Acts of Meaning 翻譯太差勁/Alfred Schutz (1899-1959)

Acts of Meaning 有意義的行為 (sic)

"......類似的例子還很多。在研究器材的性能和利用時，所抽的樣本，除了要包括收發信號的主設備，連輔助的也要包括在內。在研究家庭的心理或社會問題時，如果只對一位家庭成員進行訪談的話，含蓋面可能並不夠。所以我們為了解其完整的互動和種種壓力，可能要訪談所有成員。有時，甚至或必須訪談同一社區的其他家庭。"【hc案：Deming 博士是先知，他的說法的實例和論述，可參考Acts of Meaning by J. Bruner 的第四講：「傳記與自我」--本書有一翻譯本『有意義的行為 (sic)』勉強可參考。】--從事 (統計) 專業實務之原則 // (統計 )專業從業之原則



Principles of Professional Statistical Practice By W. Edwards Deming
Acts of Meaning
Four Lectures on Mind and Culture
Jerome Bruner Jerome Bruner argues that the cognitive revolution, with its current fixation on mind as "information processor;" has led psychology away from the deeper objective of understanding mind as a creator of meanings. Only by breaking out of the limitations imposed by a computational model of mind can we grasp the special interaction through which mind both constitutes and is constituted by culture.










Acts of Meaning by J. Bruner












2009年1月29日 星期四

Book Club 明目書社 Acts of Meaning 有意義的行為
Book Club 明目書社
書目: Acts of Meaning 有意義的行為

Time:

Feb. 5, 2009: 緒言 第一章 人文研究

Feb. 12, 2009: 第二章 作為文化工具的"通信"心理學

Feb. 19, 2009: 第三章 意義剖析

Feb. 26, 2009: 第四章 自傳和自我

Place: 明目書社 台北市溫州街六四號

• Ideas from the Culturally Oriented Psychology

Preface





Jerome Bruner (1915 -)


What Jerome Bruner calls "folk psychology" is deeply functional cultural beliefs on this and that, life included. At times presented in tiny capsules, they can be used fairly and otherwise by anyone, and also discussed to some degree by intellectuals so bent.

If relations are strained or get violated, a need to understand what is going on comes to the fore, and the need to portray oneself and one's in group(s) in a good light. Bruner goes into that in his Acts of Meaning of 1990. He says in it that he does not think psychology is permanently condemned, but it could be less dear to the hearts that most other cultural sides of life, who also include proverbs and memorabl sayings to make life easier or perhaps somewhat more understandable too. Minds are shaped in history or by culture, and we humans should proceed, he holds. [p. x, xiii]

- Tormod Kinnes


5. from Intro Pages:

" ... ban mind from the mental sciences. Nor were John Stuart Mill's principles of induction meant to quell all forms of intellectual curiosity save those which could be slaked by the controlled experiment. This book is written against the background of psychology today, with its confusions ... "

from Intro Pages: " ... limit its inquiries to ways of thinking that grew out of yesterday's physics. Rather, the task is so compellingly important that it deserves all the rich variety"



1. on Page 21:


"enabled to cope with seven chunks of infor- mation rather than with seven bits. Our knowledge, then, becomes enculturated knowledge, indefinable ... "


2. on Page 83:


" ... every hour of recorded conversation there are 8.5 narratives, one every seven minutes, of which three-quarters are told by the mother"


3. from Back Matter:


"Miller, "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information," Psychological Review 63 (1956):81-97. 29 ... "

on Page 17:


"We know all about ego defense and rationalization. As for knowl- edge of Self, it is a compromise symptom hardened in the interplay between inhibition and anxiety, a formation that"




Ideas from the Culturally Oriented Psychology
A. Constructing Cultural Conclusions within the Confines of Psychology

A culture must contain a set of norms, it must also contain a set of interpretive procedures for rendering departures from those norms meaningful . . . It is narrative and narrative interpretation upon which folk psychology depends for achieving this kind of meaning. Stories achieve their meanings by explicating deviations from the ordinary in a comprehensible form. - Jerome Bruner p. 47

