俄羅斯禁止美國家庭收養該國兒童
, 聯合報道 2012年12月28日
莫斯科——本周四，俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·V·普京(Vladimir V.
Putin)決定簽署禁止美國人領養俄羅斯兒童的法案，致使原已緊張的俄美外交關係遭受沉重挫折。然而，對於數百名正處於費用高昂、手續複雜的領養申請過
程中的美國人來說，這個決定更是造成了切膚之痛。
“我有點懵，”紐約州錫克利夫的按摩理療師瑪麗亞·德雷溫斯基(Maria Drewinsky)說。她正在領養一個名叫阿廖沙(Alyosha)的五歲男孩，相關手續已經進入最後階段。她和丈夫曾兩次飛往俄羅斯看望阿廖沙，而且 每周都會打電話給他。“我們已經為他準備好了衣服和房間，整天都在談論他，就像談論自己的兒子。”
但是，在普京周四宣布將把領養禁令簽署為法律之後，這對夫婦開始擔心阿廖沙可能永遠無法來到紐約。美國此前頒佈了一項旨在懲罰俄羅斯踐踏人權行為的法律，俄羅斯隨即制定了一個報復性法案，領養禁令便是法案內容之一。
該法案是為了回應奧巴馬於本月簽署的《馬格尼茨基法案》(Magnitsky Act)，後者將禁止那些被控侵犯人權的俄羅斯人來到美國，禁止他們在美國擁有房產或其他資產。剛開始，奧巴馬政府曾因擔心外交報復而對《馬格尼茨基法 案》表示反對，但國會議員急於就踐踏人權問題向俄羅斯施壓，並把該法案和一項賦予俄羅斯完全貿易夥伴地位的措施綁在了一起。
普京曾高聲指責美國行事虛偽，並且指出，美國也曾在伊拉克、阿富汗以及古巴關塔那摩監獄(Guantánamo Bay)等地實施侵犯人權的行為。此外，他發誓進行報復。
如果領養禁令按計劃於下周二生效的話，它就將徹底打亂很多正處在領養俄羅斯兒童最後階段的美國家庭的計劃。領養手續可能會花費5萬美元（約合31萬 元人民幣）甚至更多，要求領養者多次出國，通常還要求領養者與官員進行長時間的、令人抓狂的會面。即便從目前來看，禁令也已經給這個過程增添了令人揪心的 情感困擾。俄羅斯今年與美國簽訂的一項關於領養的協議已於11月1日生效，領養禁令似乎還將使該協議作廢。
周三，上述俄羅斯法案在俄羅斯議會上院即聯邦委員會(Federation Council)得到了全體通過，同一天通過的還有一項呼籲改善俄羅斯兒童福利制度的決議。普京表示，他將簽署上述法案和決議。普京說，“我打算簽署這個 法案，同時還要簽署一項總統令，該法令將會改變為兒童提供幫助的程序，對象是那些孤兒以及沒有父母照料的兒童，特別是那些因為健康問題而處境堪憂的兒 童。”
有人指責該法案將剝奪一些俄羅斯孤兒前往美國享受更優越生活的機會，但普京對此不予理會。2011年，美國領養者領養的俄羅斯兒童大概有1000名，超過了所有其他國家的領養者，但是，鑒於適於領養的俄羅斯兒童有將近12萬，這個數字仍然微乎其微。
“世界上興許有很多地方的生活水平比我們高，”普京說，“那又怎樣呢？難道我們要把所有孩子都送到那裡，或者我們自己也搬過去？”
美國官員對這項規定表示了強烈指責，並告誡俄羅斯政府不要把孤兒扯進政治。美國國務院(State Department)發言人帕特里克·文特雷爾(Patrick Ventrell)周四表示，“我們曾在私底下和公開場合反覆闡明，我們對俄羅斯議會通過的這項法案深感擔憂。”
然而，奧巴馬政府官員一直在內部進行辯論，究竟該對俄羅斯的領養禁令做出多麼強硬的回應，美俄關係中的其他方面又會受到什麼樣的影響。
在向阿富汗的軍事單位運送給養的時候，美國嚴重依賴俄羅斯境內的陸上通道，在遏制伊朗核項目的時候也拉來了俄羅斯的支持。這兩個曾經的冷戰對手之間也存在一些巨大的分歧，特別是在敘利亞內戰的問題上。
儘管人們急切地等待着普京的決定，但在周四的的政府高官會議上，普京似乎對此事漠不關心。圖拉州州長弗拉基米爾·格魯茲傑夫(Vladimir S. Gruzdev)說，“我想問：那項法案結果如何？”普京答道，“哪項法案？”
同時，該禁令的美國支持者稱，需要領養的美國孩子就已經供大於求了。大多數跨國領養行為的批評人士則重申了以往的怨言，稱這種領養程序顯然出於利益驅使，有時還很腐敗。
但是對於那些決意領養俄羅斯兒童的家長來說，這一政治對話僅僅是他們自身痛苦的背景雜音。莫斯科的高級官員稱，他們預計禁令會直接阻止46名兒童出境，儘管他們那些美國父母的領養手續已經接近完成。
常常同俄羅斯孤兒院打交道的一些美國領養機構官員稱，約有200至250對父母已經確定了他們打算領養的兒童，這些人將會受到禁令的影響。
新澤西州弗里霍爾德的羅伯特(Robert)及金·薩默斯(Kim Summers)夫婦已經買好了3張下月從俄羅斯飛回家的機票。在法官批准他們的領養申請之後，他們按規定需要等待30天，因此計劃於1月14日去卡盧加市領養這個21個月大的男孩。
