《海德格爾選集》Martin Heidegger

 Heidegger: A very short introduction, by Michael Inwood, OUP, 2000

 Heidegger by George Steiner, London: Fontana, 1978

《海德格爾選集》 孫周興選編  上海：三聯、1994

海德格爾選集 內容簡介

馬丁・海德格爾（Martin Heidegger，1889―1976）是20世紀德國最具魅力的思想家。他一生運思逾半個世紀，著作等身。海德格爾早年在弗萊堡大學研讀神學和哲學，一九二三年任馬堡大學哲學教授。一九二八年，接替他的老師、現象學創始人胡塞爾任弗萊堡大學哲學講座教授。海德格爾是西方哲學史上一位有獨創性的、影響廣泛的思想家。他的最重要的著作是《存在與時間》，由於此書，海德格爾被視為現象學學派的發展者、存在主義哲學的創始人。

海德格爾選集 本書前言

　　一、德國思想家馬丁・海德格爾在二十世紀西方思想景觀中的顯突地位已經毋需編者在此多說。在鄰近世紀末的時候編譯這部《海德格爾選集》，我只為包括“海學”研究和翻譯工作在內的中國當代學術的落後深感心情之沉重――我們早就應該有此類《選集》了。

　　二、海德格爾一生運思逾半個世紀，著述殊為宏富，遠非這部百余萬言的兩卷本《選集》所能囊括。海德格爾全集編委會已擬訂出洋洋六十五卷的出版計畫，且尚有部分手稿未及編目。自七十年代中期以來，海氏全集的編輯和出版工作進展順利，每年出版三卷左右。以此速度，全集之峻工已經指日可待。而我國的“海學”翻譯和研究事業，只能說還處於起步的階段。本《選集》僅為研究海氏思想提供一個較為系統的文本。

　　三、我們在此將海德格爾的42篇文章（論文或著作之部分）收入本《選集》中。所選篇目多為海氏生前發表的論著，即基本上限於海氏全集的第一部分（第1―16卷）。這些篇目應是海德格爾的最重要的文字，是進入海氏思想之門的基本讀物。有些重要著作因篇幅過長，我們只能割愛，如《存在與時間》，我們只選收“導論”部分（好在它已有了中文全譯本）；《康得和形而上學問題》，我們選譯了其中的“導論”和“第一、四章”；又如《形而上學導論》，我們只收其“第二、三章”；而被認為海德格爾的最具代表性的著作之一的《哲學文集》（海氏《全集》第65卷，1989年海氏誕辰一百周年之際初版），因時間和精力的緣由，我們終於未能收入。這留待以後重版時修訂補充。

　　四、此項編選工作在一定程度上反映了編者對海德格爾思想的理解。編者按照“主題”把所選文章分為八編。各編之間的比例未必均衡。各編中的各篇文章則是根據創作時間的先後次序排列的。這種分劃和編排顯然不是嚴格的，而只可能是相對的，其合理性固然亦可置疑。不待說，若由另一人承擔此事，則將編出另一種模樣來，至少在選目和次序的安排方面會有很大變化。儘管如此，編者仍相信，基本的篇目還是可以確定的。

　　五、編者在編選時參考了幾個英文版海德格爾著作選集，如《海德格爾基本著作集》（D.F.克雷爾編，倫敦1978年）和《詩・語言・思》（A.霍夫斯達特譯，紐約1971年）等。但本《選集》的內容顯然已遠遠超出了眼下可見的幾個英文選本。

　　六、文中術語和譯名盡可能一致，但亦不能強求統一。最為典型的是後期海德格爾的基本思想詞語Ereignis，在本《選集》的有關文章的不同語境中有十分不同的譯法。這一方面基於海氏的“思的事情”本身，另一方面也表明我們的翻譯和研究工作尚有待深入。