A domain under the control of our own intentional states: a domain where Self as agent operates with world knowledge and with desires that are expressed in a manner congruent with context and belief. The third class of events is produced "from outside" in a manner not under our own control. It is the domain of "nature." In the first domain we are in some manner "responsible" for the course of events; in the third not . . . [A] second class of events . . . comprising some indeterminate mix of the first and third . . . requires a more elaborate form of interpretation in order to allocate proper causal shares to individual agency and to "nature." . . . the second is ordinarily seen to be governed either by some form of magic or . . . by the scientism . . - Jerome Bruner p. 40-41

A study by Peggy Miller concerns the narrative environments of young children in blue-collar Baltimore. In that intimate environment, the flow of stories recreating everyday experiences is, to paraphrase Miller, "relentless." in every hour of recorded conversation there are 8.5 narratives, one every seven minutes. They are simple narratives of a kind widely in everyday use in American talk. A very considerable number deal with violence, aggression, or threats, and a not inconsiderable number deal explicitly with death, with child abuse, with wife-beatings, and even with shootings. This lack of censorship, this parading of the "harsh realities". The stories, moreover, almost always portray the narrator in a good light. [There is a need for that. - TK]- Jerome Bruner p. 83, abr

Autobiography . . . the act of constructing a longitudinal version of Self." - Jerome Bruner p. 120

Communal ways of life are [not] easily changed. - Jerome Bruner p. 24

Cultural commitment is a belief, an "ontology" that a certain mode of life merits or deserves support. Those committed to such a mode will be suffering to do so if necessary. - With Jerome Bruner p. 22

Cultural contexts . . . are always contexts of practice: it is always necessary to ask what people are doing or trying to do in that context. - Jerome Bruner p. 118

Interpretation and meaning central to a cultural psychology—or to any psychology or mental science, for that matter. - Jerome Bruner p. 19

It is through folk psychology that people anticipate and judge one another, draw conclusions about the worthwhileness of their lives. - Jerome Bruner p. 14

[The American anthropologist] Margaret Mead [(1901-78) raised] such questions as why life stages such as adolescence were so differently defined among the Samoans. - Jerome Bruner p. 36

Narrative . . . also requires a sensitivity to what is canonical and what violates canonicality in human interaction. - Jerome Bruner p. 77

Narrative requires something approximating a narrator's perspective: it cannot, in the jargon of narratology, be "voiceless." - Jerome Bruner p. 77

Narrative . . . mediates between the canonical world of culture and the more idiosyncratic world of beliefs, desires, and hopes. It renders the exceptional comprehensible and keeps the uncanny at bay—save as the uncanny is needed as a trope. It reiterates the norms of the society without being didactic. And . . . it provides a basis for rhetoric without confrontation. It can even teach, conserve memory, or alter the past. - Jerome Bruner p. 52

Organizing experience, what functions it may serve. - Jerome Bruner p. 43

Pain (as in torture) obliterates our connection with the personal-cultural world - narrows human consciousness to the point where man literally becomes a beast. - Jerome Bruner p. 22, abr

People and their actions dominate the child's interest and attention. - Jerome Bruner p. 78

The invasive bureaucratization of life in our times, with its resultant erosion of selfhood and compassion - Jerome Bruner p. 23

The meaning of talk is powerfully determined by the train of action in which it occurs. - Jerome Bruner p. 18

The nine-month-old looks out along the trajectory of an adult's "point" and, finding nothing there, turns back to check not only the adult's direction of point but the line of visual regard as well. And from this folk-psychological antecedent there eventually emerge such linguistic accomplishments as demonstratives, labeling, and the like. Once the child masters through interaction the appropriate prelinguistic forms for managing ostensive reference, he or she can move beyond them to operate, as it were, within the confines of language proper. - Jerome Bruner p. 75

There has been a lively debate in the burgeoning literature on "developing theories of mind" as to whether children have such theories before the age of four. - Jerome Bruner p. 74

For [Donald] Spence, then, the ego (or Self) is cast in the role of a storyteller, a constructor of narratives about a life. - Jerome Bruner p. 111

How does the child "grasp the significance" of situations (or contexts) in a way that can help him or her master the lexicon and grammar that fits those situations? - Jerome Bruner p. 71

Information processing needs advance planning and precise rules. - Jerome Bruner p. 5

The acquisition of a first language is very context-sensitive. - Jerome Bruner p. 71

