員會主席,牛津大學(University of Oxford)校監,香港最後一任總督。
譯者/何黎


彭定康评《邓小平传》
Deng and the Transformation of China




When Chinese historians are able one day to ply their subversive trade without control or censorship, their judgment will surely be that their country should revere Deng Xiaoping way above his predecessor Mao Zedong. Mao led the Communist party to victory over the Kuomintang and the Japanese, and united China in the 1950s. He then plunged his country into the famine and bloody mayhem of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Deng carefully put the pieces of the smashed nation back together again and launched China on its recovery to become assuredly once again the world’s largest economy.如果中国的历史学者在从事他们具有颠覆性的职业时,能有朝一日不受控制和审查, 他们一定会有这样的评价:中国人对于邓小平的崇敬,应远远超过毛泽东。毛泽东曾领导中国共产党打败日军和国民党,并在20世纪50年代统一中国,但他随后 又使国家陷入了大跃进造成的饥荒和文化大革命的混乱。而邓小平则小心翼翼地重整破碎的山河,使中国充满信心, 推向了再度成为世界最大经济体的复兴之路。
Ezra Vogel’s massive biography assembles the case for Deng (1904-97) with narrative skill and prodigious scholarship. Vogel, for many years a Harvard professor, published the bestselling Japan as Number One in 1979. His principal academic interest then turned to China and he spent some time in the late 1980s studying economic reform in Guangdong. The sources and acknowledgements he cites in this book indicate the breadth of his contacts and study, though when required to stray outside the world of conventional western Sinology he is less sure-footed. His knowledge of British and Hong Kong politics, for example, is pretty sketchy.傅高义(Ezra Vogel)这部厚重的传记, 写得很有叙事技巧, 富有高超学术水准,阐明了应当对邓小平更崇敬(1904年-1997年)的理由。傅高义在哈佛大学任教多年,曾在1979年出版畅销书《日本第一》 (Japan as Number One),之后他的主要研究兴趣转向中国,并在20世纪80年代花时间研究广东的经济改革。书中引述的资料来源和鸣谢对象,都显示出他交友广泛、学识渊 博。尽管在超出西方汉学的常规领域时,其论述或可商榷。例如,他对英国和香港政治的了解就颇为欠缺。
The book is not hagiographical but it does occasionally read a little like the Deng family’s authorised biography. Warts are mentioned from time to time but the overall picture presented usually discounts the blemishes. While we learn once again that Deng’s time as a young emigrant worker in France in the 1920s left him with a lifetime love of croissants, his later military exploits in the civil war are dealt with pretty summarily. Moreover, Deng’s rule in the south-west of China, including his native Sichuan from 1949-52, gets just a page and a half. It was sufficiently brutal to earn Mao’s approval. Larger landlords were attacked and killed. One day we will presumably learn more about Deng’s methods at this time; they were plainly not for the squeamish.本书并非充满溢美之词,但某些段落读来确有几分像是邓家授权的传记。书中或会提及邓的缺点,但 给出的总体评价中,展示其瑕疵时却是手下留情。虽然我们再次得知,20世纪20年代邓小平少年时在法国务工的经历,使他终生都爱吃法式羊角面包,然而对于 他后来在内战中的军事成就,描述却十分简明扼要。更有甚者,对邓小平1949年至1952年间在中国西南部(包括他的故乡四川省)的治理,仅一页半的篇幅 轻轻带过。而邓小平那段时间的作为足称残暴,并赢得毛泽东的赏识,大地主遭攻击和杀害。有一天我们一定能对邓小平当时采取的手段了解更多,那绝对不是神经 脆弱者能够承受的。
Deng’s role as Mao’s enforcer during the “anti-rightist campaign” of the 1950s is hardly mentioned. Half a million intellectuals were shipped to labour camps. His careful avoidance of personal trouble during the disastrous Great Leap Forward of 1958-61, which led to 45m or more deaths (he broke a leg playing billiards and used a sick note as an excuse for missing difficult meetings) was not heroic. Almost 10m of his fellow Sichuanese starved to death.在20世纪50年代的“反右运动”中,该书对邓小平充当毛泽东执行者的历史几乎没有谈及。那段 时间有近50万名知识分子被送去劳改。1958至1961年的大跃进造成了灾难性后果,导致4500万甚至更多人死亡(他在打台球时弄伤了腿,用病假做借 口缺席那些麻烦的会议),邓小平在这个时期小心翼翼避免个人麻烦的做法称不上英雄所为。当时几乎有1000万四川人饿死
