2014年9月30日 星期二

Revisiting the Lehman Brothers Bailout That Never Was大到不能倒:金融海嘯內幕真相始末 Too Big to Fail

大到不能倒:金融海嘯內幕真相始末 Too Big to Fail: The inside story of how Wall Street and Washington fought to save the financial system---and themselves

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〔推薦序〕金融海嘯帶給我們的珍貴教訓 殷乃平
〔推薦序〕金融資本主義的失落 許振明
作者的話
譯者的話
重要人物與機構
前言
第一章 雷曼股價暴跌
第二章 財政部長鮑爾森
第三章 為何拯救貝爾斯登?
第四章 聯準會主席柏南克
第五章 放空雷曼!
第六章 雷曼的內部爭議
第七章 美林搖搖欲墜
第八章 AIG深陷危機
第九章 高盛的未來
第十章 房地美與房利美的危機
第十一章 接管兩房
第十二章 即將倒下的巨人
第十三章 誰來救雷曼?
第十四章 執行長們的會議
第十五章 雷曼之死
第十六章 AIG崩塌
第十七章 摩根士丹利的掙扎
第十八章 日本三菱來電!
第十九章 高盛獲救
第二十章 財政部的最後會議
後記
致謝
參考書目

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推薦序1
金融海嘯帶給我們的珍貴教訓  殷乃平
   「大到不能倒」一直是金融界的名言。因為銀行吸收民眾的存款,貸放或投資給企業、投資者、消費者等,一旦倒閉,波及甚廣。愈大的銀行影響層面愈深,嚴重 者可以撼動一國經濟。所以世界各國出現嚴重的大銀行倒閉事件時,多由政府出面解決,當然最後都是納稅人買單。不過金融海嘯發生之後,不少國家發現銀行的虧 損已大到政府無法因應的地步,例如冰島的銀行業務遍及歐洲,倒閉虧損是其全國GDP的二十倍左右,而瑞士的瑞士信貸與瑞士銀行業務跨及全世界,虧損也超過 瑞士GDP的六倍,這時,政府想救也救不起來。於是有人改稱之為「大到不能救」。本書以「大到不能倒」為名,自然一語道破其中的問題所在。
   書中從金融海嘯的源頭華爾街的投資銀行在金融市場上興風作浪、槓桿操作講起,其中金融機構所創造的金融資產證券化,將銀行的放款集束包裝成市場上可以轉 手買賣交易的證券,不同的金融機構從規劃到包裝、提供信用保證、信用評等、負責上市行銷、撮合造市等,由於有多重保障,風險低而報酬相對卻較高,成為機構 投資人主要投資對象,對沖基金又以之為主要的投資工具對沖風險。如此,每家金融機構環環相扣,一旦發生違約事件,就會造成骨牌效應,每家涉入的金融機構都 會被拖累。次貸風暴就是在這種背景之下爆發出來的。
  本書從貝爾斯登倒閉在金融市場中帶來的衝擊,到雷曼掙扎求生,波濤起伏,終至敗亡的 經過,歷歷如繪。而美國政府不救雷曼卻因為擔心體制風險,怕引起全球金融恐慌,扔出八百五十億美元救AIG(最後是花了一千八百億美元),折衝往返的決策 過程,頗為精彩。隨後投資人對金融機構失去信心,客戶不斷流失,美林被迫併入美國銀行,摩根士丹利與高盛也在持續虧損、股價直落的情形下,改制為銀行,接 受較嚴格的銀行規範,至此,美國的投資銀行幾乎全部消失。而在財政部的壓力下,摩根士丹利與高盛不甘不願地被迫與銀行做合併商議,雖然終以增資暫時解決, 不過,未來前途未卜,仍然逆料。除此之外,房地美、房利美是半官方的房貸批發機構,隨著房貸市場出問題,若不立即救援,房地產市場全面崩潰可期。同時,為 恢復投資人與存款人對金融機構的信心,問題資產拯救計劃(TARP)在國會的通過,以及執行銀行注資,近乎國有化過程的經過,都有頗為深入的分析。
   金融海嘯為人類有史以來少有的大災難,處身其中的每個人應該都有不同的體會。本書中對金融危機從華爾街到華盛頓每一個場景,都生動地描繪出來。其中,最 值得一看的是面臨金融災難下,扮演救火隊的各個角色:財政部長鮑爾森(來自華爾街)、聯儲主席柏南克(原是研究一九三○年代經濟大恐慌的學者)、紐約聯儲 總裁蓋特納(後接任財長)等人在金融危機當中,如何全力施展,力圖挽救惡化中的金融機制、以及衰退的美國經濟。當然,事後觀察,許多危機處理政策不無可置 喙之處,同時整個危機的發展已延伸到全世界,全球經濟問題接二連三的爆發,已近失控狀態,卻是始料未及。
