大到不能倒：金融海嘯內幕真相始末 Too Big to Fail: The inside story of how Wall Street and Washington fought to save the financial system---and themselves

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〔推薦序〕金融海嘯帶給我們的珍貴教訓　殷乃平
〔推薦序〕金融資本主義的失落　許振明
作者的話
譯者的話
重要人物與機構
前言
第一章　雷曼股價暴跌
第二章　財政部長鮑爾森
第三章　為何拯救貝爾斯登？
第四章　聯準會主席柏南克
第五章　放空雷曼！
第六章　雷曼的內部爭議
第七章　美林搖搖欲墜
第八章　AIG深陷危機
第九章　高盛的未來
第十章　房地美與房利美的危機
第十一章　接管兩房
第十二章　即將倒下的巨人
第十三章　誰來救雷曼？
第十四章　執行長們的會議
第十五章　雷曼之死
第十六章　AIG崩塌
第十七章　摩根士丹利的掙扎
第十八章　日本三菱來電！
第十九章　高盛獲救
第二十章　財政部的最後會議
後記
致謝
參考書目

序

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推薦序1
金融海嘯帶給我們的珍貴教訓　　殷乃平
　　「大到不能倒」一直是金融界的名言。因為銀行吸收民眾的存款，貸放或投資給企業、投資者、消費者等，一旦倒閉，波及甚廣。愈大的銀行影響層面愈深，嚴重者可以撼動一國經濟。所以世界各國出現嚴重的大銀行倒閉事件時，多由政府出面解決，當然最後都是納稅人買單。不過金融海嘯發生之後，不少國家發現銀行的虧損已大到政府無法因應的地步，例如冰島的銀行業務遍及歐洲，倒閉虧損是其全國GDP的二十倍左右，而瑞士的瑞士信貸與瑞士銀行業務跨及全世界，虧損也超過瑞士GDP的六倍，這時，政府想救也救不起來。於是有人改稱之為「大到不能救」。本書以「大到不能倒」為名，自然一語道破其中的問題所在。
　　書中從金融海嘯的源頭華爾街的投資銀行在金融市場上興風作浪、槓桿操作講起，其中金融機構所創造的金融資產證券化，將銀行的放款集束包裝成市場上可以轉手買賣交易的證券，不同的金融機構從規劃到包裝、提供信用保證、信用評等、負責上市行銷、撮合造市等，由於有多重保障，風險低而報酬相對卻較高，成為機構投資人主要投資對象，對沖基金又以之為主要的投資工具對沖風險。如此，每家金融機構環環相扣，一旦發生違約事件，就會造成骨牌效應，每家涉入的金融機構都會被拖累。次貸風暴就是在這種背景之下爆發出來的。
　　本書從貝爾斯登倒閉在金融市場中帶來的衝擊，到雷曼掙扎求生，波濤起伏，終至敗亡的經過，歷歷如繪。而美國政府不救雷曼卻因為擔心體制風險，怕引起全球金融恐慌，扔出八百五十億美元救AIG(最後是花了一千八百億美元)，折衝往返的決策過程，頗為精彩。隨後投資人對金融機構失去信心，客戶不斷流失，美林被迫併入美國銀行，摩根士丹利與高盛也在持續虧損、股價直落的情形下，改制為銀行，接受較嚴格的銀行規範，至此，美國的投資銀行幾乎全部消失。而在財政部的壓力下，摩根士丹利與高盛不甘不願地被迫與銀行做合併商議，雖然終以增資暫時解決，不過，未來前途未卜，仍然逆料。除此之外，房地美、房利美是半官方的房貸批發機構，隨著房貸市場出問題，若不立即救援，房地產市場全面崩潰可期。同時，為恢復投資人與存款人對金融機構的信心，問題資產拯救計劃(TARP)在國會的通過，以及執行銀行注資，近乎國有化過程的經過，都有頗為深入的分析。
　　金融海嘯為人類有史以來少有的大災難，處身其中的每個人應該都有不同的體會。本書中對金融危機從華爾街到華盛頓每一個場景，都生動地描繪出來。其中，最值得一看的是面臨金融災難下，扮演救火隊的各個角色：財政部長鮑爾森（來自華爾街）、聯儲主席柏南克（原是研究一九三○年代經濟大恐慌的學者）、紐約聯儲總裁蓋特納(後接任財長)等人在金融危機當中，如何全力施展，力圖挽救惡化中的金融機制、以及衰退的美國經濟。當然，事後觀察，許多危機處理政策不無可置喙之處，同時整個危機的發展已延伸到全世界，全球經濟問題接二連三的爆發，已近失控狀態，卻是始料未及。
　　回顧美國在金融危機中的救援政策，有許多打破先例的做法，如聯儲原只負責銀行的管理，卻於法不合的跨界救援投資銀行與保險公司；當財政部公債賣不掉時，聯儲干冒大不諱印鈔來買；財政部長濫用權力，介入迫使金融機構配合購併，以解決問題等，均多有違常理，縱使事急從權，亦有所不當。
　　華爾街為世界金融中心，集世界上最為聰明、最有智慧的金融專業人才，在金錢追逐與貪婪動力之下，堆砌成世界財富的聚散之地。本書指出，在政府「大到不能倒」的原則下，整個經濟體系與社會成為華爾街的人質，不管你願不願意，都要付出贖金。肥貓一族，可以坐享其利，風險與成本卻都由社會承擔，頗值得深思。美國新近通過的金改法案，就是在這個背景之下推出的。
　　細讀此書，可以了解華爾街金融機構的運作，對金融業者應有所啟發；面對各種金融問題，如何因應，政策如何制定，對金融主管亦有頗多可參考或戒慎之處；對投資人而言，可以看到金融危機發生的原因與發展的經過，可以經由書中的分析知道投資風險之所在，找出哪類金融機構較能在風雨中屹立不搖，進而找出趨吉避凶之道。這也是人類史上極為重要的一段記錄，它所產生的體制變革，影響將更為久遠。
　　總之，本書不僅值得一讀，更值得保存。