　　七、文中的注釋分為三類：原注、譯（校）者注和編者注。文後附有：海德格爾生平年表、海德格爾著作目錄（生前發表的著作）、海德格爾全集目錄（中、德文），可供參考。

　　八、此項譯事由國內部分“海學”研究者合作完成。編者承擔了其中二十六篇文章的翻譯和“附錄”的編譯，並作了一些統校、編輯工作；其餘十六篇文章為其他學者所譯。為尊重譯者的勞動，宣導良好的編譯風氣，本《選集》在目錄和文中均標明各篇文章的譯者和校者的姓名。希望讀者在引用本《選集》的文字時，亦能注明有關文章的譯、校者。

　　九、海德格爾著作之艱澀和奇譎舉世聞名。譯事本屬勉強，可謂“譯不可譯”。雖經譯者和編者的盡心盡力，但譯文中錯訛之處實為難免。懇請有心的讀者不吝賜教，以便促成更可靠、更成熟的譯文的出現。

作為編者，我在此首先要感謝北京大學的熊偉教授的大力支持。熊偉先生對中國的“海學”研究具有開創之功。他欣然同意將他的獨具風格的幾篇重要譯文收入本《選集》中。甚至在病重住院期間，熊偉先生仍關心著《選集》編譯工作的進展。倘若沒有熊偉先生的激勵、指導和幫助，本《選集》的工作無疑將極難開展。

　　在編選過程中，張志揚教授、劉小楓教授、倪梁康教授等友人對編者初擬的編選計畫提出了修改意見。我盡可能考慮和採納了他們的意見。瑞士巴塞爾大學的海因裏希・奧特（HeinrichOtt）教授、德國圖賓根大學的貢特・費加爾（GünterFigal）教授、德國明斯特大學的路德維希・西普（LudwigSiep）教授等提供了具體的指導和幫助。他們對選目計畫的整體肯定使我增加了一些信心。費加爾教授曾建議編者增加海德格爾前期哲學部分的份量，並且指出了可增收的有關篇目。他的建議終由於時間方面的限制而未能得到採納。

　　因編者的約請，倪梁康教授、鄧曉芒教授和陳小文、戴暉等友人承接了本《選集》的部分譯事。我感謝他們的友情支持。《選集》並且經王煒、劉小楓、陳嘉映、靳希平諸位先生同意，收錄了他們已經發表的譯文，在此謹表謝意。

　　上海三聯書店的倪為國先生為本《選集》的出版耗費了大量時間和精力。我妻子方紅玫不辭辛勞，為我列印了大部分譯稿。我感激的心情在此無以言表。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　孫周興

　　　　　　　　　　　　1994年6月4日記於西子湖畔

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　補記

　　　　　　　交稿前夕，驚悉熊偉教授逝世。謹以此書紀念熊偉先生。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1994年8月1日晚記

Foreign Affairs

Martin Heidegger may have been a virulent anti-Semite, but his work still stands on its own:

http://ow.ly/FXg4n

參考翻譯

Haters Gonna Hate

Does It Matter That Heidegger Was a Nazi?

By Christian Madsbjerg
; Gregory Fried

FROM OUR JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2015 ISSUE

WHAT WE KNOW

The German philosopher Martin Heidegger has always been a deeply problematic character. Scholars have long known that Heidegger was an active and unapologetic Nazi. But for the most part, they managed to separate the man from his work. Until now, that is: after examining several of Heidegger’s private notebooks, released just last year, Gregory Fried (“What Heidegger Was Hiding,” November/December 2014) argues that such a separation is no longer possible.


Fried is one of a growing number of academics who claim that Heidegger’s anti-Semitism infected his core philosophical ideas and who have delivered, in essence, an intellectual death sentence. “The notebooks will almost certainly spell the end of Heidegger as an intellectual cult figure, and that is a welcome development,” Fried writes. But he has things backward: philosophers achieve immortality not by escaping the eye of critics but by being subjected to critics, who chisel away at the uninteresting and inconsistent to reveal a bedrock 
of truth.


All the notebooks provide is further evidence that Heidegger was a flawed person with dangerous political views. His work, like that of other philosophers with problematic biographies, will continue to stand on its own. Marx’s ideas have survived despite his xenophobia; Nietzsche’s, despite his madness. Students still read these thinkers at seminar tables around the world, just as they should Heidegger. However abhorrent Heidegger’s politics, his ideas are more relevant than ever. They tackle today’s most important philosophical question: How can humans find meaning in modern lives?