  回顧美國在金融危機中的救援政 策,有許多打破先例的做法,如聯儲原只負責銀行的管理,卻於法不合的跨界救援投資銀行與保險公司;當財政部公債賣不掉時,聯儲干冒大不諱印鈔來買;財政部 長濫用權力,介入迫使金融機構配合購併,以解決問題等,均多有違常理,縱使事急從權,亦有所不當。
  華爾街為世界金融中心,集世界上最為 聰明、最有智慧的金融專業人才,在金錢追逐與貪婪動力之下,堆砌成世界財富的聚散之地。本書指出,在政府「大到不能倒」的原則下,整個經濟體系與社會成為 華爾街的人質,不管你願不願意,都要付出贖金。肥貓一族,可以坐享其利,風險與成本卻都由社會承擔,頗值得深思。美國新近通過的金改法案,就是在這個背景 之下推出的。
  細讀此書,可以了解華爾街金融機構的運作,對金融業者應有所啟發;面對各種金融問題,如何因應,政策如何制定,對金融主管 亦有頗多可參考或戒慎之處;對投資人而言,可以看到金融危機發生的原因與發展的經過,可以經由書中的分析知道投資風險之所在,找出哪類金融機構較能在風雨 中屹立不搖,進而找出趨吉避凶之道。這也是人類史上極為重要的一段記錄,它所產生的體制變革,影響將更為久遠。
  總之,本書不僅值得一讀,更值得保存。
(本文作者為國立政治大學金融學系教授)
推薦序2
金融資本主義的失落  許振明
   《大到不能倒》這本書是以二○○八年的三月至十月期間,從金融危機爆發,到美國財政部投入資金於各大銀行為止,其中的發展與各種內幕為主。其以雷曼兄弟 (Lehman Brothers)為主視窗,旁及其他投資銀行(高盛、摩根士丹利、美林)、商業銀行(美國銀行、摩根大通、花旗、美聯銀行……)、大型保險公司 (AIG)、對沖基金、空頭炒家、媒體、國會、金融主管機關(財政部、聯準會),眾多機構與人物牽涉其中,不僅描摹出金融危機的全貌,高度的寫實性與豐富 的情節,凸顯了各機構的不同立場與衝突合作,使這本書讀來像是一本抽絲剝繭的偵探小說、一部懸疑影片,讓讀者可在趣味中,不知不覺、一氣呵成地看到最後, 並能從中汲取寶貴教訓。
  在雷曼兄弟執行長福爾德(Richard Fuld)的掌舵之下,雷曼兄弟度過了一九九八年的俄羅斯金融危機,卻躲不過十年後的美國次級房貸危機,甚而釀成國際金融海嘯。福爾德太過自信,認為擁有 足夠的流動資金即可支應任何狀況,對於自家的房地產相關衍生商品過於自信,也缺乏足夠的理解與注意,為了追求高利潤,過度承擔風險,忽略了資產泡沫的信用 風險、倒帳風險,終遭反噬。當各資產一一違約的連鎖反應不斷擴大時,即使再龐大的現金部位也難以支應。最終,負債大於資本,許多資產都變得一文不值。因 此,金融機構面對追求高風險高報酬的抉擇時,應審慎考量這類高槓桿高負債的經營方式。
  這本書還有以下幾點值得思考與討論:
   第一,長期以來,金融業「大到不能倒」的現象,一直是貨幣銀行學的主題之一,也成為金融主管機關的一大挑戰。政府往往在紓困措施之後說「僅此一次」,但 是下次遇到「拯救大銀行 vs.放任經濟崩潰」的抉擇時,又會怎麼做?此次金融危機當中,美國財長鮑爾森就面臨了三月時紓困貝爾斯登,九月初紓困房利美與房地美,九月十五日讓雷曼 兄弟破產,九月十六日立刻決定紓困AIG給予八百五十億美元貸款,之後又撮合美林併入美國銀行,努力營救高盛和摩根士丹利……。前後不一的決策,再加上政 治力的牽制,往往讓情況更加複雜。紓困會造成銀行的「道德風險」問題,身為主管機關如何拿捏,有時並無絕對的標準。聯準會主席柏南克在雷曼申請破產後的一 次會議上說過:「貓耳洞?沒有無神論者,金融危機中沒有道學先生。」道盡了理論與實務的兩難。
  第二,就世界局勢看,雷曼兄弟事件爆發成 為金融危機,造成全球市場與經濟環境的動盪,這使得美國式資本主義,在全球進行金融殖民主義的進程遭到嚴重挫敗。由於美國連帶歐洲的經濟陷入衰退,相對地 中國經濟強勢成長成為全球復甦的火車頭,使得經濟勢力從先進國家往新興國家挪移之趨勢,越發明顯,也開啟了未來的世界新局。而金融風暴影響所及,WTO的 金融服務業全球化的推動,也面臨推遲。
  第三,原本金融機構賴以生存的關鍵,不是滿坑滿谷的錢,而是存款人的信賴,以及金融機構彼此之間 的信任。從書中可以看到,在金融危機的最高峰,信心盡失的存款人、對沖基金、及各銀行為了避免成為「最後一個」,爭先恐後的撤資的慘況,有識者應有所警 惕。不光是金融業,各行各業也是,顧客的信心與信賴,應特別予以重視關心。