（本文作者為國立政治大學金融學系教授）

推薦序2
金融資本主義的失落　　許振明
　　《大到不能倒》這本書是以二○○八年的三月至十月期間，從金融危機爆發，到美國財政部投入資金於各大銀行為止，其中的發展與各種內幕為主。其以雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）為主視窗，旁及其他投資銀行（高盛、摩根士丹利、美林）、商業銀行（美國銀行、摩根大通、花旗、美聯銀行……）、大型保險公司（AIG）、對沖基金、空頭炒家、媒體、國會、金融主管機關（財政部、聯準會），眾多機構與人物牽涉其中，不僅描摹出金融危機的全貌，高度的寫實性與豐富的情節，凸顯了各機構的不同立場與衝突合作，使這本書讀來像是一本抽絲剝繭的偵探小說、一部懸疑影片，讓讀者可在趣味中，不知不覺、一氣呵成地看到最後，並能從中汲取寶貴教訓。
　　在雷曼兄弟執行長福爾德（Richard Fuld）的掌舵之下，雷曼兄弟度過了一九九八年的俄羅斯金融危機，卻躲不過十年後的美國次級房貸危機，甚而釀成國際金融海嘯。福爾德太過自信，認為擁有足夠的流動資金即可支應任何狀況，對於自家的房地產相關衍生商品過於自信，也缺乏足夠的理解與注意，為了追求高利潤，過度承擔風險，忽略了資產泡沫的信用風險、倒帳風險，終遭反噬。當各資產一一違約的連鎖反應不斷擴大時，即使再龐大的現金部位也難以支應。最終，負債大於資本，許多資產都變得一文不值。因此，金融機構面對追求高風險高報酬的抉擇時，應審慎考量這類高槓桿高負債的經營方式。
　　這本書還有以下幾點值得思考與討論：
　　第一，長期以來，金融業「大到不能倒」的現象，一直是貨幣銀行學的主題之一，也成為金融主管機關的一大挑戰。政府往往在紓困措施之後說「僅此一次」，但是下次遇到「拯救大銀行 vs.放任經濟崩潰」的抉擇時，又會怎麼做？此次金融危機當中，美國財長鮑爾森就面臨了三月時紓困貝爾斯登，九月初紓困房利美與房地美，九月十五日讓雷曼兄弟破產，九月十六日立刻決定紓困AIG給予八百五十億美元貸款，之後又撮合美林併入美國銀行，努力營救高盛和摩根士丹利……。前後不一的決策，再加上政治力的牽制，往往讓情況更加複雜。紓困會造成銀行的「道德風險」問題，身為主管機關如何拿捏，有時並無絕對的標準。聯準會主席柏南克在雷曼申請破產後的一次會議上說過：「貓耳洞?沒有無神論者，金融危機中沒有道學先生。」道盡了理論與實務的兩難。
　　第二，就世界局勢看，雷曼兄弟事件爆發成為金融危機，造成全球市場與經濟環境的動盪，這使得美國式資本主義，在全球進行金融殖民主義的進程遭到嚴重挫敗。由於美國連帶歐洲的經濟陷入衰退，相對地中國經濟強勢成長成為全球復甦的火車頭，使得經濟勢力從先進國家往新興國家挪移之趨勢，越發明顯，也開啟了未來的世界新局。而金融風暴影響所及，WTO的金融服務業全球化的推動，也面臨推遲。
　　第三，原本金融機構賴以生存的關鍵，不是滿坑滿谷的錢，而是存款人的信賴，以及金融機構彼此之間的信任。從書中可以看到，在金融危機的最高峰，信心盡失的存款人、對沖基金、及各銀行為了避免成為「最後一個」，爭先恐後的撤資的慘況，有識者應有所警惕。不光是金融業，各行各業也是，顧客的信心與信賴，應特別予以重視關心。
　　這本書可以從許多角度來看：從金融監管的角度，從反省金融資本主義心態的角度，從了解商業運作的角度（有些是負面示範），甚至可從書中讀到人心與人性，相信會對讀者有所幫助。

