關於ISIS的兩本新書
閱讀2015年04月16日
Alessandra Montalto/The New York Times
如今，我們每天都能在報紙頭條看到伊斯蘭國的名字及其暴行——斬首、大規模處決、奴役婦女兒童、摧毀文化古迹。這個恐怖集團不僅席捲中東，把勢力範圍從伊拉克與敘利亞擴展到利比亞和也門，也在埃及和尼日利亞發展危險的新機構，繼續嫻熟地運用社交媒體招募外國戰士。
基地組織伊斯蘭國（也稱ISIS或ISIL）的崛起如此之快，人們不禁會震驚地回想起，就在2014年1月，奧巴馬總統還將它稱為「低年級校隊」，說它的威脅完全不能和基地組織相提並論。
從那以後，用來記錄或研究這個組織的文字與圖片就有如車載斗量。如今，兩本新書把這些素材組織起來並進行闡釋。儘管對於關注這方面新聞的人來說，書中許多內容可能是他們所熟悉的（比如這個組織如何使用社交媒體、如何刺激宗派仇恨、如何把極端暴力與民事管理結合起來），但這兩位作者聰明地把大量研究工作和自己對恐怖主義的專業知識結合起來，成為條理分明、可讀性強的敘事，幫助我們理解伊斯蘭國的歷史與變遷，乃至它的特殊行事方式。
《ISIS: 恐怖軍隊內部》(ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror)是由記者邁克爾·韋斯(Michael Weiss)與哈桑·哈桑(Hassan Hassan)所著，該書建立在兩位記者範圍廣泛的新聞報道之上，其中包括對ISIS在伊拉克與敘利亞的幾十名合作者的訪談，這些人當中有宗教人士、戰士、安保官員和ISIS的同情者。這本書堪稱一幅邏輯嚴密的全景，令讀者看到這個組織是如何在各式各樣的前身（包括伊拉克基地組織、聖戰者協商委員會和伊拉克伊斯蘭國）基礎之上發展起來，以及它在今日如何運作。
左起依次為，邁克爾·韋斯，哈桑·哈桑，傑西卡·斯特恩，J·M·伯格。
Left to right: Sylvain Gaboury/Starpix; Dahlia Shami; Richard Howard; Janet Walsh
《ISIS:恐怖之國》(ISIS: The State of Terror)是由哈佛大學專門研究恐怖主義的學者傑西卡·斯特恩(Jessica Stern)與《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)雜誌撰稿人J·M·伯格(J. M. Berger)合著，它與上一本書的基礎大致相同，但細節並不那麼豐富。對於西方世界的對策，這本書的兩位作者也給出了一些大致的建議：應當致力於「牽制與遏制」，而非投入壓倒性的軍事力量，並且要在數碼領域進行更有效的控制（「我們如果有了控制互聯網的力量，就等於有了在戰爭中控制天氣的力量」）。
斯特恩-伯格這本書最精彩的部分是把ISIS和基地組織做對比的章節。兩人把基地組織比作孤立的「先驅運動」，「一個自視為精英知識分子的陰謀小集團，領導全球意識形態革命，並對之進行援助和操縱」。他們寫道，整個20世紀90年代，基地組織「成了一個公司式的團體，有工資名單和福利部門，工作人員週遊世界，見縫插針，介入當地衝突」。
相反，ISIS更像是由民粹主義者啟動的行為。斯特恩和伯格寫道，在網上，「它們召集起『一群聰明的』支持者，並且給予他們力量，」他們還「對『選民』進行投票調查，精明地判斷何時應該傾聽，什麼樣的人可以完全無視。」
他們寫道，基地組織將恢復伊斯蘭王權視為「一項一板一眼的長期工程」——「是一個理想化的未來，基地組織的領導者們並不指望自己有生之年能夠親眼見到」。作者認為，通過使用「典型的極端主義修辭」（保衛一個人自身所屬的群體不受侵犯），奧薩馬·本·拉登(Osama bin Laden)的組織「用『做正確的事』之類與人們更加切身相關的詞語，為招募潛在新人奠定了基調」。
伯格和斯特恩寫道，伊斯蘭國擯棄了這種知性的思辨，強調恐怖暴力（這是為了刺激和吸引心懷不滿與憤怒的年輕男人），並且承諾建立「一個穆斯林社會，且具備其所有外部特徵」。這個烏托邦式的王國有「豐盛的食物、工業、銀行、學校、衛生保健、社會服務、道路維修——甚至還有療養院，四壁懸掛着叛亂者們鮮明的黑色旗幟」，他們寫道，這個王國「召喚着所有非戰鬥人員、男人與女人，來建立一個單一民族國家，除了戰士，也擔負起工程師、醫生、電影導演、系統管理員，甚至是交通警察的角色」。
韋斯與哈桑的書把伊斯蘭國不僅描述為一個恐怖主義組織，也描述為「一個精巧的宣傳機器，能夠有效地散布它的信息」、「一個黑幫組織，擅長利用擁有幾十年歷史的跨國灰色是由與武器交易市場」、「一個傳統軍事力量，擅長調度和組織步兵」，並且極具軍事頭腦，此外它還是「一群聰明老練的人集合起來組成的機構，能滲透到與之競爭的組織中去，從內部靜悄悄地招募新成員，直至將其徹底接管。」
韋斯和哈桑指出，許多勉強的伊斯蘭國支持者們都認為「過去十年里，遜尼派穆斯林處境凄涼，先是喪失了對伊拉克的控制，如今又在敘利亞忍受着全國性的暴行，很多都相當於種族滅絕，伊斯蘭國是他們唯一的選擇。他們視中東戰爭為遜尼派與一個伊朗領導下的聯盟之間的衝突，他們將極端暴力視為一種取得平衡，或遏制什葉派霸權的必要工具。」伊斯蘭國惡意利用這種宗派的不滿情緒，煽風點火，挑動內戰，刺激什葉派民兵採取暴力行動——然後就可以把這些暴力行為作為證據，讓遜尼派覺得「除了伊斯蘭王國之外別無希望」。
兩本書都指出，努里·卡邁勒·馬利基(Nuri Kamal al-Maliki)是個兩極化的人物，身為伊拉克總理，他日漸剝奪遜尼派的公民權利，從政府中清理著名的遜尼派領袖，他的宗派主義只能把更多遜尼派人士推向伊斯蘭國的懷抱。