  這本書可以從許多角度來看:從金融監管的角度,從反省金融資本主義心態的角度,從了解商業運作的角度(有些是負面示範),甚至可從書中讀到人心與人性,相信會對讀者有所幫助。
(本文作者為台灣金融研訓院院長)
作者的話
   這本書是與直接參與到金融危機各事件的逾兩百位受訪者進行超過五百個小時的訪問,所得到的成果。受訪者包括華爾街的高層行政人員、董事會成員、管理層、 現任或前任公務員、外國政府官員、銀行家、律師、會計師、以及一些顧問。不少受訪者提供了「白紙黑字」的文件資料,包括筆記、電郵、錄音、內部報告、文件 草稿、講稿、行事曆、來電顯示、收費單據、開支報告……構成了書中細節的基礎。
  他們有的更絞盡腦汁甚至花上數小時回憶會談中的一字一句,或者會議上的任何細節──不少會議只供特權人士知悉,甚至是機密。
   有鑑於這些事件的爭議性──撰寫此書時,有幾件涉及刑事的調查仍在進行當中,更不用說數不清的民事訴訟案件──不少受訪者都以不具名、無法被追索身分的 形式提供資料。再考慮到每個場景都有不同人士參與重建、確認當時的實際情況,因此,每一個角色說出的每一句話,其資源來源可能是來自其他方面,例如在場的 其他與會者、透過擴音器參與電話會議的人士、或者由當場聽到當事人覆述情況的第三者,甚至當時的草稿、筆記資料──總的來說,並不一定由講者本人提供。
  關於這次金融危機,坊間已有不少文字紀錄,而這本書是依據我的財經記者同事們的珍貴資料,這部份我會容後一一詳細列明。
  但是,我希望在此提供的,是第一次把細節、以及無時無刻地追蹤這個歷史上最扣人心弦的災難,將之清楚地帶到世人眼前。提供資料的每一位人士,他們深信自己親眼看著經濟如何跌入深坑。
  義大利偉大的科學家伽利略曾說:「所有被發現的真理都很容易被理解,重點是去發現它。」我希望我至少發現了一點點,也因此,可以讓過去幾年複雜的財經事件更容易被人理解。
譯者的話
   動筆翻譯《大不能倒》是源於一股試它一試的衝動。這一念頭帶來的結果,是持續一百天的「筆戰」——每天早上四時半起床,爭取在上班前翻譯它三個小時;下 班回家趕緊完成家務,晚上九時開始,再奮鬥四個小時……日復一日,按編輯大人的囑咐每天苦戰五頁。我把所有的空閒活動置之度外,為的,只是希望能和我最好 的朋友盡早分享和討論書中內容。
  作者安德魯.羅斯.索爾金(Andrew Ross Sorkin)擁有深邃的洞察力,這部厚墩墩的大作文風坦誠直率。不少人有先入為主的成見,以為索爾金這位出色的傳媒工作者,以其筆桿慣有的辛辣鋒利,此 作八成是一心羅列華爾街和華盛頓官商勾結的罪證;反而,作者是把二00八年金融海嘯的箇中關鍵人物,內心深處不足為外人道的恐懼、無援,深刻地勾畫並展現 在讀者的眼前,力圖做出一個公平、公正的紀錄。
  儘管作者索爾金在美國主流媒體打滾多年,但翻開《大到不能倒》,讀者看到的卻是徹底違反 好萊塢公式的實況:傳媒並非秉持正義,堅持發掘「真相」;也沒有挺身而出為他人犧牲的英雄,反而是,主人翁個個都以受害者自居,滿腔的怨恨不知應向誰發 洩;同樣,所謂拯救世界經濟的英雄,其實不外是幾個急就章的臭皮匠湊得一個諸葛亮……
  華爾街是世界上把資本主義發揮得最淋漓盡致的地 方,就是一股求利的動力,竟可把來自不同種族、不同文化、不同信念、不同宗教……的各式人物牢牢地團結在一起。完成交易是銀行家天生的本能,為了完成交 易,再不可能發生的妥協都變為可能──原來,利之當頭,真正的世界大同可展現在世人面前……原來,利益的熙來攘往力量之大,絕對凌駕在種族、宗教和政治立 場……的芥蒂之上。
  不過,令譯者最為感動的是,儘管金融界被一場海嘯弄得人仰馬翻,但在索爾金的筆下,人人仍盡力堅守崗位:不論是基層 員工或國際級風雲人物,每人都是各為其主(這主可能是自己),在可能是一生最大的徬徨焦慮中仍克盡己任,在這場驚天動地的金融海嘯中咬緊牙關捍衛個人、美 國、全球不同政權和經濟體系內各階層的利益。
  另一觸動譯者之處,是作者對人的尊重。在這個世界上,人們總習慣前仆後繼地記錄「偉人」的 一舉一動,其他的大多數人物就統統被埋入所謂無名英雄記念碑,其實是偉人的背後,有不少同事、下屬……各式人等一直鞠躬盡瘁地供「偉人」如牛馬驅策──在 索爾金這本暢銷全球的金融故事書中,作者記錄的除了鮑爾森、蓋特納、柏南克外,還包括幾個月來一同苦撐的聯儲、財政部的隊伍,以及業界的一眾人物,就是這 一點一滴的故事讓人動容——It makes it real and it makes it so much more human.