（本文作者為台灣金融研訓院院長）

作者的話
　　這本書是與直接參與到金融危機各事件的逾兩百位受訪者進行超過五百個小時的訪問，所得到的成果。受訪者包括華爾街的高層行政人員、董事會成員、管理層、現任或前任公務員、外國政府官員、銀行家、律師、會計師、以及一些顧問。不少受訪者提供了「白紙黑字」的文件資料，包括筆記、電郵、錄音、內部報告、文件草稿、講稿、行事曆、來電顯示、收費單據、開支報告……構成了書中細節的基礎。
　　他們有的更絞盡腦汁甚至花上數小時回憶會談中的一字一句，或者會議上的任何細節──不少會議只供特權人士知悉，甚至是機密。
　　有鑑於這些事件的爭議性──撰寫此書時，有幾件涉及刑事的調查仍在進行當中，更不用說數不清的民事訴訟案件──不少受訪者都以不具名、無法被追索身分的形式提供資料。再考慮到每個場景都有不同人士參與重建、確認當時的實際情況，因此，每一個角色說出的每一句話，其資源來源可能是來自其他方面，例如在場的其他與會者、透過擴音器參與電話會議的人士、或者由當場聽到當事人覆述情況的第三者，甚至當時的草稿、筆記資料──總的來說，並不一定由講者本人提供。
　　關於這次金融危機，坊間已有不少文字紀錄，而這本書是依據我的財經記者同事們的珍貴資料，這部份我會容後一一詳細列明。
　　但是，我希望在此提供的，是第一次把細節、以及無時無刻地追蹤這個歷史上最扣人心弦的災難，將之清楚地帶到世人眼前。提供資料的每一位人士，他們深信自己親眼看著經濟如何跌入深坑。
　　義大利偉大的科學家伽利略曾說：「所有被發現的真理都很容易被理解，重點是去發現它。」我希望我至少發現了一點點，也因此，可以讓過去幾年複雜的財經事件更容易被人理解。
譯者的話
　　動筆翻譯《大不能倒》是源於一股試它一試的衝動。這一念頭帶來的結果，是持續一百天的「筆戰」——每天早上四時半起床，爭取在上班前翻譯它三個小時；下班回家趕緊完成家務，晚上九時開始，再奮鬥四個小時……日復一日，按編輯大人的囑咐每天苦戰五頁。我把所有的空閒活動置之度外，為的，只是希望能和我最好的朋友盡早分享和討論書中內容。
　　作者安德魯．羅斯．索爾金（Andrew Ross Sorkin）擁有深邃的洞察力，這部厚墩墩的大作文風坦誠直率。不少人有先入為主的成見，以為索爾金這位出色的傳媒工作者，以其筆桿慣有的辛辣鋒利，此作八成是一心羅列華爾街和華盛頓官商勾結的罪證；反而，作者是把二００八年金融海嘯的箇中關鍵人物，內心深處不足為外人道的恐懼、無援，深刻地勾畫並展現在讀者的眼前，力圖做出一個公平、公正的紀錄。