49歲的薩默斯太太說，他們計劃給這個孩子起名為普雷斯頓(Preston)，而且在自家的房子里裝滿了玩具和衣物，還有孩子的照片。她說，“嬰兒車放在餐廳里，組裝了一部分的搖籃就擺在我的床邊。
提到該禁令將會變成法律的消息時，薩默斯太太說，“我被嚇着了。我甚至不能理解到底是怎麼回事，這件事太政治化了，又跟孩子沒有任何關係。”
周四，在俄羅斯，一位來自北卡羅來納州的母親正準備帶着新領養的兒子返回美國。她表示憤怒，因為俄羅斯官員沒有遵守新的領養雙邊協議當中的一項規定，也就是說，任何一方如果想要終止協議，需要提前一年通知對方。
這位母親要求不要泄露她的家庭信息，因為擔心俄羅斯會阻止她和家人出境。她說，養父母和孩子建立關係遠遠早於孩子離開孤兒院。她和丈夫在2009年從俄羅斯領養了一個男孩，上周又帶着孩子來接孩子的新弟弟。
這位30多歲的母親從事市場營銷工作。她說，“許多父母都給孩子留下了小相冊，裡面有新媽媽新爸爸、兄弟姐妹、寵物及卧室的照片。
她說，“領養機構的人幫我們給照片貼上標籤，好讓照看孩子的人幫孩子熟悉這些新面孔。他們會拿着這些相冊想，那些承諾過幾周就會再來的人，怎麼再也沒出現呢？一想到這樣的情景，我就忍不住流淚。”
“我有點懵，”紐約州錫克利夫的按摩理療師瑪麗亞·德雷溫斯基(Maria Drewinsky)說。她正在領養一個名叫阿廖沙(Alyosha)的五歲男孩，相關手續已經進入最後階段。她和丈夫曾兩次飛往俄羅斯看望阿廖沙，而且 每周都會打電話給他。“我們已經為他準備好了衣服和房間，整天都在談論他，就像談論自己的兒子。”
該法案是為了回應奧巴馬於本月簽署的《馬格尼茨基法案》(Magnitsky Act)，後者將禁止那些被控侵犯人權的俄羅斯人來到美國，禁止他們在美國擁有房產或其他資產。剛開始，奧巴馬政府曾因擔心外交報復而對《馬格尼茨基法 案》表示反對，但國會議員急於就踐踏人權問題向俄羅斯施壓，並把該法案和一項賦予俄羅斯完全貿易夥伴地位的措施綁在了一起。
普京曾高聲指責美國行事虛偽，並且指出，美國也曾在伊拉克、阿富汗以及古巴關塔那摩監獄(Guantánamo Bay)等地實施侵犯人權的行為。此外，他發誓進行報復。
如果領養禁令按計劃於下周二生效的話，它就將徹底打亂很多正處在領養俄羅斯兒童最後階段的美國家庭的計劃。領養手續可能會花費5萬美元（約合31萬 元人民幣）甚至更多，要求領養者多次出國，通常還要求領養者與官員進行長時間的、令人抓狂的會面。即便從目前來看，禁令也已經給這個過程增添了令人揪心的 情感困擾。俄羅斯今年與美國簽訂的一項關於領養的協議已於11月1日生效，領養禁令似乎還將使該協議作廢。
周三，上述俄羅斯法案在俄羅斯議會上院即聯邦委員會(Federation Council)得到了全體通過，同一天通過的還有一項呼籲改善俄羅斯兒童福利制度的決議。普京表示，他將簽署上述法案和決議。普京說，“我打算簽署這個 法案，同時還要簽署一項總統令，該法令將會改變為兒童提供幫助的程序，對象是那些孤兒以及沒有父母照料的兒童，特別是那些因為健康問題而處境堪憂的兒 童。”
有人指責該法案將剝奪一些俄羅斯孤兒前往美國享受更優越生活的機會，但普京對此不予理會。2011年，美國領養者領養的俄羅斯兒童大概有1000名，超過了所有其他國家的領養者，但是，鑒於適於領養的俄羅斯兒童有將近12萬，這個數字仍然微乎其微。
“世界上興許有很多地方的生活水平比我們高，”普京說，“那又怎樣呢？難道我們要把所有孩子都送到那裡，或者我們自己也搬過去？”
美國官員對這項規定表示了強烈指責，並告誡俄羅斯政府不要把孤兒扯進政治。美國國務院(State Department)發言人帕特里克·文特雷爾(Patrick Ventrell)周四表示，“我們曾在私底下和公開場合反覆闡明，我們對俄羅斯議會通過的這項法案深感擔憂。”
然而，奧巴馬政府官員一直在內部進行辯論，究竟該對俄羅斯的領養禁令做出多麼強硬的回應，美俄關係中的其他方面又會受到什麼樣的影響。
在向阿富汗的軍事單位運送給養的時候，美國嚴重依賴俄羅斯境內的陸上通道，在遏制伊朗核項目的時候也拉來了俄羅斯的支持。這兩個曾經的冷戰對手之間也存在一些巨大的分歧，特別是在敘利亞內戰的問題上。
儘管人們急切地等待着普京的決定，但在周四的的政府高官會議上，普京似乎對此事漠不關心。圖拉州州長弗拉基米爾·格魯茲傑夫(Vladimir S. Gruzdev)說，“我想問：那項法案結果如何？”普京答道，“哪項法案？”
同時，該禁令的美國支持者稱，需要領養的美國孩子就已經供大於求了。大多數跨國領養行為的批評人士則重申了以往的怨言，稱這種領養程序顯然出於利益驅使，有時還很腐敗。
但是對於那些決意領養俄羅斯兒童的家長來說，這一政治對話僅僅是他們自身痛苦的背景雜音。莫斯科的高級官員稱，他們預計禁令會直接阻止46名兒童出境，儘管他們那些美國父母的領養手續已經接近完成。