兩本書也都清醒地評估了美國的錯誤與災難性的決策在促使伊斯蘭國、乃至其前身和旁系的崛起中扮演的角色。斯特恩與伯格寫道，2003年入侵伊拉克「加強了伊斯蘭聖戰的呼聲，要求推翻美國在中東的霸權，為恐怖主義者提供了豐富的信任資源，這正是他們最需要的。」他們還說，「有些政客在盟軍入侵期間將伊拉克視為廉價旅館，我們卻將其視為一個馬蜂窩——盟軍的炮彈與子彈只是讓馬蜂飛得更遠，遍及這一地區，乃至更多地方。」
盟軍的佔領與戰後計劃同樣是災難性的。兩本書都提醒我們，2003年，美國駐伊拉克最高民事長官L·保羅·布雷默三世(L. Paul Bremer III)所做的一系列決定——解散伊拉克軍隊，禁止阿拉伯社會復興党進入政府——導致憤怒、失業的伊拉克人迅速增長，他們特別容易被吸納到新興的叛亂組織中去，人心惶惶，缺乏安全感。事實上，韋斯和哈桑主張，大多數伊斯蘭國的「頂尖決策者都曾在薩達姆·侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)的軍隊或保安系統中服役，」因此，「『現世的』阿拉伯社會復興主義在伊斯蘭原教旨主義的偽裝下再度回到了伊拉克。」
最後，兩本書都指出，美國2011年從伊拉克撤軍，以及奧巴馬政府的政治脫離政策會產生持續性後果，會導致韋斯與哈桑所謂的「這個國家未來的不穩定狀態」。
伯格與斯特恩總結道，「ISIS的崛起，在某種程度上是西方介入伊拉克後，無意中所產生的後果。聯合武裝令一個殘忍的獨裁者倒台，但他們也破壞了伊拉克的國體。西方世界缺乏耐心、意志與智慧，無法去建立一個嶄新而包容的國家。那裡仍然是廢墟一片。」他們援引約旦國王阿卜杜拉二世的話——與ISIS的鬥爭將是「持續整整一代人的鬥爭」。
然而韋斯與哈桑的論調甚至更加悲觀。「恐怖的軍隊，」他們在書的末尾寫道，「將永遠與我們同在。」
《ISIS: 恐怖之國》
傑西卡·斯特恩與J·M·伯格著
385頁，Ecco/HarperCollins出版社，27.99美元。
《ISIS：恐怖軍隊內部》
邁克爾·韋斯與哈桑·哈桑著
270頁，Regan Arts出版社，14美元。
本文最初發表於2015年4月3日。
翻譯：董楠
Review: ‘ISIS: The State of Terror,’ by Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, and ‘ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror,’ by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan
Books of The TimesApril 16, 2015
Alessandra Montalto/The New York Times
The Islamic State and its atrocities — beheadings, mass executions, the enslavement of women and children, and the destruction of cultural antiquities — are in the headlines every day now. The terror group not only continues to roll through the Middle East, expanding from Iraq and Syria into Libya and Yemen, but has also gained dangerous new affiliates in Egypt and Nigeria and continues to recruit foreign fighters through its sophisticated use of social media.
Given the ascendance of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL), it’s startling to recall that in January 2014, President Obama referred to it as a “J.V. team,” suggesting that it did not pose anywhere near the sort of threat that Al Qaeda did.
Since then, yards of copy and scores of pixels have been devoted to trying to chronicle and comprehend the group. Two new books pull together and analyze a lot of material on it. Although much of their coverage (on matters like the organization’s use of social media, its fueling of sectarian hatred and its combination of ultraviolence with civil governance) will be familiar to those who follow the news, the authors do nimble jobs of turning their copious research and their own expertise on terrorism into coherent, accessible narratives that leave us with an understanding of the Islamic State’s history and metastasis, and its modus operandi.
“ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror” by the journalists Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, draws upon the authors’ extensive reporting — including interviews with dozens of ISIS associates in Iraq and Syria, among them religious clerics, fighters, security officials and sympathizers — to give readers a fine-grained look at the organization’s evolution through assorted incarnations (Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Mujahidin Advisory Council and the Islamic State of Iraq) and its operations today.
From left, Michael Weiss, Hassan Hassan, Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger.
Left to right: Sylvain Gaboury/Starpix; Dahlia Shami; Richard Howard; Janet Walsh
“ISIS: The State of Terror” by the Harvard terrorism scholar Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, a contributor to Foreign Policy magazine, covers much of the same ground but with less granular detail. The authors also offer some vague recommendations on how they think the West should deal with the Islamic State: focus on “containment and constriction” rather than overwhelming military force, and exert more effective control of the digital battleground. (“Our power over the Internet is the equivalent of being able to control the weather in a ground war.”)
The most compelling sections of the Stern-Berger book are devoted to comparing ISIS and Al Qaeda. The authors describe Al Qaeda as an exclusive “vanguard movement,” a “cabal that saw itself as the elite intellectual leaders of a global ideological revolution that it would assist and manipulate.” Through the 1990s, they write, Al Qaeda “grew into a corporation, with a payroll and benefits department, and operatives who traveled around the world inserting themselves into local conflicts.”
ISIS, in contrast, is more of a populist start-up operation. Online, Ms. Stern and Mr. Berger note, “it amassed and empowered a ‘smart mob’ of supporters,” polling “its constituents and making shrewd calls about when to listen and who could safely be ignored.”