　　儘管作者索爾金在美國主流媒體打滾多年，但翻開《大到不能倒》，讀者看到的卻是徹底違反好萊塢公式的實況：傳媒並非秉持正義，堅持發掘「真相」；也沒有挺身而出為他人犧牲的英雄，反而是，主人翁個個都以受害者自居，滿腔的怨恨不知應向誰發洩；同樣，所謂拯救世界經濟的英雄，其實不外是幾個急就章的臭皮匠湊得一個諸葛亮……
　　華爾街是世界上把資本主義發揮得最淋漓盡致的地方，就是一股求利的動力，竟可把來自不同種族、不同文化、不同信念、不同宗教……的各式人物牢牢地團結在一起。完成交易是銀行家天生的本能，為了完成交易，再不可能發生的妥協都變為可能──原來，利之當頭，真正的世界大同可展現在世人面前……原來，利益的熙來攘往力量之大，絕對凌駕在種族、宗教和政治立場……的芥蒂之上。
　　不過，令譯者最為感動的是，儘管金融界被一場海嘯弄得人仰馬翻，但在索爾金的筆下，人人仍盡力堅守崗位：不論是基層員工或國際級風雲人物，每人都是各為其主（這主可能是自己），在可能是一生最大的徬徨焦慮中仍克盡己任，在這場驚天動地的金融海嘯中咬緊牙關捍衛個人、美國、全球不同政權和經濟體系內各階層的利益。
　　另一觸動譯者之處，是作者對人的尊重。在這個世界上，人們總習慣前仆後繼地記錄「偉人」的一舉一動，其他的大多數人物就統統被埋入所謂無名英雄記念碑，其實是偉人的背後，有不少同事、下屬……各式人等一直鞠躬盡瘁地供「偉人」如牛馬驅策──在索爾金這本暢銷全球的金融故事書中，作者記錄的除了鮑爾森、蓋特納、柏南克外，還包括幾個月來一同苦撐的聯儲、財政部的隊伍，以及業界的一眾人物，就是這一點一滴的故事讓人動容——It makes it real and it makes it so much more human.

內容連載

§內文1

第二章　財政部長鮑爾森
　　
　　二○○八年三月，在華盛頓西北面一個樹影悠悠的花園住宅內，緊張不安的鮑爾森在家中來回踱步，他的手機貼在他耳邊其慣常的位置。今天是貝爾斯登被收購後的第一個星期天。鮑爾森的太太溫蒂整個週末都對丈夫頗有微詞，他的手機不分晝夜響個不停，一個又一個說不完的電話。她哄鮑爾森出外散步：「一個小時也不行？」鮑爾森終於答應她到離家不遠、在市中心的岩溪公園騎單車逛逛。這是過去一個多星期來，鮑爾森頭一次從埋頭苦幹中釋放出來。

　　但是，他的電話又響了。而且當他聽完來電者道明來意後，這位美國財政部部長對著電話大叫起來：「我真的很想破口大罵！」

　　電話是傑米．戴蒙（Jamie Dimon）打來的。戴蒙在摩根大通總部八樓的辦公室跟財長報告他極不願聽到的消息：摩根大通決定調高收購貝爾斯登的作價，由每股二美元提高到十美元。

