對於中國與波爾布特(Pol Pot)的關係、1979年中越戰爭，齊奧塞斯庫(Nicolai Ceausescu)之死及東歐劇變這些極富爭議的國際人物和事件，大陸版《鄧小平時代》也進行了刪節。
第18章《為軍事現代化作準備》(The Military: Preparing for
Modernization)寫道，鄧小平為了遏制蘇聯與越南的軍事合作，要通過攻打越南來展示不惜一戰的決心。當越南出兵柬埔寨之後，紅色高棉
(Khmer
Rouge)領導人波爾布特請鄧小平派兵幫助柬埔寨。儘管波爾布特的暴政受到西方的強烈譴責，鄧小平依然決定與他合作。第9章波爾布特的名字和第18章對
越戰爭的一些細節（如戰爭之後，鄧小平指示大量中國軍隊在邊境駐紮，對越南人進行騷擾），以及高層領導人對對越戰爭的不同意見在大陸版中被刪去。
第22章《穩住陣腳》(Standing
Firm)寫到，羅馬尼亞領導人、中國的老朋友齊奧塞斯庫及其妻子因為向平民開槍被槍決。中國媒體對齊奧塞斯庫的向平民開槍未作任何報道；當齊奧塞斯庫被
槍決兩天後，《人民日報》在第四版下方簡短地發佈了一句話：“羅馬尼亞電視台12月25日宣布，羅馬尼亞特別軍事法庭宣判齊奧塞斯庫及其妻子死刑，這一判
決已經得到執行。”
又如，原著第22章中對東歐和蘇聯社會主義陣營崩潰及中國反應的記載，“波蘭在1989年6月4日以公投的方式選出議會，東德於1989年10月7
日爆發大規模抗議，1990年2月蘇共全會討論放棄黨對權力的壟斷，這些重大事件都被中國媒體淡化和掩蓋。”在大陸版中，中國媒體對東歐劇變的蓄意淡化也
被淡化為兩句話：“通過《參考資料》上每天從西方媒體翻譯過來的材料，中國的官員要比一般的群眾更了解真相”，“儘管中國的領導人在向民眾報道蘇東劇變時
動作遲緩，但很快就根據新的現實調整了其外交政策。”
)，在英文版中出現12次，大陸版出現1次。其中4條注釋被單獨刪去，引文保留，其餘7條則與對應引文一齊刪去。《杜導正日記》在第19章出現了3次，但注釋與引文都被刪除。
儘管大陸版刪節了5.3萬字，對於很多大陸讀者來說，它還是披露了大量的細節，許多關於1980年代中國歷史的敘述在大陸公開出版物中都屬首次出
現。讀者仍然有機會從書中領略到歷史及歷史人物的真實和複雜。對於在出版審查中生活，並建立了“自我審查”的筆者，大陸版中許多保留的內容已令筆者感到意
外驚喜。
1. [美] 傅高義(Ezra F. Vogel)著，馮克利 譯，香港中文大學出版社編輯部、生活·讀書·新知三聯書店編輯部 譯校《鄧小平時代》，生活·讀書·新知三聯書店，2013年1月北京第1版；
2. 傅高義(Ezra F. Vogel)著，馮克利 譯，香港中文大學出版社編輯部 譯校《鄧小平時代》，中文大學出版社，2012年香港；
3.
by Ezra F.Vogel The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 2011
這本關於
鄧小平(1904-97)
的傳記巨著以兩個強有力的反問結尾：“20世紀有沒有任何其他領導人在改善這麼多人的生活方面做出更大的貢獻？20世紀有沒有任何其他領導人對世界歷史產
生如此重大而深遠的影響？”答案可以從這部全面、詳實的書中找到，但是並不像哈佛大學社會科學榮譽教授傅高義(Ezra F.