But it is Deng’s muddled view of the relationship between economic progress and political freedom that will always attract the most criticism. In his policy battles with the economic hardliner Chen Yun in the 1980s, he was always in the camp that contested the argument that if the party gave up control over the economy it would sooner or later lose control of the state. For Deng and his circle, stepping back from command economics was essential for growth and job creation, and without them the Communist party would certainly lose control of the state. Both propositions are probably true and China’s main existential challenge remains the issue of resolving this dilemma.不过, 邓小平招致最多批评的,还是他对经济发展和政治自由两者关系的糊涂看法。在20世纪80年代,与经济强硬派陈云的政策纷争中,他一直反对如果党放弃经济控 制权,迟早会失去国家控制权的观点。对于邓小平和他圈子里的人,放松经济控制权对促进经济增长和创造就业至关重要,而如果不能实现经济增长并解决就业,共 产党肯定会失去对国家的控制。这两种说法可能都是成立的,中国主要的生存挑战至今仍然是如何解决这个两难局面。
The problem was bloodily resolved in 1989 in and around Tiananmen Square, “a tragedy of enormous proportions”, in Vogel’s words. It is, maybe, unfair but inevitable that Deng’s life will be viewed by many through the prism of this catastrophe. Those of us who were in Beijing just before the crackdown should not have been carried away by the epic romance of what was happening in the streets. We should have listened more carefully to the seasoned hacks who told us it would all end in tears and that Deng’s whole career showed that he would never accept such a challenge to the authority of the Communist party.这个问题曾在1989年,在天安门广场周围,以血腥的方式得到了解决。用傅高义的话说,那是 “一场异常巨大的悲剧”。许多人看待邓小平生平时,都是通过这起灾祸的棱镜,这或许不公平,但不可避免。我们当中,在镇压前刚好身处北京的那些人,不可能 不对北京街头发生的史诗般的浪漫运动叹为观止。一些熟稔政局者,曾经对我们说过,这一切都会以眼泪告终,邓小平的毕生经历都显示出,他永远不会接受共产党 的权威受到挑战。我们本应更关切地倾听他们的意见。
One unnamed provincial first party secretary is quoted, by Vogel, as saying that Deng’s view of democracy was like Lord Ye’s view of dragons. “Lord Ye loved looking at a book with pretty pictures of dragons but when a real dragon appeared, he was terrified.” This well-known story about a mythical figure from China’s distant past is customarily told to draw attention to the inconsistency between words and actions.傅高义在书中写道,一位不愿透露姓名的省委书记说,邓小平看待民主,就像叶公好龙——叶公子高好龙,于是夫龙闻而下之。叶公见之,弃而还走,失其魂魄,五色无主。“叶公好龙”这则广为人知的故事,习惯上用来比喻言行不一。
Vogel chronicles very well Deng’s role in stabilising China after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), in which he and his family had themselves suffered, literally getting the trains running again, making people work together without reprisals, and re-establishing schools and universities. His initial success in preventing China capsizing led to his second ousting by Mao in 1976. The paranoid Mao was suspicious that the younger man would not support unequivocally the case for the Cultural Revolution, was jealous of his growing popularity and feared that he might, on Mao’s own death, become the Khrushchev to his Stalin, denouncing the departed tyrant.傅高义对经历文化大革命(1966年-1976年)混乱之后邓小平稳定中国的角色阐述得当,邓 小平和他家人在文革中也承受了苦难。实际上是邓小平让火车又开动起来,让人们没有互相报复就重新开始工作,还恢复大中小学教育。他开始成功地让中国免于倾 覆,而这个成功又令他在1976年第二次被毛泽东打倒。偏执多疑的毛泽东怀疑比他年轻的邓小平并不会坚定地拥护文化大革命,嫉妒邓越来越强的声望,恐惧邓 会在毛本人去世后像赫鲁晓夫对待斯大林那样,谴责已故的独裁者。
When Hua Guofeng succeeded Mao later that year, he was soon persuaded to reinstate Deng, China’s best pragmatic manager. But Hua, who had shown great resolve in arresting Mao’s widow and the other members of the Gang of Four, proved no match politically for his wily rival. Deng’s sidelining and despatch of Hua is a masterclass in ruthless, though not vindictive, politics. Hua was stripped of authority, humiliated but not imprisoned.华国锋在1976年晚些时候继承毛泽东的权力后,很快就被人说服重新启用邓小平这个中国最好的 务实派。尽管华国锋逮捕了毛泽东的遗孀和“四人帮”的另外三个成员,表现出极大的决断力,但他在政治上却无法与精明的对手相抗衡。邓小平排挤和打发了华国 锋,显示出大师级的冷酷政治手腕。华国锋被剥夺了权力,遭到羞辱,不过并没有入狱。
Intellectually, it was Deng’s bold pragmatism, learning truth from facts, that triumphed over what was ridiculed as the “whateveritis” of Hua – whatever Mao had said or done must be the correct way to act. This approach led to the opening of China to the world, the reform of agriculture and industrial management and the years of stupendous growth. In 1978, the year that really saw the beginnings of change, China exported about as much in 12 months as it now exports in a day.就思想而言,邓小平果敢的务实主义,“实践检验真理”,战胜了华国锋被戏称为“两个凡是”的理 论——凡是毛泽东说过的和做过的,就一定是正确的。这条路线使中国向世界开放,引发了农业和工业管理的改革,促成了许多年令人惊叹的经济增长。今天, 中国一天的出口额,几乎相当于改革真正开始的1978年12个月的出口总额。