內容連載


§內文1

第二章 財政部長鮑爾森
  
  二○○八年三月,在華盛頓西北面一個樹影悠悠的花園住宅內,緊張不安的鮑爾森在家中來回踱步,他的手機貼在他耳邊其慣常的位置。今天是貝爾斯 登被收購後的第一個星期天。鮑爾森的太太溫蒂整個週末都對丈夫頗有微詞,他的手機不分晝夜響個不停,一個又一個說不完的電話。她哄鮑爾森出外散步:「一個 小時也不行?」鮑爾森終於答應她到離家不遠、在市中心的岩溪公園騎單車逛逛。這是過去一個多星期來,鮑爾森頭一次從埋頭苦幹中釋放出來。

  但是,他的電話又響了。而且當他聽完來電者道明來意後,這位美國財政部部長對著電話大叫起來:「我真的很想破口大罵!」

  電話是傑米.戴蒙(Jamie Dimon)打來的。戴蒙在摩根大通總部八樓的辦公室跟財長報告他極不願聽到的消息:摩根大通決定調高收購貝爾斯登的作價,由每股二美元提高到十美元。

  其實,這消息對鮑爾森來說並非完全意料之外,整整一個星期,鮑爾森幾乎每天都跟戴蒙通電話,好幾次甚至打斷了戴蒙每早的跑步鍛鍊。在每天的交 談中,鮑爾森已知道摩根大通有可能提高價格。自摩根大通宣布收購貝爾斯登後,貝爾斯登的股東對於收購價之低感到十分不滿,鮑爾森和戴蒙都非常擔心貝爾斯登 的股東會對收購投反對票,導致貝爾斯登又一次的崩塌。

  鮑爾森原希望戴蒙對收購價只增加一點──最多提高到八美元,而絕非二位數。鮑爾森對戴蒙的決定感到很懊惱,他壓低沙啞的聲音說:「這價錢遠高 於我們所談過的。」一週前,當戴蒙表示他準備以每股四美元收購貝爾斯登時,鮑爾森曾私下指示戴蒙要把價錢盡量壓低:「我覺得可以象徵式地,例如一美元或二 美元之類的。」事實上,如果貝爾斯登沒有得到政府承諾擔保其二百九十億美元的債務,公司早就破產了,鮑爾森不想背上「為拯救華爾街的老朋友而甘願當冤大 頭」的惡名,他跟戴蒙說:「我看不出有什麼理由他們可以得到這個數目。」

  事情發展至今,除戴蒙外,沒有其他人知道,原來美國財政部部長是貝爾斯登低價出售的幕後統籌者,鮑爾森希望這個祕密一直保持下去。就像大多數信奉保守經濟主義的人,鮑爾森仍尊崇新古典經濟學派「看不見的手」的原則,任何政府的干預都應該是萬不得已的最後一招。

  鮑爾森本身亦曾擔任執行長,他太明白戴蒙的立場;然而,他同樣看重的是如何平復市場。在過去的一週,市場已充滿紛亂。貝爾斯登的股東和員工知 道二美元收購價之後幾乎全體發難,威脅玉石俱焚──不僅拉倒交易,而且拉倒整個市場。另一邊,戴蒙發現這個急就章的合併協議原來包含極大的漏洞:貝爾斯登 的股東可以否決交易,但摩根大通在未來一年仍然有責任要擔保貝爾斯登進行的交易。

  戴蒙引述貝爾斯登老牌經紀人埃德.莫德沃(Ed Moldaver)的話回答鮑爾森:「這不是奉旨成婚,這根本是強姦!」這句話,是莫德沃當著上百個貝爾斯登員工的面,對於戴蒙提出如此的收購建議的尖銳嘲諷。

  鮑爾森也向戴蒙坦言,說華府內也有極大的反對聲音,因華府大多數人都認為華爾街充斥的是貪婪的高薪肥貓一族,提出方案拯救他們,就如同提出加稅一般不受歡迎。鮑爾森說他也受到龐大的壓力:「我簡直是四面受敵。」





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維基百科,自由的百科全書

大到不能倒(Too Big to Fail,縮寫TBTF)是一個經濟學上的概念,指當一些規模極大或在產業中具有關鍵性重要地位的企業瀕臨破產時,政府不能等閒視之,甚至要不惜投入公帑相救,以避免那些企業倒閉後所掀起的巨大連鎖反應造成社會整體更嚴重的傷害,這種情況即稱為「大到不能倒」。

"Too big to fail" is a term of art in regulation and public policy that refers to businesses dealing with market complications related to moral hazard, economic specialization, and monetary theory.
Entities are considered to be "too big to fail" by those who believe those entities are so central to a macroeconomy that their failure will be disastrous to an economy, and as such believe they should become recipients of beneficial financial and economic policies from governments and/or central banks.[1] It is thought that companies that fall into this category take positions that are high-risk, as they are able to leverage these risks based on the policy preference they receive.[2] The term has emerged as prominent in public discourse since the 2007–2010 global financial crisis.
Some critics see the policy as counterproductive and that large banks or other institutions should be left to fail if their risk management is not effective.[3][4] Moreover, some assert that the "too big to fail" policy has been explicitly refuted in the People's Republic of China, with the bankruptcy of Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corporation in 1998.[5]
Some economists, such as Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman don't see it as necessarily a bad thing, with economy of scale in banks, as in other businesses, as worth preserving, so long as they are well regulated, in proportion to their economic clout.[6][7][8][9]