Vogel)假定的那樣顯而易見。
1976年毛澤東去世後，鄧成了經濟改革的擁護者，這改變了很多中國人的生活，但不是絕大多數中國人的生活（傅高義注意到，毛的接班人華國鋒是改革
的發起人）。鄧長久以來都是中共的核心人物。傅高義公正地說“文化大革命前的十多年裡”，“沒有人比鄧小平對建立和管理舊體制負有更大的責任”。但是鄧生
活和事業的大部分內容只佔了傅高義714頁陳述的四分之一。
按圖放大
傅高義的《鄧小平時代》 簡體中文版1月18日由生活·讀書·新知三聯書店出版。
到1978年，鄧已經成了中國“至高無上的領導者”。1967-73年，他經受了漫長的軟禁和流放，1976-77年，他再次被毛從政治舞台上抹
去。但除此之外，毛給中國和中國人造成的極大痛苦，鄧都應該與其共同分擔很大一部分責任。他當然還應對1989年天安門的屠殺承擔主要責任。
奇怪的是，在《鄧小平時代》(Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of
China)一書中，我們幾乎看不到鄧這個人。他個人性格的某些方面眾所周知：他打橋牌；喜歡麵包、奶酪和咖啡；抽煙；喝酒；使用痰盂。他非常自律。雖然
鄧沒有留下任何個人文件資料，傅高義還是巧妙地講述了一些為人所知的情況。
鄧出生於四川省的一個小地主家庭，孩提時代在當地的學校讀過書，但是他接受正規教育的時間其實只有一年，那就是1926年在莫斯科的中山大學接受意
識形態教化。在那之前的五年時間，他住在巴黎，在幼年時期的中國共產黨內部接受了實用而持久的教育，當時的中共是由年輕的周恩來領導的。
從莫斯卡回國之後不久，他就不再是一位“快樂的、愛玩鬧的、開朗的”小夥子了。他組織了一小支軍隊打擊軍閥，結果被打敗了，可能還逃跑了。最後，他
加入了“毛派”，隨着這個派別的命運起起落落。在1934-35年的長征期間，鄧參加了毛取得最高指揮權的那次會議。1949年共產黨獲勝之後，他就任佔
領西藏的那支軍隊的政委，但是他似乎從來沒去過西藏。1949-51年，他在西南組織了旨在“消滅地主階級”的土地改革運動。毛因為鄧“殺死了一些地主”
而讚揚了“他取得的勝利”（在這場全國性運動中，有200萬到300萬人被殺。作為這場運動的一部分，“一些”這個詞好像不夠充分）。1957年，鄧監管
“反右運動”，這場運動“對55萬持批評態度的知識分子進行的惡毒攻擊”，“毀掉了中國很多最優秀的科技人才”。在1958-61年的大躍進運動中，有多
達4500萬人被餓死，傅高義沒有找到任何證據證明鄧反對毛的這種偏激的政策。然而馮客(Frank
Dikötter)編著的資料詳實的《毛的大饑荒》(Mao’s Great
Famine)一書，卻表明鄧下令從將要餓死的農民手中拿走糧食，供應城市，出口國外。
傅高義告訴我們，在1966年末，鄧被指控“走資本主義路線”。他被軟禁在北京家中直到1969年，而後被轉移到江西省的一個工廠，每天工作半天。紅衛兵不斷騷擾他的五個孩子，其中一個兒子在被紅衛兵恐嚇或欺負後，從窗戶跳下，摔斷了脊椎。1973年毛批准鄧回到北京。
傅高義認為，鄧在國內流放期間斷定中國的體制有問題：經濟落後，與世界脫離；人民的教育水平很低。在鄧的領導下，中國變成了一個越來越城市化的社
會。鄧認為懲治腐敗會限制發展，因此很多官員“想辦法不僅使中國富裕起來，而且使自己富裕起來”。傅高義說，結果中國比以往任何時候都更加腐敗，環境污染
也更加嚴重。
雖然鄧知道科技很重要——從19世紀末，中國的很多改革者都知道這一點——但是他擔心人文學科和社會科學可能會成為異端邪說的溫床；在懲治知識分子
方面他從來都沒有猶豫過，他認為這些人的異見可能會“引發破壞公共秩序的遊行示威”。很說明問題的是，對鄧來說，“天安門事件”後，共產主義世界裡最糟糕
的發展可能就是1989年12月25日羅馬尼亞獨裁者尼古拉·齊奧塞斯庫(Nicolae
Ceausescu)和他的妻子被處決。齊奧塞斯庫是唯一一位下令軍隊向平民開槍的東歐領導人。
傅高義稱天安門事件是一場“悲劇”，還提到鄧的同事提出質疑，說使用軍隊鎮壓起義會惹怒外國人，鄧對此不以為然：“西方人會忘記的。”實際上，年輕
一代的中國人對這次在300多個城市爆發的示威只有模糊的認識，因為他們的歷史課上沒有提到這件事。傅高義對這次鎮壓的描述大部分是準確的，不過他遺漏了
一點：周日早上，很多在廣場邊緣尋找自己孩子的父母被槍殺了。關於這一點，以及其他一些部分，傅高義本可以與當時在場的記者交流一下，而不只是閱讀他們的
記述（作為這些事件的目擊者，我表示願意與他交談）。令人失望的一點是，傅高義提出了這樣的疑問：為什麼“天安門悲劇在西方社會引發了大範圍的強烈抗議，
強度遠遠大於之前在亞洲發生的類似規模的悲劇”？
對此，傅高義引用了另一個學者的觀點，準確地說出了其中一個原因：天安門事件在電視上實時播放。然後他令人費解地補充說，觀眾把他們看到的情況“解
讀為”“對美國神話的一種攻擊，這個神話就是：經濟、思想和政治自由將永遠獲勝。很多外國人將鄧視為罪人，認為他是自由的敵人，他鎮壓了英勇的學生”。更
離譜的是，傅高義認為，對外國記者來說，天安事件“是他們職業生涯中最令人興奮的時刻”。這樣的評論與他嚴肅學者的身份極不相稱。他斷然認為“鄧不是為了
報復”。如果他的意思是鄧沒有下令殺死他的敵人和批評者，那他說的是事實——從私人的角度看是這樣的。但是在致使無數無名百姓被殺害方面，鄧從來沒有退縮
過，不管是在毛的時代，還是他自己的時代。
傅高義的陳述中最有價值的部分是他對鄧的經濟改革的調查。這些改革使很大一部分中國人富裕了起來，把中國推上了國際舞台。但是中共掩蓋了毛澤東執政
的幾十年里成百上千萬人被害死或餓死的事實。最後，從傅高義這本內容廣泛的傳記中顯露出來的，是他那兩個問題的真正的答案：在鄧小平漫長的職業生涯的大部
分時間裡，他為中國做的事，遠遠比不上他對中國所做的事。