There is . . . a constraining biological limit on immediate memory—George Miller's famous "seven plus or minus two." But we have constructed symbolic devices for exceeding this limit: coding systems like octal digits, mnemonic devices, language tricks. Recall that Miller's main point in that landmark paper was that by conversion of input through such coding systems we, as enculturated human beings, are enabled to cope with seven chunks of information rather than with seven bits. Our knowledge, then, becomes enculturated knowledge . . . [and] we have broken through the original bounds set by the so-called biology of memory. Biology constrains, but not forevermore. - Jerome Bruner p. 21

Narrative is not just plot structure or dramatism. Nor is it just "historicity" or diachronicity. It is also a way of using language. To a striking degree, it relies upon the power of tropes—upon metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, implicature, and the rest to explore the full range of connections between the exceptional and the ordinary. Indeed, Ricocur even speaks of mimesis as a "metaphor of reality." - Jerome Bruner p. 59-60, abr

Roger Lewin, reviewing the primate literature of the last decades, concludes that it is probably sensitivity to the requirements of living in groups that provides the criterion for evolutionary selection in high primates.- Jerome Bruner p. 73

If the cognitive revolution erupted in 1956, the contextual revolution (at least in psychology) is occurring today. - Jerome Bruner p. 105-6

The biological substrate, the so-called universals of human nature, is not a cause of action but, at most, a constraint upon it or a condition for it. - Jerome Bruner p. 20-21

The existence of story as a form is a perpetual guarantee that humankind will "go meta" on received versions of reality. - Jerome Bruner p. 55

The organizing principle of folk psychology [is] narrative in nature rather than logical or categorical. Folk psychology is about human agents doing things on the basis of their beliefs and desires, striving for goals, meeting obstacles which they best or which best them, all of this extended over time. - Jerome Bruner p. 42-43

The story is being put together. - Jerome Bruner p. 122

To say something useful about truth. . . [Rorty says,] is to "explore practice rather than theory". - Jerome Bruner p. 26

In the end, "learning theory" died, or perhaps it would be better to say it withered away. - Jerome Bruner p. 104

Initial mastery [of language] can come only from participation in language as an instrument of communication. - Jerome Bruner p. 73

Is what we know "absolute," or is it always relative to some perspective, some point of view? . . . is reality a construction? - Jerome Bruner p. 24

There was . . . the standard way of adding a landscape of consciousness to the landscape of action in narrative. - Jerome Bruner p. 91

The study of the human mind is so difficult, so caught in the dilemma of being both the object and the agent of its own study. - Jerome Bruner p. xiii

A group of young sociologists led by Harold Garfinkel, mindful of the sorts of problems in epistemology such issues raised, took the radical step of proposing that in place of the classic sociological method—positing social classes, roles, and so on ex hypothesi --the social sciences might proceed by the rules of "ethnomethodology," creating a social science by reference to the social and political and human distinctions that people under study made in their everyday lives. In effect, Garfinkel and his colleagues were proposing an ethnosociology. - Jerome Bruner p. 37

I take the constructivism of cultural psychology to be a profound expression of democratic culture. It demands that we be conscious of how we come to our knowledge and as conscious as we can be about the values that lead us to our perspectives. It asks that we be accountable for how and what we know. - Jerome Bruner p. 30

It is only when constituent beliefs in a folk psychology are violated that narratives are constructed - Jerome Bruner p. 39

People narrativize their experience of the world and of their own role in it. - Jerome Bruner p. 115

Scientific psychology will fare better when it recognizes that its truths, like all truths about the human condition, are relative to the point of view that it takes toward that condition. And it will achieve a more effective stance toward the culture at large when it comes to recognize that the folk psychology of ordinary people is not just a set of self-assuaging illusions, but the culture's beliefs and working hypotheses about what makes it possible and fulfilling for people to live together, even with great personal sacrifice. - Jerome Bruner p. 32

Since C. S. Peirce, we recognize that meaning depends not only upon a sign and a referent but also upon an interpretant. - Jerome Bruner p. 69.