常常同俄羅斯孤兒院打交道的一些美國領養機構官員稱，約有200至250對父母已經確定了他們打算領養的兒童，這些人將會受到禁令的影響。
新澤西州弗里霍爾德的羅伯特(Robert)及金·薩默斯(Kim Summers)夫婦已經買好了3張下月從俄羅斯飛回家的機票。在法官批准他們的領養申請之後，他們按規定需要等待30天，因此計劃於1月14日去卡盧加市領養這個21個月大的男孩。
49歲的薩默斯太太說，他們計劃給這個孩子起名為普雷斯頓(Preston)，而且在自家的房子里裝滿了玩具和衣物，還有孩子的照片。她說，“嬰兒車放在餐廳里，組裝了一部分的搖籃就擺在我的床邊。
提到該禁令將會變成法律的消息時，薩默斯太太說，“我被嚇着了。我甚至不能理解到底是怎麼回事，這件事太政治化了，又跟孩子沒有任何關係。”
周四，在俄羅斯，一位來自北卡羅來納州的母親正準備帶着新領養的兒子返回美國。她表示憤怒，因為俄羅斯官員沒有遵守新的領養雙邊協議當中的一項規定，也就是說，任何一方如果想要終止協議，需要提前一年通知對方。
這位母親要求不要泄露她的家庭信息，因為擔心俄羅斯會阻止她和家人出境。她說，養父母和孩子建立關係遠遠早於孩子離開孤兒院。她和丈夫在2009年從俄羅斯領養了一個男孩，上周又帶着孩子來接孩子的新弟弟。
這位30多歲的母親從事市場營銷工作。她說，“許多父母都給孩子留下了小相冊，裡面有新媽媽新爸爸、兄弟姐妹、寵物及卧室的照片。
她說，“領養機構的人幫我們給照片貼上標籤，好讓照看孩子的人幫孩子熟悉這些新面孔。他們會拿着這些相冊想，那些承諾過幾周就會再來的人，怎麼再也沒出現呢？一想到這樣的情景，我就忍不住流淚。”
Russia’s Plan to Bar American Adoptions Upends Families
December 28, 2012
MOSCOW — President Vladimir V. Putin’s decision on Thursday to endorse a ban on the adoption of Russian children by American citizens dealt a serious blow to an already strained diplomatic relationship, but for hundreds of Americans enmeshed in the costly, complicated adoption process, the impact was deeply personal.
“I’m a little numb,” said Maria Drewinsky, a massage therapist from Sea Cliff, N.Y., who was in the final stages of adopting a 5-year-old boy named Alyosha. Both she and her husband have flown twice to visit him, and they speak to him weekly on the telephone. “We have clothes and a bedroom all set up for him, and we talk about him all the time as our son.”
But the couple are starting to fear that Alyosha may never get to New York, after Mr. Putin’s announcement Thursday that he would sign the adoption ban into law, as part of a bill retaliating against a new American law aimed at punishing human rights abuses in Russia.