Two mighty rhetorical questions conclude this enormous biography of
Deng Xiaoping
(1904-97): “Did any other leader in the 20th century do more to improve
the lives of so many? Did any other 20th-century leader have such a
large and lasting influence on world history?” The answers emerge from
this comprehensive, minutely documented book, but not as predictably as
Ezra F. Vogel, a Harvard University emeritus professor of social
sciences, assumes.
After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng became the champion of the economic
reforms that transformed the lives of many, but not most, Chinese.
(Vogel observes that Mao’s immediate successor, Hua Guofeng, was the
initiator of the reforms.) Deng had long been a central figure in the
Communist Party. Vogel rightly says that “for more than a decade before
the Cultural Revolution” — 1966-1976 — “no one had greater
responsibility for building and administering the old system than Deng
Xiaoping.” Yet, most of Deng’s life and career takes up only a quarter
of Vogel’s 714 pages of narrative.
按图放大
The Chinese version of Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, written by Ezra F. Vogel, will be published on Jan, 18th, 2013.
By 1978, Deng had become China’s “paramount leader.” It follows,
therefore, that apart from his long period of house arrest and
banishment during the years 1967-73, and during another year in 1976-77,
when Mao again removed him from the political scene, Deng must share
the blame for much of the agony Mao inflicted on China and the Chinese.
He certainly bears the major responsibility for the Tiananmen Square
killings in 1989.
It is a curiosity of “Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China”
that Deng the man is almost invisible. There is a well-known list of his
personal characteristics: he played bridge; liked bread, cheese and
coffee; smoked; drank and used spittoons. He was unswervingly
self-disciplined. Though Deng left no personal paper trail, Vogel ably
relates what is known.
Deng came from a small-landlord family in Sichuan Province, yet his
formal education, apart from his time at a local school when he was a
child, consisted mainly of a single year, 1926, of ideological
indoctrination at Sun Yatsen University in Moscow. For five years before
that, he lived in Paris, where he received a practical, and enduring,
education inside the infant Chinese Communist Party, serving under the
leadership of the young Zhou Enlai.