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Continue reading the main storyShare This Page
Inside the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, time was running out to answer a question that would change Wall Street forever.
At issue that September, six years ago, was whether the Fed could save a major investment bank whose failure might threaten the entire economy.
The firm was Lehman Brothers. And the answer for some inside the Fed was yes, the government could bail out Lehman, according to new accounts by Fed officials who were there at the time.
But as the world now knows, no one rescued Lehman. Instead, the firm was allowed to collapse overnight, a decision that, in cool hindsight, let problems at one bank snowball into a full-blown panic. By the time it was over, nearly every other major bank had to be saved.
Why, given all that happened, was Lehman the only bank that was not too big to fail? For the first time, Fed officials have offered an account that differs significantly from the versions that, for many, have hardened into history.
Ben S. Bernanke, the Fed chairman at the time, Henry M. Paulson Jr., the former Treasury Secretary, and Timothy F. Geithner, who was then president of the New York Fed, have all argued that Lehman Brothers was in such a deep hole from its risky real estate investments that Fed did not have the legal authority to rescue it.
Photo
Richard S. Fuld Jr., center, chief of Lehman Brothers, was heckled by protesters after testifying to Congress in October 2008 about the collapse. CreditSusan Walsh/Associated Press
But now, interviews with current and former Fed officials show that a group inside New York Fed was leaning toward the opposite conclusion — that Lehman was narrowly solvent and therefore might qualify for a bailout. In the frenetic events of what has become known as the Lehman weekend, that preliminary analysis never reached senior officials before they decided to let Lehman fail.
Understanding why Lehman was allowed to die goes beyond apportioning responsibility for the financial crisis and the recession that cost millions of ordinary Americans jobs and savings. Today, long after the bailouts, the debate rages over the Fed’s authority to bail out failing firms. Some Fed officials worry that when the next financial crisis comes, the Fed will have less power to shield the financial system from the failure of a single large bank. After the Lehman debacle, Congress curbed the Fed’s ability to rescue a bank in trouble.
Whether to save Lehman came down to a crucial question: Did Lehman have enough solid assets to back a loan from the Fed? Finding the answer fell to two teams of financial experts at the New York Fed. Those teams had provisionally concluded that Lehman might, in fact, be a candidate for rescue, but members of those teams said they never briefed Mr. Geithner, who said he did not know of the results.
“My colleagues at the New York Fed were careful and creative, and as demonstrated through the crisis that fall, we were willing to go to extraordinary lengths to try to protect the economy from the unfolding financial disaster,” Mr. Geithner said Monday in a statement to The New York Times. “We explored all available alternatives to avoid a collapse of Lehman, but the size of its losses were so great that they were unable to attract a buyer, and we were unable to lend on a scale that would save them.”
Mr. Bernanke and Mr. Paulson said in recent interviews with The Times that they did not know about the Fed analysis or its conclusions.
Interviews with half a dozen Fed officials, who spoke on the condition they not be named, so as not to breach the Fed’s unofficial vow of silence, suggest some Fed insiders believed that the government had the authority to throw Lehman Brothers a lifeline, even if the bank was nearly broke. The Fed earlier came to the rescue of Bear Stearns, after doing little analysis, and only days later saved the American International Group. The government subsequently saved the likes of Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Ultimately, whether Lehman should have gotten Fed support was a judgment call, not a matter of strict statute, these people said.ontinue reading the main story



Financial Turmoil in 2008 …


MARCH 14, 2008


The Federal Reserve provides financial backing

to JPMorgan Chase’s purchase of Bear Stearns.


JUNE 9


Lehman Brothers reports a second-quarter

loss of $2.8 billion.


JULY 11


The Treasury Department general counsel writes in

an email that the Fed has “plenty of legal authority to

provide liquidity” to Lehman.


JULY 15


In an email, William C. Dudley of the Federal Reserve

Bank of New York outlines a plan for the Fed to take

$60 billion of assets off Lehman’s balance sheet.


… and Crisis


September


The federal government bails out

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.


7


The heads of Wall Street firms gather at the

New York Fed to look for ways to end the

Lehman crisis. The Treasury secretary tells

the participants that no government money

can be used in any rescue.


12


Attempts are made to arrange a Barclays

purchase of Lehman, but fall through the

next day.


13


Lehman files for bankruptcy.


15


The Fed announces an $85 billion bailout of

the American International Group.


16


OCT. 3


Congress passes the Troubled Asset Relief

Program, enabling the government to take big

equity stakes in banks.


OCT. 8


The Fed creates a second bailout facility for

A.I.G., worth $38 billion.
“We had lawyers joined at our hips,” said one participant. “And they were very helpful at framing the issues. But they never said we couldn’t do it.”
As another participant put it, “It was a policy and political decision, not a legal decision.”

A Wall Street Watershed

The account from the New York Fed officials provides new insight into a dangerous moment in Wall Street history. Countless financial figures — from Wall Street chiefs to government policy makers — have said that allowing Lehman to die the way it did was a misjudgment that inflicted unnecessary pain.
“There is close to universal agreement that the demise of Lehman Brothers was the watershed event of the entire financial crisis and that the decision to allow it to fail was the watershed decision,” Alan S. Blinder, an economics professor at Princeton and former vice chairman of the Fed, wrote in his history of the financial crisis, “After the Music Stopped.”
“The Fed has explained the decision as a legal issue,” Mr. Blinder said in an interview. “But is that true or valid? Is it enough? Those are important questions.”
Photo
“I will maintain to my deathbed that we made every effort to save Lehman, but we were just unable to do so because of a lack of legal authority,” said Ben S. Bernanke, in an interview with the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission on Nov. 17, 2009.CreditShawn Thew/European Pressphoto Agency
Whether the Fed should have tried to save Lehman is still a subject of heated debate. And it is unclear whether the firm could have been rescued at all.
What happened that September was the culmination of circumstances reaching back years — of ordinary people too eager to borrow, of banks too eager to lend and of Wall Street financial engineers reaping multimillion-dollar bonuses. Even so, saving Lehman from complete collapse might have shielded the economy from what turned out to be a crippling blow. And as the subsequent rescue of A.I.G., the insurance giant, demonstrated, a rescue could have included substantial protections for taxpayers.
Back in 2008, the Fed possessed broad authority to lend to banks in trouble. Section 13-3 of the Federal Reserve Act provided that “in unusual and exigent circumstances” the Fed could lend to any institution, as long as the loan was “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Bank.” In the eyes of the Fed, that means a firm must be solvent and have adequate collateral to lend against, and making that determination was the responsibility of the New York Fed, the regional Fed bank that had begun to assume responsibility for Lehman. On that September weekend, teams from the New York Fed were told to assess Lehman’s solvency and collateral.
Whether and how much the Fed could lend Lehman depended on those teams’ findings, although the final decision rested with Mr. Geithner, Mr. Bernanke and the Federal Reserve Board.