The bill that includes the adoption ban was drafted in response to the Magnitsky Act, a law signed by President Obama this month that will bar Russian citizens accused of violating human rights from traveling to the United States and from owning real estate or other assets there. The Obama administration had opposed the Magnitsky legislation, fearing diplomatic retaliation, but members of Congress were eager to press Russia over human rights abuses and tied the bill to another measure granting Russia new status as a full trading partner.
Mr. Putin loudly accused the United States of hypocrisy, noting human rights abuses in Iraq, Afghanistan and at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and he pledged to retaliate.
If the ban comes into force on Tuesday as scheduled, it stands to upend the plans of many American families in the final stages of adopting in Russia. Already, it has added wrenching emotional tumult to a process that can cost $50,000 or more, requires repeated trips overseas, and typically entails lengthy and maddening encounters with bureaucracy. The ban would apparently also nullify an agreement on adoptions between Russia and the United States that was ratified this year and went into effect on Nov. 1.
The bill was approved unanimously by the Federation Council, the upper chamber of Parliament, on Wednesday. Mr. Putin said that he would sign it as well as a resolution also adopted Wednesday that calls for improvements in Russia’s child welfare system. “I intend to sign the law,” Mr. Putin said, “as well as a presidential decree changing the procedure of helping orphaned children, children left without parental care, and especially children who are in a disadvantageous situation due to their health problems.”
Mr. Putin also brushed aside criticism that the law would deny some Russian orphans the chance for a much better life in the United States. In 2011, about 1,000 Russian children were adopted by Americans, more than any other foreign country, but still a tiny number given that nearly 120,000 children in Russia are eligible for adoption.
“There are probably many places in the world where living standards are better than ours,” Mr. Putin said. “So what? Shall we send all children there, or move there ourselves?”