After Paris and Moscow, Deng went back to China, and before long had
ceased being “a cheerful, fun-loving extrovert.” He commanded a small
force against warlords, was defeated and may have run away. Eventually,
he joined the “Mao faction,” rising and falling with its inner-party
fortunes. During the Long March of 1934-35 Deng attended the meeting
where Mao took supreme power, and after the Communist triumph in 1949,
he served as party commissar for the army that occupied Tibet, although
he seems not to have set foot there. In the southwest Deng organized the
land reform program of 1949-51 “that would wipe out the landlord
class.” Mao praised Deng “for his success . . . killing some of the
landlords.” (As part of a national campaign in which two million to
three million were killed, “some” seems an inadequate word.) In 1957,
Deng oversaw the “anti-rightist campaign,” a “vicious attack on 550,000
intellectual critics” that “destroyed many of China’s best scientific
and technical minds.” As for the Great Leap Forward of 1958-61, when as
many as 45 million people starved to death, Vogel provides no evidence
that Deng objected to Mao’s monomaniacal policies. Frank Dikötter’s
well-documented book “Mao’s Great Famine,” however, shows that Deng
ordered the extraction of grain from starving peasants for the cities
and export abroad.
In late 1966, Vogel tells us, Deng was accused of “pursuing the
capitalist road.” Under house arrest in Beijing until 1969, he was
transferred to Jiangxi Province to work half days in a factory. Red
Guards harassed his five children, and the back of one of his sons was
broken when he may have jumped from a window after the guards frightened
or bullied him. Mao permitted Deng to return to Beijing in 1973.
Vogel contends that during his internal exile Deng concluded that
something had gone systemically wrong with China: it was economically
backward and isolated from the international scene; its people were
poorly educated. China under Deng became an increasingly urban society.
And following Deng’s view that corruption crackdowns limit growth, many
officials, Vogel writes, “found ways not only to enrich China, but also
to enrich themselves.” The result, he says, is that China is more
corrupt than ever and its environment more polluted.
While Deng believed that science and technology were important — as
have many Chinese reformers since the late 19th century — he feared that
the humanities and social sciences could be seedbeds of heterodoxy; he
never hesitated in punishing intellectuals, whose divergent views could
“lead to demonstrations that disrupt public order.” It is telling that
for Deng perhaps the worst development in the Communist world after
Tiananmen was the execution on Dec. 25, 1989, of the Romanian dictator
Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife. Ceausescu was the only Eastern European
leader whose troops had fired on civilians.
Vogel calls Tiananmen a “tragedy,” and quotes Deng brushing aside
doubts from colleagues that using troops to smash the uprising would
disturb foreigners; “Westerners would forget.” Actually, it is young
Chinese for whom the demonstrations in over 300 cities are a dim fact
absent from their history lessons. Vogel’s account of the crackdown is
largely accurate, although he omits the shooting down on Sunday morning
of many parents milling about at the edge of the square, searching for
their children. In this, as in other parts of this narrative, Vogel
could have spoken with journalists who were there, and not just read
their accounts. (I declare an interest; I saw these events.) What is
disappointing is Vogel’s comments about why “the tragedy in Tiananmen
Square evoked a massive outcry in the West, far greater than previous
tragedies in Asia of comparable scale.”
Part of the answer, Vogel correctly says, citing another scholar, was
the real-time television in Tiananmen. Then he perplexingly adds that
viewers “interpreted” what they saw “as an assault on the American myth
that economic, intellectual and political freedom will always triumph.
Many foreigners came to see Deng as a villainous enemy of freedom who
crushed the heroic students.” Furthermore, Vogel contends, for foreign
reporters the Tiananmen uprising “was the most exciting time of their
careers.” Such comments are unworthy of a serious scholar. He states
flatly that “Deng was not vindictive.” If he means Deng didn’t order his
adversaries and critics killed, that is true — as far as individuals
are concerned. But Deng never shrank, either in Mao’s time or his own,
from causing the murder of large numbers of anonymous people.
The most valuable part of Vogel’s account is his survey of Deng’s
economic reforms; they made a substantial portion of Chinese better-off,
and propelled China onto the international stage. But the party has
obscured the millions of deaths that occurred during the Maoist decades.
In the end, what shines out from Vogel’s wide-ranging biography is the
true answer to his two questions: for most of his long career Deng
Xiaoping did less
for China than he did
to it.
Jonathan Mirsky is a journalist and historian specializing in China.
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