　　其實，這消息對鮑爾森來說並非完全意料之外，整整一個星期，鮑爾森幾乎每天都跟戴蒙通電話，好幾次甚至打斷了戴蒙每早的跑步鍛鍊。在每天的交談中，鮑爾森已知道摩根大通有可能提高價格。自摩根大通宣布收購貝爾斯登後，貝爾斯登的股東對於收購價之低感到十分不滿，鮑爾森和戴蒙都非常擔心貝爾斯登的股東會對收購投反對票，導致貝爾斯登又一次的崩塌。

　　鮑爾森原希望戴蒙對收購價只增加一點──最多提高到八美元，而絕非二位數。鮑爾森對戴蒙的決定感到很懊惱，他壓低沙啞的聲音說：「這價錢遠高於我們所談過的。」一週前，當戴蒙表示他準備以每股四美元收購貝爾斯登時，鮑爾森曾私下指示戴蒙要把價錢盡量壓低：「我覺得可以象徵式地，例如一美元或二美元之類的。」事實上，如果貝爾斯登沒有得到政府承諾擔保其二百九十億美元的債務，公司早就破產了，鮑爾森不想背上「為拯救華爾街的老朋友而甘願當冤大頭」的惡名，他跟戴蒙說：「我看不出有什麼理由他們可以得到這個數目。」

　　事情發展至今，除戴蒙外，沒有其他人知道，原來美國財政部部長是貝爾斯登低價出售的幕後統籌者，鮑爾森希望這個祕密一直保持下去。就像大多數信奉保守經濟主義的人，鮑爾森仍尊崇新古典經濟學派「看不見的手」的原則，任何政府的干預都應該是萬不得已的最後一招。

　　鮑爾森本身亦曾擔任執行長，他太明白戴蒙的立場；然而，他同樣看重的是如何平復市場。在過去的一週，市場已充滿紛亂。貝爾斯登的股東和員工知道二美元收購價之後幾乎全體發難，威脅玉石俱焚──不僅拉倒交易，而且拉倒整個市場。另一邊，戴蒙發現這個急就章的合併協議原來包含極大的漏洞：貝爾斯登的股東可以否決交易，但摩根大通在未來一年仍然有責任要擔保貝爾斯登進行的交易。

　　戴蒙引述貝爾斯登老牌經紀人埃德．莫德沃（Ed Moldaver）的話回答鮑爾森：「這不是奉旨成婚，這根本是強姦！」這句話，是莫德沃當著上百個貝爾斯登員工的面，對於戴蒙提出如此的收購建議的尖銳嘲諷。

　　鮑爾森也向戴蒙坦言，說華府內也有極大的反對聲音，因華府大多數人都認為華爾街充斥的是貪婪的高薪肥貓一族，提出方案拯救他們，就如同提出加稅一般不受歡迎。鮑爾森說他也受到龐大的壓力：「我簡直是四面受敵。」

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維基百科，自由的百科全書

大到不能倒（Too Big to Fail，縮寫TBTF）是一個經濟學上的概念，指當一些規模極大或在產業中具有關鍵性重要地位的企業瀕臨破產時，政府不能等閒視之，甚至要不惜投入公帑相救，以避免那些企業倒閉後所掀起的巨大連鎖反應造成社會整體更嚴重的傷害，這種情況即稱為「大到不能倒」。

"Too big to fail" is a term of art in regulation and public policy that refers to businesses dealing with market complications related to moral hazard, economic specialization, and monetary theory.
Entities are considered to be "too big to fail" by those who believe those entities are so central to a macroeconomy that their failure will be disastrous to an economy, and as such believe they should become recipients of beneficial financial and economic policies from governments and/or central banks.^[1] It is thought that companies that fall into this category take positions that are high-risk, as they are able to leverage these risks based on the policy preference they receive.^[2] The term has emerged as prominent in public discourse since the 2007–2010 global financial crisis.
Some critics see the policy as counterproductive and that large banks or other institutions should be left to fail if their risk management is not effective.^[3]^[4] Moreover, some assert that the "too big to fail" policy has been explicitly refuted in the People's Republic of China, with the bankruptcy of Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corporation in 1998.^[5]
Some economists, such as Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman don't see it as necessarily a bad thing, with economy of scale in banks, as in other businesses, as worth preserving, so long as they are well regulated, in proportion to their economic clout.^[6]^[7]^[8]^[9]

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Revisiting the Lehman Brothers Bailout That Never Was

By JAMES B. STEWART and PETER EAVISSEPT. 29, 2014

Lehman’s headquarters on its bankruptcy day in 2008.Mark Lennihan/Associated Press

Inside the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, time was running out to answer a question that would change Wall Street forever.