Stories seem to be designed to give the exceptional behavior meaning in a manner that implicates both an intentional state in the protagonist (a belief or desire) and some canonical element in the culture . . . The function of the story is to find an intentional state that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible a deviatiotion from a canonical cultural pattern. - Jerome Bruner p. 49-50

That we "store" specific archetypal stories or myths, as C. G. Jung has proposed . . . seems like misplaced concreteness. Rather, I mean [humans have] a readiness or predisposition to organize experience into a narrative form, into plot structures and the rest. - Jerome Bruner p. 45

The culture . . . provides us with guides and stratagems for finding a niche between stability and change: it exhorts, forbids, lures, denies, rewards the commitments that the Self undertakes. - Jerome Bruner p. 110

The interpreter has to grasp the narrative's configuring plot in order to make sense of its constituents, which he must relate to that plot. But the plot configuration must itself be extracted from the succession of events. - Jerome Bruner p. 43-44

The narrative's opaqueness, its circumstantiality, its genre, are taken to be as important as or, in any case, inseparable from its content. - Jerome Bruner p. 113

Narrative organizes experience. - Jerome Bruner p. 35

Utility is the multiplicative resultant of the value of a particular choice and its subjective probability of being successfully executed, and it has been the cornerstone of formal economic theory since Adam Smith. - Jerome Bruner p. 28

Where verifiability and verisimilitude seem to come together, to bring off a successful convergence is to bring off good rhetoric. - With Jerome Bruner p. 94

The new cognitive science . . . has gained its technical successes at the price of dehumanizing the very concept of mind it had sought to reestablish. - Jerome Bruner p. 1

Constructivism . . . is what legal scholars refer to as "the interpretive turn". - Jerome Bruner p. 25

Culture is also constitutive of mind. - Jerome Bruner p. 33

Human reflexivity, our capacity to turn around on the past and alter the present in its light, or to alter the past in the light of the present. - Jerome Bruner p. 109

I believe that we shall be able to interpret meanings and meaning-making in a principled manner only in the degree to which we are able to specify the structure and coherence of the larger contexts in which specific meanings are created and transmitted. - Jerome Bruner p. 63-64

People hold beliefs not only about the present but about the past and future, beliefs that relate us to time conceived of in a particular way—our way, not the way of [Meyer] Fortes's Talensee or [Margaret] Mead's Samoans. We believe, moreover, that our beliefs should cohere in some way. - Jerome Bruner p. 39

Pragmatic, perspectival questions would be more in order: "What would it be like to believe that?" or "What would I be committing myself to if I believed that?" - Jerome Bruner p. 26

Self too must be treated as a construction that, so to speak, proceeds from the outside in as well as from the inside out, from culture to mind as well as from mind to culture. - Jerome Bruner p. 108

Story, in a word, is vicarious experience, and the treasury of narratives into which we can enter includes, ambiguously, either "reports of real experience" or offerings of culturally shaped imagination. - Jerome Bruner p. 54

The Essential Self gave way to the Conceptual Self with hardly a shot fired. - Jerome Bruner p. 100

The fact that the historian's "empirical" account and the novelist's imaginative story share the narrative form is, on reflection, rather startling. - Jerome Bruner p. 45

The values underlying a way of life, as Charles Taylor points out, are only lightly open to "radical reflection." They become incorporated in one's self identity and, at the same time, they locate one in a culture. - Jerome Bruner p. 29

Well-formed stories, [Kenneth] Burke proposed, are composed of a pentad of an Actor, an Action, a Goal, a Scene, and an Instrument—plus Trouble. Trouble consists of an imbalance between any of the five elements of the pentad: an Action toward a Goal is inappropriate in a particular Scene . . . an Actor does not fit the Scene . . . or there is a dual Scene . . . or a confusion of Goals. - Jerome Bruner p. 50

When anybody is seen to believe or desire or act in a way that fails to take the state of the world into account, to commit a truly gratuitous act, he is judged to be folk-psychologically insane unless he as an agent can be narratively reconstrued as being in the grip of a mitigating quandary or of crushing circumstances . . . folk psychology has room for such reconstruals. - Jerome Bruner p. 40

Culture became the major factor in giving form to the minds of those living under its sway. A product of history rather than of nature, culture now became the world to which we had to adapt and the tool kit for doing so. - Jerome Bruner p. 11-12

Power of narrative, the ability not only to mark what is culturally canonical but to account for deviations that can be incorporated in narrative. The achievement of this skill, as I shall try to show, is not simply a mental achievement, but an achievement of social practice that lends stability to the child's social life. For one of the most powerful forms of social stability . . . is the human propensity to share stories of human diversity and to make their interpretations congruent with the divergent moral commitments and institutional obligations that prevail in every culture. - Jerome Bruner p. 68

Rules . . . affected human action. - Jerome Bruner p. 3

Utterances were treated in the classical tradition as decontextualized or unsponsored locutions. - Jerome Bruner p. 62.