United States officials have strongly criticized the measure and have urged the Russian government not to entangle orphaned children in politics. “We have repeatedly made clear, both in private and in public, our deep concerns about the bill passed by the Russian Parliament,” a State Department spokesman, Patrick Ventrell, said Thursday.
Internally, however, Obama administration officials have been debating how strongly to respond to the adoption ban, and the potential implications for other aspects of the country’s relationship with Russia.
The United States relies heavily on overland routes through Russia to ship supplies to military units in Afghanistan, and it has enlisted Russia’s help in containing Iran’s nuclear program. The former cold war rivals also have sharp disagreements, notably over the civil war in Syria.
Although his decision has been eagerly awaited, Mr. Putin seemed blasé at a meeting with senior government officials on Thursday. When Vladimir S. Gruzdev, the governor of the Tula region, said, “I would like to ask: What is the fate of the law?” Mr. Putin replied, “Which law?”
Meanwhile, supporters of the ban in the United States said there were more than enough American children in need of adoption, and critics of international adoption generally reiterated complaints that the process is overly profit-driven and sometimes corrupt.
But for parents with their hearts set on adopting Russian children, the political discourse has been little more than background noise to their own personal agony. Senior officials in Moscow have said they expect the ban to have the immediate effect of blocking the departure of 46 children whose adoptions by American parents were nearly completed.
Adoption agency officials in the United States who work regularly with Russian orphanages said there were about 200 to 250 sets of parents who had already identified children they planned to adopt and would be affected.
Robert and Kim Summers of Freehold, N.J., have already paid for three seats on a flight home from Russia next month. They are scheduled to pick up a 21-month-old boy that they consider their son in the city of Kaluga, on Jan. 14, after a required 30-day waiting period that began when a judge approved their adoption.
They plan to call the boy Preston, and their house is already filled with toys and clothes and pictures of him, said Ms. Summers, 49. “The stroller is in my dining room and the partly assembled crib is next to my bed.”
“I’m appalled,” Ms. Summers said of news that the ban would become law. “I can’t even fathom what is happening, something so political that has absolutely nothing to do with children.”
One mother from North Carolina who was in Russia on Thursday preparing to return to the United States with her newly adopted son expressed outrage that Russian officials were not adhering to a requirement in the new bilateral agreement on adoptions that called for one year’s notice if either side wanted to terminate it.
This mother, who asked that her family not be identified out of fear of her family being blocked from leaving Russia, described how the relationship between parents and children begins long before the children leave the orphanage. She and her husband adopted a boy in Russia in 2009 and returned with him last week to pick up his new brother.
“A lot of parents leave little picture albums with the children, with pictures of the new mama and papa and siblings and pets and bedrooms,” said the mother, who is in her 30s and works in marketing.
“Facilitators help us put labels on the pictures so that the caregivers can help the children get familiar with the new faces,” she said. “I weep to think of them holding those albums and wondering why the people that promised they would be back in a few weeks have never come back.”
Stalin’s Shadow
December 28, 2012
Having brilliantly documented the horror of Stalin’s Soviet terror machine in her Pulitzer Prize-winning “Gulag,”
Anne Applebaum now offers a bulky sequel, “Iron Curtain,” about the
brutal effort of that same machine to crush and colonize Eastern Europe
in the first decade after World War II. Her evidence, once again drawn
from archival research and some survivor interviews, is overwhelming and
convincing. But the heart of her story is hardly news.
That Soviet tanks carried Moscow-trained agents into Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany was known in the West at the time and has been well documented since. When those agents set out to produce not only a friendly sphere of Soviet influence but also a cordon of dictatorships reliably responsive to Russian orders, Winston Churchill was moved to warn, just days after the Nazis’ surrender in 1945, that an Iron Curtain was being drawn through the heart of Europe. (He coined the metaphor in a message to President Truman a full year before he used it in public in Fulton, Mo.) And Matyas Rakosi, the “little Stalin” of Hungary, was well known for another apt metaphor, describing how the region’s political, economic, cultural and social oppositions were to be destroyed by “cutting them off like slices of salami.”