At issue that September, six years ago, was whether the Fed could save a major investment bank whose failure might threaten the entire economy.

The firm was Lehman Brothers. And the answer for some inside the Fed was yes, the government could bail out Lehman, according to new accounts by Fed officials who were there at the time.

But as the world now knows, no one rescued Lehman. Instead, the firm was allowed to collapse overnight, a decision that, in cool hindsight, let problems at one bank snowball into a full-blown panic. By the time it was over, nearly every other major bank had to be saved.

Why, given all that happened, was Lehman the only bank that was not too big to fail? For the first time, Fed officials have offered an account that differs significantly from the versions that, for many, have hardened into history.

Ben S. Bernanke, the Fed chairman at the time, Henry M. Paulson Jr., the former Treasury Secretary, and Timothy F. Geithner, who was then president of the New York Fed, have all argued that Lehman Brothers was in such a deep hole from its risky real estate investments that Fed did not have the legal authority to rescue it.

Richard S. Fuld Jr., center, chief of Lehman Brothers, was heckled by protesters after testifying to Congress in October 2008 about the collapse. CreditSusan Walsh/Associated Press

But now, interviews with current and former Fed officials show that a group inside New York Fed was leaning toward the opposite conclusion — that Lehman was narrowly solvent and therefore might qualify for a bailout. In the frenetic events of what has become known as the Lehman weekend, that preliminary analysis never reached senior officials before they decided to let Lehman fail.

Understanding why Lehman was allowed to die goes beyond apportioning responsibility for the financial crisis and the recession that cost millions of ordinary Americans jobs and savings. Today, long after the bailouts, the debate rages over the Fed’s authority to bail out failing firms. Some Fed officials worry that when the next financial crisis comes, the Fed will have less power to shield the financial system from the failure of a single large bank. After the Lehman debacle, Congress curbed the Fed’s ability to rescue a bank in trouble.

Whether to save Lehman came down to a crucial question: Did Lehman have enough solid assets to back a loan from the Fed? Finding the answer fell to two teams of financial experts at the New York Fed. Those teams had provisionally concluded that Lehman might, in fact, be a candidate for rescue, but members of those teams said they never briefed Mr. Geithner, who said he did not know of the results.

“My colleagues at the New York Fed were careful and creative, and as demonstrated through the crisis that fall, we were willing to go to extraordinary lengths to try to protect the economy from the unfolding financial disaster,” Mr. Geithner said Monday in a statement to The New York Times. “We explored all available alternatives to avoid a collapse of Lehman, but the size of its losses were so great that they were unable to attract a buyer, and we were unable to lend on a scale that would save them.”

Mr. Bernanke and Mr. Paulson said in recent interviews with The Times that they did not know about the Fed analysis or its conclusions.

Interviews with half a dozen Fed officials, who spoke on the condition they not be named, so as not to breach the Fed’s unofficial vow of silence, suggest some Fed insiders believed that the government had the authority to throw Lehman Brothers a lifeline, even if the bank was nearly broke. The Fed earlier came to the rescue of Bear Stearns, after doing little analysis, and only days later saved the American International Group. The government subsequently saved the likes of Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Ultimately, whether Lehman should have gotten Fed support was a judgment call, not a matter of strict statute, these people said.

“We had lawyers joined at our hips,” said one participant. “And they were very helpful at framing the issues. But they never said we couldn’t do it.”

As another participant put it, “It was a policy and political decision, not a legal decision.”

A Wall Street Watershed

The account from the New York Fed officials provides new insight into a dangerous moment in Wall Street history. Countless financial figures — from Wall Street chiefs to government policy makers — have said that allowing Lehman to die the way it did was a misjudgment that inflicted unnecessary pain.