Al Qaeda’s vision for the restoration of the Islamic caliphate, they write, “is framed squarely in the long term” — “an idealized future that its leaders did not expect to see realized in their lifetimes.” Using “a classic extremist trope” (the defense of one’s own identity group against aggression), the authors assert, Osama bin Laden’s organization “framed its pitch to potential recruits in more relatable terms as ‘doing the right thing.’ ”
The Islamic State, Mr. Berger and Ms. Stern say, dispensed with such intellectual argumentation and instead emphasized horrific violence (which served to stimulate and attract disaffected, angry young men) combined with the promise of a building “a Muslim society with all the trappings.” This utopian vision of “food aplenty, industry, banks, schools, health care, social services, pothole repair — even a nursing home with the insurgents’ unmistakable black flag draped over the walls,” they write, served as “a call for noncombatants, men and women alike, to build a nation-state alongside the warriors, with a role for engineers, doctors, filmmakers, sysadmins, and even traffic cops.”
Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hassan describe the Islamic State not only as a terrorist organization but also as “a slick propaganda machine effective at disseminating its message,” “a mafia adept at exploiting decades-old transnational gray markets for oil and arms trafficking,” a “conventional military that mobilizes and deploys foot soldiers” with professional acumen, and a “sophisticated intelligence-gathering apparatus that infiltrates rival organizations and silently recruits within their ranks before taking them over.”
As Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hassan see it, many reluctant supporters regard the Islamic State as “the only option on offer for Sunni Muslims who have been dealt a dismal hand in the past decade — first losing control of Iraq and now suffering nationwide atrocities, which many equate to genocide, in Syria. They view the struggle in the Middle East as one between Sunnis and an Iranian-led coalition, and they justify ultraviolence as a necessary tool to counterbalance or deter Shia hegemony.” The Islamic State has viciously exploited this sense of sectarian grievance, trying to fan the flames of civil war and incite Shia militias to violence — which the group could then hold up as proof to Sunnis that they “have no hope but the caliphate.”
These books note that in Iraq the sectarianism of Nuri Kamal al-Maliki (a polarizing figure who as prime minister increasingly moved to disenfranchise Sunnis and purge prominent Sunni leaders from the government) served only to push more Sunnis into the embrace of the Islamic State.
Both books also provide lucid assessments of the role that missteps and disastrous decision-making on the part of the United States played in fueling the rise of the Islamic State and its antecedents and affiliates. Ms. Stern and Mr. Berger write that the 2003 invasion of Iraq “reinforced jihadi claims about America’s hegemonic designs on the Middle East, providing a recruiting bonanza at a time when the terrorists needed it most.” They add that “while some politicians wanted to see Iraq during the allied invasion as a roach motel, we see it more like a hornet’s nest — with allied bombs and bullets spreading the hornets ever further, throughout the region and beyond.”
The occupation and postwar planning would prove equally disastrous. Both books remind us that decisions announced by L. Paul Bremer III, the top American civilian administrator in Iraq, in 2003 — to dissolve the Iraqi Army and to ban Baath Party members from government — resulted in huge numbers of angry, unemployed Iraqis, easily recruited into a burgeoning insurgency and a dangerous lack of security. In fact, Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hassan contend that most of the Islamic State’s “top decision makers served in Saddam Hussein’s military or security services,” and in that sense, “ ‘secular’ Baathism has returned to Iraq under the guise of Islamic fundamentalism.”
Finally, both books point out that the United States’ withdrawal of troops from Iraq in 2011 and the Obama administration’s political disengagement have had lasting consequences for what Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hassan call “the country’s future instability.”
“The rise of ISIS,” Mr. Berger and Ms. Stern conclude, “is to some extent, the unintended consequence of Western intervention in Iraq. Coalition forces removed a brutal dictator from power, but they also broke the Iraqi state. The West lacked the patience, the will, and the wisdom to build a new, inclusive one. What remained were ruins.” They quote King Abdullah II of Jordan saying that the battle with ISIS will be a “generational fight.”
Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hassan sound an even more pessimistic note. “The army of terror,” they write at the end of their book, “will be with us indefinitely.”
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