Applebaum tracks the salami slicing as typically practiced in Poland,
Hungary and Germany, and serves up not only the beef but also the fat,
vinegar and garlic in exhausting detail. She shows how the knives were
sharpened before the war’s end in Soviet training camps for East
European Communists, so that trusted agents could create and control
secret police forces in each of the “liberated” nations. She shows how
reliable operatives then took charge of all radio broadcasting, the
era’s most powerful mass medium. And she demonstrates how the Soviet
stooges could then, with surprising speed, harass, persecute and finally
ban all independent institutions, from youth groups and welfare
agencies to schools, churches and rival political parties.
Along the way, millions of Germans, Poles, Ukrainians and Hungarians were ruthlessly driven from their historic homes to satisfy Soviet territorial ambitions. Millions more were deemed opponents and beaten, imprisoned or hauled off to hard labor in Siberia. In Stalin’s paranoid sphere, not even total control of economic and cultural life was sufficient. To complete the terror, he purged even the Communist leaders of each satellite regime, accusing them of treason and parading them as they made humiliating confessions.
It is good to be reminded of these sordid events, now that more archives are accessible and some witnesses remain alive to recall the horror. Still, why should we be consuming such a mass of detail more than half a century later?
In her introduction Applebaum says it is important to remember that “historically, there were regimes that aspired to total control,” not only of the organs of state but also of human nature itself. We should be studying how totalitarianism worked, she maintains, because “we can’t be certain that mobile phones, the Internet and satellite photographs won’t eventually become tools of control” in other places. Well, Vladimir Putin may yet make her a prophet, but so far this century, technology has become a welcome defense against tyranny.
More relevant to contemporary discussion are some themes Applebaum evokes along the way but never develops. She begins her tale by insisting that the United States and Britain, having promised the East Europeans a democratic future, quickly abandoned them to Soviet domination. True enough. Yet what were the West’s alternatives? The door to Europe was left open for Stalin in 1945 because the Americans were rapidly redeploying to fight Japan and eager to enlist Stalin in the Pacific war. Applebaum does not speculate about how Soviet colonization might have been forestalled or what methods of intervention for freedom we should be applying now in Cuba or North Korea, Syria or China.
Similarly, she barely touches on the contrary claims of some historians that it was not the West’s appeasement but rather hostility against the Soviet Union that provoked Stalin’s aggressive responses. These scholars accuse the United States of having triggered the cold war, thus baiting Stalin into taking crude defensive countermeasures. Applebaum’s evidence provides a telling rebuttal to those “revisionist” theories, but she never really engages them.
Most conspicuously missing is any sustained examination of Soviet motives for the rape of Eastern Europe. What did the Russians want? Revenge against Germany and its allies? Compensation for their enormous loss of life and suffering in the war and the spoils due a victor? Was the domination of neighboring states a wildly arrogant policy of defense so that no conqueror could ever again follow Napoleon and Hitler to Moscow? Or was it a revival of Russia’s imperial desire to annex at least half of Poland, to secure a rebellious Ukraine and to incorporate the Baltic States and various adjacent Balkan lands?
Applebaum’s overriding interest is in Stalin’s deranged tyranny, which aggravated the postwar horror inside the Soviet Union at the same time that it was being slavishly imitated by his East European henchmen until his death in 1953. Yet Stalin’s successors were just as intent on preserving their dominion. Why? Applebaum contends that Stalin, having once postponed the Soviet dream of igniting an international Communist revolution, “was preparing to relaunch it” in 1944 as the Red Army rolled westward. But that passing comment — and debatable premise — is all she offers to explain Soviet policy.
While her documentation of the Soviet takeover is impressive, at this late date fewer facts and more analysis would have been welcome. The seeds of the Communists’ ultimate failure in East Europe are strewed throughout her book, but with little explanation. She shows how poorly the Communist regimes provided for their consumers and how they alienated the workers in whose name they governed. Why? And does not this subject require lengthy discussion of how Communism collided with the deeply rooted nationalisms of the region? Applebaum incisively demonstrates the moral confusion that haunted Roman Catholic leaders and other opponents of the Communist regimes, some openly hostile, some reluctantly cooperative, many simply passive. But how should we evaluate their choices?