Heidegger believed that previous philosophers had answered this question incorrectly, assuming that meaning came from external forces. For Plato, truth derived from ideal forms; for Christians, from God; for Nietzsche, from the so-called will to power. Heidegger feared that such worldviews, by directing people’s focus outward, estranged them from their fundamental “being,” turning them into mere resources available to be optimized. Something can be said for that prediction: many businesses now refer to their employees as “full-time resources,” or “FTRs.” They manage them through human resources departments, track them on spreadsheets, and dispose of those they deem unneeded. 


Heidegger believed that such logic led to a nihilistic culture that alienated people from where meaning actually lay: in deep involvement with the world they inhabited. People were at their best, he contended, when they collectively engaged with their history, as the French do in what they call 
“the culture of the table,” a tradition of cooking and conversation now under siege from TV dinners and other processed food. When people got in touch with their roots, they couldn’t be reduced to profit engines for others.


It is true that Heidegger used such concepts to indict Jews in his notebooks, writing that they were “uprooting” German society and promoting 
a culture of “empty rationality” and “calculative skill.” But just because Heidegger’s hatred made its way into the notebooks doesn’t invalidate his use of similar concepts elsewhere, such as in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” his noteworthy 1951 lecture, in which he never referenced the Jews but still made a stirring case for a more rooted existence. 


Further evidence for Heidegger’s theories can be found by looking at the state of the world today. Time and again, the culture Heidegger warned against has sowed misunderstanding in virtually every area of human affairs. As crises of governance have gripped countries around the world, politicians have fed the paralysis by reading their constituents through abstract poll numbers. And because banks calculated risk according to a reductive conception of human nature—as rational and profit maximizing—they led the entire financial system astray in 2008, setting the stage for a crash. If flawed ideas are holding modern society back, then, Heidegger’s offer a way forward. The philosopher’s anti-Semitism, however abominable, shouldn’t stand in the way.


CHRISTIAN MADSBJERG is a founding partner of the innovation consultancy ReD Associates.


FRIED REPLIES

Christian Madsbjerg calls me “one of a growing number of academics who claim that Heidegger’s anti-Semitism infected his core philosophical ideas and who have delivered, in essence, an intellectual death sentence.” But that description misunderstands my reaction to what I termed “the end of Heidegger as an intellectual cult figure.” I argued that Heidegger wanted his readers to embrace genuine philosophical questions rather than his own ossified answers—a goal best served by Heidegger’s death as an object of intellectual hagiography.


Taking up Heidegger’s call requires walking a fine line between rejecting the philosopher outright and ignoring his political choices. To do so, one must closely examine Heidegger’s anti-
Semitism and his Nazism, assessing how the questions Heidegger formulated and the answers he arrived at led him where they did. Only then can Heidegger’s work retain its value. After all, one doesn’t study philosophy merely to find confirmation in the views of others. Quite the opposite: readers learn the most about themselves by confronting those with whom they deeply disagree.


The question Heidegger took up—of what it meant to be human—is as ancient as philosophy itself and never belonged solely to him. Heidegger rejected any answer that located meaning in the metaphysical, in terms of a supreme being, entity, or system. He argued that meaning instead came from an existence rooted in one’s own time and place. That is why Heidegger hoped Hitler’s movement would occasion a radical, even apocalyptic new beginning to history: the overthrow of liberal universalism and the return to a society grounded in historical tradition. It is also why he saw the Jews—in his mind, one of the prime proponents of the Western metaphysical tradition—as standing in the way.


Madsbjerg is right that Heidegger’s thinking still has much to offer outside the walls of the academy. The conflict between universalism and particularism remains the defining test of today, as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, destroys cities to forward its fundamentalist vision and nativist groups in Europe attack immigrants to serve their nationalist ones. Humanity can confront this continuing challenge only by treating it seriously and philosophically. And Heidegger can still help make sense of it; important thinkers almost always have some ideas that can be broken off from their work as a whole, and one can engage with the questions they take up without accepting their specific answers. In Heidegger’s case, however, one must tread especially carefully, armed with a full recognition of what that whole entails.