“There is close to universal agreement that the demise of Lehman Brothers was the watershed event of the entire financial crisis and that the decision to allow it to fail was the watershed decision,” Alan S. Blinder, an economics professor at Princeton and former vice chairman of the Fed, wrote in his history of the financial crisis, “After the Music Stopped.”

“The Fed has explained the decision as a legal issue,” Mr. Blinder said in an interview. “But is that true or valid? Is it enough? Those are important questions.”

“I will maintain to my deathbed that we made every effort to save Lehman, but we were just unable to do so because of a lack of legal authority,” said Ben S. Bernanke, in an interview with the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission on Nov. 17, 2009.CreditShawn Thew/European Pressphoto Agency

Whether the Fed should have tried to save Lehman is still a subject of heated debate. And it is unclear whether the firm could have been rescued at all.

What happened that September was the culmination of circumstances reaching back years — of ordinary people too eager to borrow, of banks too eager to lend and of Wall Street financial engineers reaping multimillion-dollar bonuses. Even so, saving Lehman from complete collapse might have shielded the economy from what turned out to be a crippling blow. And as the subsequent rescue of A.I.G., the insurance giant, demonstrated, a rescue could have included substantial protections for taxpayers.

Back in 2008, the Fed possessed broad authority to lend to banks in trouble. Section 13-3 of the Federal Reserve Act provided that “in unusual and exigent circumstances” the Fed could lend to any institution, as long as the loan was “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Bank.” In the eyes of the Fed, that means a firm must be solvent and have adequate collateral to lend against, and making that determination was the responsibility of the New York Fed, the regional Fed bank that had begun to assume responsibility for Lehman. On that September weekend, teams from the New York Fed were told to assess Lehman’s solvency and collateral.

Whether and how much the Fed could lend Lehman depended on those teams’ findings, although the final decision rested with Mr. Geithner, Mr. Bernanke and the Federal Reserve Board.

A Question of Valuation

In recent interviews, members of the teams said that Lehman had considerable assets that were liquid and easy to value, like United States Treasury securities. The question was Lehman’s illiquid assets — primarily a real estate portfolio that Lehman had recently valued at $50 billion. By Lehman’s account, the firm had a surplus of assets over liabilities of $28.4 billion.

“Let me also say, for the record, strongly: There was no authority, there was no law that would have let us save Lehman Brothers,” said Henry M. Paulson Jr., at the House Committee on Financial Services on Nov. 18, 2008. CreditAlex Wong/Getty Images

Others had already taken a stab at valuing Lehman’s troubled assets. Kenneth D. Lewis, then the chief executive of Bank of America — who, with the government’s encouragement, was considering a bid for Lehman — asserted that Lehman had a “$66 billion hole” in its balance sheet.

A group of bankers summoned to the Fed by Mr. Paulson, who was hoping they would mount a private rescue, did not accept Lehman’s $50 billion valuation for its real estate and could not decide whether Lehman was solvent. But potential private rescuers had a motive to lowball Lehman’s value. Fed officials involved in the valuation stressed that the Fed could hold distressed assets for much longer than private parties, allowing time for those assets to recover in value. Also, because the Fed sets monetary policy, it exerts enormous influence over the assets’ ultimate value.

“There can’t be any reasonable doubt that had the Fed rescued Lehman, that very act would have pushed up the value of its assets,” Mr. Blinder said.

While the Fed team did not come up with a precise value for Lehman’s illiquid assets, it provided a range that was far more generous in its valuations than the private sector had been.

“It was close,” a member of the Fed team that evaluated the collateral said. “Folks were aware of how ambiguous these values are, especially at a time of crisis. So it becomes a policy question: Do you want to take a chance or not?”

Argument continues today over the value of Lehman’s assets. A report compiled by Anton R. Valukas, a Chicago lawyer, at the behest of the bankruptcy court overseeing Lehman concluded in 2010 that nearly all of the firm’s real estate valuations were reasonable. It also suggested that Lehman’s chaotic bankruptcy caused many of the losses later borne by the firm’s creditors. Other analysts have argued that Lehman was deeply insolvent.