The first experiments were in Fujian and Guangdong, where the father of the man tipped to be China’s next leader, Xi Jinping, was provinicial party secretary. Vogel has written before about the economic adjustments and rural reforms in China under Deng, starting with the creation of a Special Economic Zone around the hitherto sleepy fishing village of Shenzhen, just across the border from Hong Kong. Foreign investment was welcomed and foreign technology was brought in, copied and, of course, stolen. The commands of a controlled economy were partly replaced by markets and profits. Vogel tells this story authoritatively, culminating in Deng’s journey to the south in 1992 to give heart to the reformers and embolden his successor, Jiang Zemin.邓最初的实验是在福建和广东进行的,很有可能成为中国下一届领导人的习近平的父亲,曾在广东担 任省委书记。傅高义以前就曾撰文讲述过邓小平时代中国的经济调整和农村改革,其开端就是在与香港一河之隔,以前一直沉睡的渔村深圳周围,建设一个经济特 区。那里欢迎外资,吸引并模仿境外技术,当然也有盗版。对经济的指令式控制,在那里部分为市场和利润追求所取代。傅高义对这段故事的描写十分权威,高潮是 1992年邓小平的南巡,让改革者吃了定心丸,也给他的继任者江泽民极大的鼓励。
Deng was never an ideologue and, as Vogel argues, it would be unfair to criticise him for failure to set out an overarching philosophy for what he was doing. Sometimes economic activity simply took off once central control was relaxed. Deng himself celebrated the spontaneous emergence of township and village enterprises.邓小平从来都不是一个意识形态理论家,正如傅高义所说,批评他未能对自己所做的事业提出一个概括性的哲学理论是不公平的。有时候,只要集中控制一放松,经济活动就会很容易发展起来。邓小平本人就曾称赞过乡镇企业的自发涌现。
How should we describe what has happened? It does not seem to have much to do with socialism, given for example that in the decade of fast growth after 1997, workers’ wages as a proportion of gross domestic product fell from 53 per cent to 40 per cent. Whatever the correct economic nomenclature, authoritarian party control was never abandoned. Perhaps it is best described as “market Leninism”.我们应当怎样描述发生的这些事件?它们似乎与社会主义并没有太大关系,例如,在1997年后中 国经济的十年高速增长中,工人工资占国内生产总值(GDP)的比例从53%下降到40%。无论在经济学上该如何正确地命名,威权主义的一党专制从未遭到摒 弃。或许最恰当的描述应该是“市场列宁主义”。
Describing Deng’s art of governing, Vogel sets out a list of the principles that underpinned his rule. Several would have been embraced by other leaders, including his ruthless sacrifice of pawns to preserve the position of the king and his throne. First, he cut down the political reformer and party general secretary Hu Yaobang in 1987 for being too soft in dealing with student protests; then he destroyed Zhao Ziyang during the Tiananmen demonstration in 1989. Deng believed above all in preserving his own authority and that of the party. Whether that was essential to transform China will remain the subject of increasingly open debate. Whatever the answer, Vogel makes a strong case for according Deng the prize for lifting more people out of poverty than anyone else in history.阐述邓小平的治国艺术时,傅高义列出了支撑邓的统治的一系列原则。其中有若干条别的政治领袖也 会采纳,包括为了保护王者的地位和自己的权柄无情地舍弃下属。邓小平先是因为党的总书记胡耀邦对待学生示威过于温和,而在1987年罢免了这位政治改革 者,后来又在1989年天安门抗议事件中解决了赵紫阳。邓小平的首要信条是保护自己的权威和党的权威。至于这对于中国的转变是不是至关重要,仍然会是辩论 的主题,而辩论也会越来越开放。无论答案如何,傅高义有力地阐述了这样一个观点:因邓小平而得以脱离贫困的人数,比历史上任何人都要多,为此他应该得到嘉 许。
Lord Patten, chairman of the BBC Trust and chancellor of the University of Oxford, was the last governor of Hong Kong作者彭定康勋爵(Lord Patten)是BBC委员会主席,牛津大学(University of Oxford)校监,香港最后一任总督。

译者/何黎


1. 葉公好龍
注音一式 ㄕㄜˋ ㄍㄨㄥ ㄏㄠˋ ㄌㄨㄥˊ
漢語拼音 sh    h o l 注音二式 sh  g ng h u l ng
古人葉子高喜歡龍,家裡全用龍來雕飾。天上的龍知道此事,特到葉公家的窗口窺視。葉公見了真龍,卻嚇得面無人色。典出漢˙劉向˙新序˙雜事。後以葉公好龍比喻表裡不一,似是而非的假象。三國志˙卷三十八˙蜀書˙秦宓傳:「昔楚葉公好龍,神龍下之,好偽徹天,何況於真。」

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