A Question of Valuation

In recent interviews, members of the teams said that Lehman had considerable assets that were liquid and easy to value, like United States Treasury securities. The question was Lehman’s illiquid assets — primarily a real estate portfolio that Lehman had recently valued at $50 billion. By Lehman’s account, the firm had a surplus of assets over liabilities of $28.4 billion.
Photo
“Let me also say, for the record, strongly: There was no authority, there was no law that would have let us save Lehman Brothers,” said Henry M. Paulson Jr., at the House Committee on Financial Services on Nov. 18, 2008. CreditAlex Wong/Getty Images
Others had already taken a stab at valuing Lehman’s troubled assets. Kenneth D. Lewis, then the chief executive of Bank of America — who, with the government’s encouragement, was considering a bid for Lehman — asserted that Lehman had a “$66 billion hole” in its balance sheet.
A group of bankers summoned to the Fed by Mr. Paulson, who was hoping they would mount a private rescue, did not accept Lehman’s $50 billion valuation for its real estate and could not decide whether Lehman was solvent. But potential private rescuers had a motive to lowball Lehman’s value. Fed officials involved in the valuation stressed that the Fed could hold distressed assets for much longer than private parties, allowing time for those assets to recover in value. Also, because the Fed sets monetary policy, it exerts enormous influence over the assets’ ultimate value.
“There can’t be any reasonable doubt that had the Fed rescued Lehman, that very act would have pushed up the value of its assets,” Mr. Blinder said.
While the Fed team did not come up with a precise value for Lehman’s illiquid assets, it provided a range that was far more generous in its valuations than the private sector had been.
“It was close,” a member of the Fed team that evaluated the collateral said. “Folks were aware of how ambiguous these values are, especially at a time of crisis. So it becomes a policy question: Do you want to take a chance or not?”
Argument continues today over the value of Lehman’s assets. A report compiled by Anton R. Valukas, a Chicago lawyer, at the behest of the bankruptcy court overseeing Lehman concluded in 2010 that nearly all of the firm’s real estate valuations were reasonable. It also suggested that Lehman’s chaotic bankruptcy caused many of the losses later borne by the firm’s creditors. Other analysts have argued that Lehman was deeply insolvent.
Photo
“We didn’t believe we had the legal authority to guarantee Lehman’s trading liabilities, even using our ‘unusual and exigent’ powers,” said Timothy F. Geithner, in “Stress Test,” his 2014 book on the financial crisis. CreditKevin Lamarque/Reuters
Ultimately, the appraisals of the New York Fed teams did not matter. Their preliminary finding was that Lehman was solvent and that what it faced was essentially a bank run, according to members of the group. Researchers working on the value of Lehman’s collateral said they thought they would be delivering those findings to Mr. Geithner that September weekend.
But Mr. Geithner had already been diverted to A.I.G., which was facing its own crisis. In the end, the team members said, they delivered their findings orally to other New York Fed officials, including Michael F. Silva, Mr. Geithner’s chief of staff.
On Sunday, Mr. Bernanke was in Washington awaiting the New York Fed’s verdict. In a phone call, Mr. Geithner said Lehman could not be saved.
The Fed would be lending into a run, Mr. Geithner told Mr. Bernanke, according to both men’s accounts. In a recent interview, Mr. Bernanke said, “Knowing the potential consequences of Lehman’s failure, I was 100 percent committed to doing whatever could possibly and legally be done to save the company, as were Tim and Hank.” Mr. Paulson has concurred, saying, “Although it was Ben and Tim’s decision to make, I shared their view that Lehman was insolvent, and I know the marketplace did.”
Those at the Fed who have contended that Lehman was insolvent have never provided any basis for that conclusion, other than references to the estimates of Wall Street firms and other anecdotal evidence. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission asked for such evidence several times, but the Fed never provided it. The members of the New York Fed teams said that they did not prepare a formal, written report, and that no one asked them for any notes or work papers or asked them to elaborate on their findings. Scott G. Alvarez, the Fed’s general counsel, told the commission that there was “no time” that weekend for a written analysis.

‘A Lack of Legal Authority’

Phil Angelides, the crisis commission’s chairman, said no one ever mentioned the New York Fed analysis during his hearings. “If in fact the analysis existed and was independent, it would have been in everyone’s interest to have that out, even if it were in the form of notes,” Mr. Angelides said in an interview. He added, “If you look at the record, there is no legal stopper,” meaning a legal barrier.
Continue reading the main story

Interactive Graphic: The Fed’s Actions in 2008: What the Transcripts Reveal

So why, then, was Lehman allowed to die?
Mr. Paulson has said that politics did not enter into the decision. But he had endured months of criticism for bailing out Bear Stearns in March 2008, and the outcry only intensified after the Treasury provided support to the mortgage finance giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in the first week of September. During a conference call on the Thursday before Lehman’s collapse, Mr. Paulson declared to Mr. Bernanke, Mr. Geithner and other regulators that he would not use public money to rescue Lehman, saying he did not want to be known as “Mr. Bailout.”
In written testimony before Congress that September, Mr. Bernanke made no mention of any legal constraint. Instead, he said, “We judged that investors and counterparties had had time to take precautionary measures.”
It was only on Oct. 7, after early praise for the decision to let Lehman fail had turned into a wave of criticism, that anyone mentioned the legal argument. In a speech that day, Mr. Bernanke said, “Neither the Treasury nor the Federal Reserve had the authority to commit public money in that way.” Mr. Paulson first mentioned the claim a week later. In an interview, Mr. Bernanke said, “We made a deliberative decision to be very cautious about publicizing our inability to save Lehman out of concern that it would further worsen the market panic.” Mr. Paulson made the same point. Mr. Bernanke was emphatic before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in 2009: “I will maintain to my deathbed that we made every effort to save Lehman, but we were just unable to do so because of a lack of legal authority.”
Mr. Bernanke and others have said that a Fed lifeline to Lehman might not have stopped the run on the firm. But others have said the point of Rule 13-3 was exactly that — to stop such panics.
“Of course the Fed can stop a run,” said Mr. Blinder, the economist. “That’s what it’s all about.”
Scholars are still struggling with the claim that the Fed could not rescue Lehman but was nonetheless able to save Bear Stearns and A.I.G.
What is clear to Mr. Blinder, he says, is that the decision was a formula for panic.
“The inconsistency was the biggest problem,” Mr. Blinder said. “The Lehman decision abruptly and surprisingly tore the perceived rule book into pieces and tossed it out the window.”