這本書的翻譯者的普通英文實在太差勁

Percey Bridgman's operationalism also went a long way toward undermining the simplistic naive realism of earlier science: The Logic of Modern Physics,








Literature

Acom: Bruner, Jerome S. Acts of Meaning (the Jerusalem-Harvard Lectures). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990.

翻譯錯誤處

3. on Page 9:


" ... based on belief, desire, and moral commit- ment-unless it is purely stipulative in Dennett's sense-is now regarded as something to be eschewed by right-minded cognitive scientists ... "

on Page 25:


"Richard Rorty, in his exploration of the consequences of pragmatism, argues that interpretivism is part of a deep, slow movement to strip philosophy of its "foundational" status"

1. on Page 28:


"Consider the anomalies. Richard Herrnstein, for example, describes one amusingly called "dearer by the dozen" in which it can be shown that people prefer to buy season ... "

on Page 29:

"values underlying a way of life, as Charles Taylor points out, are only lightly open to "radical reflection." 4° They become incorporated in one's self identity ... "

中文本p. 23

Acts of Meaning (Jerusalem-Harvard Lectures) (Paperback)

by J Bruner (Author)

有意義的行為 吉林人民出版社 2008


1. on Page 5:


" ... world organized in the mind of a Muslim fundamentalist?" or "How does thç concept of Self differ in Homeric Greece and in the postindustrial world"


2. on Page 17:


"We know all about ego defense and rationalization. As for knowl- edge of Self, it is a compromise symptom hardened in the interplay between inhibition and anxiety, a formation that"


3. on Page 18:


" ... what the other would say, given a particular context. All of this is self-evident, not only at the informal level of dialogue, but at the formal level of privileged ... "


4. on Page 22:


" ... means. As Charles Taylor puts it in his brilliant new book, Sources of the Self, commitment is not just a preference"


5. on Page 23:


" ... this trap, notably in his doctrine of instinct. But this is surely a convenient and self-assuaging form of apologetics"


6. on Page 29:


" ... only lightly open to "radical reflection." 4° They become incorporated in one's self identity and, at the same time, they locate one in a culture"


7. on Page 32:


"largely because they are so caught up in the self-image generated by positivist science"


8. on Page 41:


"Folk Psychology as an Instrument of Culture intentional states: a domain where Self as agent operates with world knowledge and with desires that are expressed in a manner ... "


9. on Page 42:


"Acts of Meaning thropology of Self and Feeling," Michelle Rosaldo argues that notions like "self" or "affect" "grow not from `inner' essence relatively ... "


10. on Page 48:


"Because it is ordinary, it is experienced as canonical and therefore as self- explanatory. We take it for granted that if you ask somebody where"
1. on Page 9:


" ... against the new anti- intentionalism, like the philosophers John Searle and Charles Taylor, or the psychologist Kenneth Gergen, or the anthro"


2. on Page 22:


" ... desires and our actions in their behalf are mediated by symbolic means. As Charles Taylor puts it in his brilliant new book, Sources of the Self, commitment is not ... "


3. on Page 29:


"values underlying a way of life, as Charles Taylor points out, are only lightly open to "radical reflection." 4° They become incorporated in one's self identity ... "


4. on Page 39:


" ... friend. Personhood is itself a constituent concept of our folk psychology, and as Charles Taylor notes, it is attributed selec- tively"




嘲笑 侮辱 Skinner

1. on Page 38:

"However much the village atheism of a B. F. Skinner attempts to explain away human freedom and dignity, there remains the reality of the law of torts"


on Page 38:

"There is a powerful institutional argument in the Schutzian claim-if I may so label the position we are considering. It is that cultural institutions are constructed in a manner to reflect commonsense ... "




1. on Page 38:


" ... that new. Garfinkel gave credit to the distinguished economist- sociologist Alfred Schutz, whose systematic writings"


2.on Page 110:


"22 Gergen-like Garfinkel, Schutz, and the others whose "ethno-" programs in sociology and anthropology we encountered in Chapter 2-was initially interested"


3. from Back Matter:


"Natanson (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962). Schutz, On Phenomenology and Social Relations: Selected Writings of Alfred Schutz, ed. Helmut R. Wagner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press ... "



on Page 36: "Frake published a celebrated study of the system for classifying skin diseases among the Subanun of Mindanao, and there followed de- tailed studies by others on ethnobotany, ethnonavigation, and the like"


2. from Back Matter:


" ... Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). C. O. Frake, "The Diagnosis of Disease among the Subanun of Mindanao," American Anthropology 63; rpt"


1.on Page 36: 

"such as the Talensee studied by Meyer Fortes in the 1930s, had no time-bound crisis definitions. Things happened when they were "ready" 翻譯錯誤



1. on Page 51:


"begins with the narratorially certain realities of the Odyssey and ends with Virginia Woolf's attenuated phenomenology in To the Light- house." It is worth more than a passing thought ... "


9 references to principle in this book

*****

http://www.littera.waseda.ac.jp/wever/schutz_e/goLogin.do






This database includes international and multidisciplinary bibliography of secondary sources for the philosopher and social scientist Alfred Schutz (1899-1959).
The original list has been transferred from the website of the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology (CARP) with its approval in July, 2003. Thereafter, the Schutz Archive in Waseda University has kept collecting information. If you find items overlooked, or publish new materials, please send an e-mail to the Alfred Schutz Archive.

Many thanks to Manuel Martin Algarra, Michael Barber, Daniel Cefai, Peter Elgin, Lester Embree, Elizabeth Kassab, Evelyn Schutz Lang, Richard Lanigan, Alba Lucia Castelo Branco, Michael McDuffie, Hisashi Nasu, J. Sojka, Ilja Srubar, and Benno Werlen.

(1932-2003) Compiled by John Drabinski and edited by Edward B. Rackley
(2003-) Compiled by Kentaro Yabe, Suguru Iida, Ken'ichi Kawano, and Masato Kimura


1. on Page 35:


"what kind of a cognitive system is a folk psychology. Since its organizing principle is narrative rather than conceptual, I shall have to consider the nature of narrative ... "


2. on Page 38:


"principle of contracts freely agreed to, and the obdurate solidity of jails, courthouses, property markers, and the rest. Stich (perhaps the most radical critic of folk psychology"


3. on Page 42:


"reemphasize a critical point about the organizing principle of folk psychology as being narrative in nature rather than logical or categorical. Folk psychology is about human ... "


4. on Page 48:


"Paul Grice's Cooperative Principle captures the idea well. Grice proposed four maxims about how conversational ex- changes are and/or should be conducted-maxims ... "


5. on Page 63:


"constrained by the Cooperative Principle to which I alluded earlier-a set of maxims about the brevity, relevance, perspicu- ousness, and sincerity of conversational exchanges"


6. on Page 75:


" ... that the linguistic forms "grow out of" the prelinguistic practices. It is, I think, impossible in principle to establish any formal continuity between an earlier 75"


7. on Page 88:


" ... over. Her soliloquies were rich. Indeed, contrary to an "established" Vygotskyan principle"


8. on Page 122:


" ... six members of the same family. What started as a matter of convenience ended as a principle of research. And so the Goodhertzes: mother and father in their early 122"


哈佛大學出版社：
Jerome Bruner is University Professor at New York University and the author of many books, including Acts of Meaning; On Knowing; The Process of Education; and Toward a Theory of Instruction (all published by Harvard).
Read More by Jerome Bruner:
The Culture of Education
Toward a Theory of Instruction
Actual Minds, Possible Worlds
On Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand, Second Edition
The Process of Education, Revised Edition
Minding the Law
The Mind of a Mnemonist: A Little Book about a Vast Memory
Constructing Panic: The Discourse of Agoraphobia
Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life