“Iron Curtain” is not a full history of the Iron Curtain because of Applebaum’s decision to end her history in 1956, just as Poles and Hungarians openly rebelled against Soviet control. There then followed a 30-year effort in the Kremlin to stabilize and reform all Communist societies, but the East Europeans remained restive, held captive only by Soviet armed might. The colonization became a huge burden on the Soviet economy, and the lures of Western democracy and economic achievement produced corrosive holes in that curtain. Finally, when Mikhail Gorbachev refused to shoot to preserve his costly empire, the curtain collapsed altogether and dragged down the Soviet center as well.
Applebaum rightly concludes, long before that climax, that the totalitarian spell could never be sustained for long. But she declines to generalize about the reasons or the defenses we all may need against other totalitarian threats. Instead, what she has given us is a concrete and sad record that honors the memory of the millions who were slaughtered, tortured and suppressed in the mad pursuit of totality.
That Soviet tanks carried Moscow-trained agents into Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany was known in the West at the time and has been well documented since. When those agents set out to produce not only a friendly sphere of Soviet influence but also a cordon of dictatorships reliably responsive to Russian orders, Winston Churchill was moved to warn, just days after the Nazis’ surrender in 1945, that an Iron Curtain was being drawn through the heart of Europe. (He coined the metaphor in a message to President Truman a full year before he used it in public in Fulton, Mo.) And Matyas Rakosi, the “little Stalin” of Hungary, was well known for another apt metaphor, describing how the region’s political, economic, cultural and social oppositions were to be destroyed by “cutting them off like slices of salami.”
Along the way, millions of Germans, Poles, Ukrainians and Hungarians were ruthlessly driven from their historic homes to satisfy Soviet territorial ambitions. Millions more were deemed opponents and beaten, imprisoned or hauled off to hard labor in Siberia. In Stalin’s paranoid sphere, not even total control of economic and cultural life was sufficient. To complete the terror, he purged even the Communist leaders of each satellite regime, accusing them of treason and parading them as they made humiliating confessions.
It is good to be reminded of these sordid events, now that more archives are accessible and some witnesses remain alive to recall the horror. Still, why should we be consuming such a mass of detail more than half a century later?
In her introduction Applebaum says it is important to remember that “historically, there were regimes that aspired to total control,” not only of the organs of state but also of human nature itself. We should be studying how totalitarianism worked, she maintains, because “we can’t be certain that mobile phones, the Internet and satellite photographs won’t eventually become tools of control” in other places. Well, Vladimir Putin may yet make her a prophet, but so far this century, technology has become a welcome defense against tyranny.
More relevant to contemporary discussion are some themes Applebaum evokes along the way but never develops. She begins her tale by insisting that the United States and Britain, having promised the East Europeans a democratic future, quickly abandoned them to Soviet domination. True enough. Yet what were the West’s alternatives? The door to Europe was left open for Stalin in 1945 because the Americans were rapidly redeploying to fight Japan and eager to enlist Stalin in the Pacific war. Applebaum does not speculate about how Soviet colonization might have been forestalled or what methods of intervention for freedom we should be applying now in Cuba or North Korea, Syria or China.
Similarly, she barely touches on the contrary claims of some historians that it was not the West’s appeasement but rather hostility against the Soviet Union that provoked Stalin’s aggressive responses. These scholars accuse the United States of having triggered the cold war, thus baiting Stalin into taking crude defensive countermeasures. Applebaum’s evidence provides a telling rebuttal to those “revisionist” theories, but she never really engages them.
Most conspicuously missing is any sustained examination of Soviet motives for the rape of Eastern Europe. What did the Russians want? Revenge against Germany and its allies? Compensation for their enormous loss of life and suffering in the war and the spoils due a victor? Was the domination of neighboring states a wildly arrogant policy of defense so that no conqueror could ever again follow Napoleon and Hitler to Moscow? Or was it a revival of Russia’s imperial desire to annex at least half of Poland, to secure a rebellious Ukraine and to incorporate the Baltic States and various adjacent Balkan lands?