2014年9月29日 星期一

《 費曼手札-不休止的鼓聲》 (Perfectly Reasonable Deviations from the Beaten Track: The Letters of Richard P. Feynman)

《 費曼手札-不休止的鼓聲》 (Perfectly Reasonable Deviations from the Beaten Track: The Letters of Richard P. Feynman)


很好笑: 我曾買《 費曼手札-不休止的鼓聲》二手書,要做此note時,才發現2006年11月就寫過一篇。後來發現是當年我是跟政大公企中心圖書館借的:政大圖書館通知單--即將到期通知單---這圖書館幫助我不少,不過多年前即轉型,我不知道它的書都搬去那兒了?

 《 費曼手札-不休止的鼓聲》有篇很不錯的書評,請參考本Blog之: Freeman Dyson: The Scientist as Rebel《反叛的科學家》。

我想這本書可以寫讀後感想的,一定非常多。譬如說,上次翻看他高中老師Abram Bader 要求他在上課時自修{高等微積分}。 全懂了之後,才可以"閙課"之故事。 (pp. 284-87)

這一次我讀他很認真的讀小學的教科書,給各版本評語,也可看出費曼凡事很認真。
我看到一位威斯康辛州北部物理老師,希望安排35~40分鐘的"電話通訊討論會"來回信(332-33):費曼1966.3.15說:"真是個瘋狂的主意,一定貴死了。.......我從來沒聽過這麼棒,這麼有創意的主意(一定貴到不行!)"
我可以講幾個類似的長途電話的故事。

1950年代Herbert Simon看到他的研究伙伴經常用電話接遠方的大電腦,一接就是數小時,他覺得這樣花錢還不以為意,實在不簡單。
我1985-86年在Motorola公司服務,剛開始覺得他們動不動就開國際電話會議,每次幾乎都1小時多,看過電信局的帳單後,覺得反正為台灣創匯,貴也無所謂。
2002年我任某公司顧問,那時後的互聯網已很便宜,使得我們每次可以開國際視訊會.....
費曼的案子,有意思的是在教育界.....



Perfectly Reasonable Deviations from the Beaten Track: The Letters of Richard P. Feynman is a collection of Nobel Prize winner Richard Feynman's letters.[1] [2] [3]
The book was edited by his daughter, Michelle Feynman and includes a foreword by Timothy Ferris. The book is also titled Don't You Have Time to Think?[4]



 2006.11.11
看看自己或自己看看
《 費曼手札-不休止的鼓聲》台北:天下文化, 2005
原題『 PERFECTLY REASONABLE DEVIATIONS from the BEATEN TRACK:The Letters of Richard P.Feynman ……
我看這種書,採翻到那看到那,所以不知道原妙書名之出處 *,似乎很有作者Richard P.Feynman 風格: PERFECTLY REASONABLE DEVIATIONS FROM THE BEATEN TRACK
他的女兒 Michelle Feynman說的:「父親讓我們知道怎樣去觀察這個世界 ……如何開懷大笑……. 」(頁20)或可當綱領,可以解釋他為什麼希望《今日物理 》等期刊不要送他…..
他給印度學生的說法之翻譯似乎有可議處:
「不要讀這麼多東西。看看自己,想想自己看到了些什麼。」(頁 359
不知道是否該為「自己看看」?
*****
* 意思
off the beaten track (US ALSO off the beaten path)
in a place where few people go, far from any main roads and towns:
The farmhouse we stayed in was completely off the beaten track.

(from
Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary )

go off the beaten track [path]  常道をはずれる; 変わったことをする .

Camille et Paul/ 卡米耶·克洛代尔书信

Quotes:

"Intelligence is nothing without delight."

http://www.answers.com/PAUL%20CLAUDEL

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camille_Claudel

克洛岱尔情结

克洛岱尔情结

原作名: Camille et Paul: La Passion Claudel
译者: 王恬
作者: [法] 多米尼克·博纳
副标题: 卡米耶与保罗的一生
ISBN: 9787561775769
页数: 338
定价: 39.80元
出版社: 华东师范大学出版社
装帧: 平装
出版年: 2010-8


狂热、激情、天才。克洛岱尔姐弟:雕塑家卡米耶和诗人保罗,都生于象征着创造和激情的火系星座之下。这部传记第一次记录了他们两人之间的联系。两个同样激 情洋溢却又敏感到极致脆弱的灵魂。卡米耶以誓不妥协的态度迎战艺术的不确定性和飘零无依的生活;保罗则以旅行和异国情调来掩饰生之痛苦——在中国、巴西、 日本。这两条我们原本以为完全分离的命运线事实上却相互滋润相互贯通。姐弟俩都遇到了无望的激情,保罗爱上了罗莎莉·维奇,一个最终将他抛弃的已婚女子; 而卡米耶则承受着罗丹的魔力直至疯狂。家庭的悲剧。沉重和世俗对抗着他们心灵的苛求。