“We didn’t believe we had the legal authority to guarantee Lehman’s trading liabilities, even using our ‘unusual and exigent’ powers,” said Timothy F. Geithner, in “Stress Test,” his 2014 book on the financial crisis. CreditKevin Lamarque/Reuters

Ultimately, the appraisals of the New York Fed teams did not matter. Their preliminary finding was that Lehman was solvent and that what it faced was essentially a bank run, according to members of the group. Researchers working on the value of Lehman’s collateral said they thought they would be delivering those findings to Mr. Geithner that September weekend.

But Mr. Geithner had already been diverted to A.I.G., which was facing its own crisis. In the end, the team members said, they delivered their findings orally to other New York Fed officials, including Michael F. Silva, Mr. Geithner’s chief of staff.

On Sunday, Mr. Bernanke was in Washington awaiting the New York Fed’s verdict. In a phone call, Mr. Geithner said Lehman could not be saved.

The Fed would be lending into a run, Mr. Geithner told Mr. Bernanke, according to both men’s accounts. In a recent interview, Mr. Bernanke said, “Knowing the potential consequences of Lehman’s failure, I was 100 percent committed to doing whatever could possibly and legally be done to save the company, as were Tim and Hank.” Mr. Paulson has concurred, saying, “Although it was Ben and Tim’s decision to make, I shared their view that Lehman was insolvent, and I know the marketplace did.”

Those at the Fed who have contended that Lehman was insolvent have never provided any basis for that conclusion, other than references to the estimates of Wall Street firms and other anecdotal evidence. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission asked for such evidence several times, but the Fed never provided it. The members of the New York Fed teams said that they did not prepare a formal, written report, and that no one asked them for any notes or work papers or asked them to elaborate on their findings. Scott G. Alvarez, the Fed’s general counsel, told the commission that there was “no time” that weekend for a written analysis.

‘A Lack of Legal Authority’

Phil Angelides, the crisis commission’s chairman, said no one ever mentioned the New York Fed analysis during his hearings. “If in fact the analysis existed and was independent, it would have been in everyone’s interest to have that out, even if it were in the form of notes,” Mr. Angelides said in an interview. He added, “If you look at the record, there is no legal stopper,” meaning a legal barrier.

So why, then, was Lehman allowed to die?

Mr. Paulson has said that politics did not enter into the decision. But he had endured months of criticism for bailing out Bear Stearns in March 2008, and the outcry only intensified after the Treasury provided support to the mortgage finance giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in the first week of September. During a conference call on the Thursday before Lehman’s collapse, Mr. Paulson declared to Mr. Bernanke, Mr. Geithner and other regulators that he would not use public money to rescue Lehman, saying he did not want to be known as “Mr. Bailout.”

In written testimony before Congress that September, Mr. Bernanke made no mention of any legal constraint. Instead, he said, “We judged that investors and counterparties had had time to take precautionary measures.”

It was only on Oct. 7, after early praise for the decision to let Lehman fail had turned into a wave of criticism, that anyone mentioned the legal argument. In a speech that day, Mr. Bernanke said, “Neither the Treasury nor the Federal Reserve had the authority to commit public money in that way.” Mr. Paulson first mentioned the claim a week later. In an interview, Mr. Bernanke said, “We made a deliberative decision to be very cautious about publicizing our inability to save Lehman out of concern that it would further worsen the market panic.” Mr. Paulson made the same point. Mr. Bernanke was emphatic before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in 2009: “I will maintain to my deathbed that we made every effort to save Lehman, but we were just unable to do so because of a lack of legal authority.”

Mr. Bernanke and others have said that a Fed lifeline to Lehman might not have stopped the run on the firm. But others have said the point of Rule 13-3 was exactly that — to stop such panics.

“Of course the Fed can stop a run,” said Mr. Blinder, the economist. “That’s what it’s all about.”

Scholars are still struggling with the claim that the Fed could not rescue Lehman but was nonetheless able to save Bear Stearns and A.I.G.

What is clear to Mr. Blinder, he says, is that the decision was a formula for panic.

“The inconsistency was the biggest problem,” Mr. Blinder said. “The Lehman decision abruptly and surprisingly tore the perceived rule book into pieces and tossed it out the window.”

人和書 ( Men and Books)

2014年9月30日星期二