简介 · · · · · ·

  《克洛岱尔情结:卡米耶与保罗的一生》是由华东师范大学出版社出版的。

作者简介 · · · · · ·

  多米尼克•博纳(Dominique Bona),法国著名女作家,1953年生于法国西南部一个加泰罗尼亚家庭,早年求学于索邦现代文学专业,后在多家媒体的文化版做采访和文学批评,同时亦 从事个人写作。她的作品曾多次获奖:其中《罗曼•加里传》获1987年法兰西学院传记大奖;《贝尔特•莫里索传》获2000年龚古尔传记奖;而她的小说 《乌木港手记》则获得了1998年的何耨豆奖(prix Renaudot)。


*****

Camille & Auguste

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C_IAARr5uyc
[CONCOURS FLASH] Aujourd'hui, trois fois deux places (valeur de la place : 25€) sont à gagner pour assister à la pièce Camille, Camille, Camille au théâtre Le Lucernaire, pour la première 1er octobre, 18h30 ! ‪#‎Claudel‬
Tentez de remporter ces places en participant à notre quiz à 15h !


2010/6/5

Camille Claudel La Correspondance 卡米耶·克洛代尔书信

幾年之後真正讀它 才發現任何朋友網絡的複雜無比

2007年12月29日星期六





Camille Claudel au Musée Marmottan






























卡米耶·克洛代尔书信
译者:吴雅凌 译 編者: (法)安娜·里維埃等: 華東師範大學出版社:


【內容提要】
克洛代爾是羅 丹的學生和情人,是保爾·克洛代爾的姐姐。她因與羅丹決裂而陷入瘋狂,在精神病療養院度過殘生。據專家的考訂,有一些署名羅丹的雕塑 作品其實都出自她之手。長期以來,卡米耶·克洛代爾因其與羅丹的愛情悲劇而為人所知,她的藝術纔華和成就,即便在法國也是到了上個世紀80年代開始纔漸漸 為人所注意。
  本書收集了迄今所發現的卡米耶·克洛代爾的全部書信,是這位女藝術家留存人世的唯一手稿。
  本書收集了迄今發現的所 有卡米耶·克洛代爾的書信。每一封信均經過專家的分析和研究,得到嚴格的編排和整理。這些珍貴的書信,堪稱為卡米耶·克洛代爾研究的最重要亦是最根本的文 獻。

【目錄】
中譯本前言
法文本前言:生命之路
書信
 生平
主要參考文獻
後記:卡米耶·克 洛代爾的悲劇

圖 像
簡介集 (英文)
http://www.answers.com/topic/camille-claudel


Wikipedia article "Camille Claudel".部份:

Creative period

Fascinated with stone and soil as a child, as a young woman she studied at the Académie Colarossi with sculptor Alfred Boucher. (At the time, the École des Beaux-Arts barred women from enrolling to study.) In 1882, Claudel rented a workshop with other young women, mostly English, including Jessie Lipscomb. In 1883, she met Auguste Rodin, who taught sculpture to Claudel and her friends.
Around 1884, she started working in Rodin's workshop. Claudel became his source of inspiration, his model, his confidante and lover. She never lived with Rodin, who was reluctant to end his 20-year relationship with Rose Beuret. Although pregnant, Claudel never had children with Rodin; she lost the child in an accident[1], which sent her into a deep depression. Knowledge of the affair agitated her family, especially her mother, who never completely agreed with Claudel's involvement in the arts. As a consequence, she left the family house. In 1892, perhaps after an unwanted abortion, Claudel ended the intimate aspect of her relationship with Rodin, although they saw one another regularly until 1898.
A  gilded version of the Bronze Waltz.
A gilded version of the Bronze Waltz.
Beginning in 1903, she exhibited her works at the Salon des Artistes français or at the Salon d'Automne. It would be a mistake to assume that Claudel's reputation has survived simply because of her notorious association with Rodin. She was in fact a brilliant sculptor in her own right, and the famous art critic Octave Mirbeau wrote she was "A revolt against nature: a woman genius". Her early work is similar to Rodin's in spirit, but shows an imagination and lyricism quite her own, particularly in the famous Bronze Waltz (1893). The Age of Maturity (1900) has been interpreted by his brother as a powerful allegory of her break with Rodin, with one figure The Implorer that was produced as an edition of its own. Her onyx and bronze small-scale Wave (1897) was a conscious break in style with her Rodin period, with a decorative quality quite different from the "heroic" feeling of her earlier work. In the early years of the 20th Century, Claudel had patrons, dealers, and commercial success - she had no need to bask in the reflected light of another.



卡米爾與羅丹CamilleandRodin~顏.pps卡米爾與羅丹CamilleandRodin~顏.pps
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钟 文音《巴黎情人:寻访杜拉斯、卡米耶、西蒙·波伏瓦》

寻 找卡米耶(1864~1943年)/148
卡米耶的故居与活动场域/148
巴黎圣路易岛(Saint—Louis)塞纳河畔
—— 波旁河滨路19号(Qiai de Bourbon)1 898~1913年/148
艾芙哈村(Ville—Evrard)精神病院 1913年5月~1914年8月/165
亚维依附近的蒙德费格(Montfavet)精神病院
1914年8月~1945年10月9日 /172

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