Applebaum’s overriding interest is in Stalin’s deranged tyranny, which aggravated the postwar horror inside the Soviet Union at the same time that it was being slavishly imitated by his East European henchmen until his death in 1953. Yet Stalin’s successors were just as intent on preserving their dominion. Why? Applebaum contends that Stalin, having once postponed the Soviet dream of igniting an international Communist revolution, “was preparing to relaunch it” in 1944 as the Red Army rolled westward. But that passing comment — and debatable premise — is all she offers to explain Soviet policy.
While her documentation of the Soviet takeover is impressive, at this late date fewer facts and more analysis would have been welcome. The seeds of the Communists’ ultimate failure in East Europe are strewed throughout her book, but with little explanation. She shows how poorly the Communist regimes provided for their consumers and how they alienated the workers in whose name they governed. Why? And does not this subject require lengthy discussion of how Communism collided with the deeply rooted nationalisms of the region? Applebaum incisively demonstrates the moral confusion that haunted Roman Catholic leaders and other opponents of the Communist regimes, some openly hostile, some reluctantly cooperative, many simply passive. But how should we evaluate their choices?
“Iron Curtain” is not a full history of the Iron Curtain because of Applebaum’s decision to end her history in 1956, just as Poles and Hungarians openly rebelled against Soviet control. There then followed a 30-year effort in the Kremlin to stabilize and reform all Communist societies, but the East Europeans remained restive, held captive only by Soviet armed might. The colonization became a huge burden on the Soviet economy, and the lures of Western democracy and economic achievement produced corrosive holes in that curtain. Finally, when Mikhail Gorbachev refused to shoot to preserve his costly empire, the curtain collapsed altogether and dragged down the Soviet center as well.
Applebaum rightly concludes, long before that climax, that the totalitarian spell could never be sustained for long. But she declines to generalize about the reasons or the defenses we all may need against other totalitarian threats. Instead, what she has given us is a concrete and sad record that honors the memory of the millions who were slaughtered, tortured and suppressed in the mad pursuit of totality.
書評
《鐵幕》：共產主義的尖刀如何在蘇聯磨利
報道 2012年12月28日
在榮獲普利策獎的《古拉格》(Gulag)一書中，安妮·阿普勒鮑姆(Anne
Applebaum)出色地記錄了斯大林時期蘇聯恐怖機器帶來的苦難。現在她又推出了大部頭續集《鐵幕》(Iron
Curtain)，講述二戰之後的十年中，同一機器在東歐進行殘酷鎮壓和建立殖民地的故事。她的證據同樣也來自於檔案研究和倖存者訪談，極為詳實，富有說
服力。但這個故事的中心思想並不新穎。
在莫斯科受訓的特工隨着蘇聯坦克進入波蘭、匈牙利、羅馬尼亞、保加利亞、捷克斯洛伐克和東德境內，西方世界當時知曉此事，而且一直加以詳細的記載。 特工們不僅着手把這些國家變成蘇聯的友好勢力國，而且也開始建立一道可以有效回應俄國人指示的獨裁統治警戒線。1945年，納粹剛剛投降不久，溫斯頓·丘 吉爾(Winston Churchill)就警告說，一道鐵幕已經在歐洲的心臟地帶降下（他首先在給杜魯門總統[President Truman]的一封信里使用這個比喻說法，整整一年之後，他才在密蘇里州富爾頓公開用這個詞）。匈牙利的“小斯大林”馬加什·拉科西(Matyas Rakosi)做過另外一個恰當的比喻，也非常出名，他說這個地區政治、經濟、文化和社會上的反對勢力會“像薩拉米香腸切成片”那樣被摧毀。
阿普勒鮑姆追蹤了在波蘭、匈牙利和德國進行過典型實施的“香腸切片”過程，她端上來給讀者的不僅是香腸中的牛肉，還有脂肪、醋和大蒜，極盡詳實。阿
普勒鮑姆記敘了二戰結束前夕，為東歐共產黨準備的尖刀如何在蘇聯特工訓練營里磨利，以便讓可靠的特工在“被解放”的國家裡建立和控制秘密警察部隊。她描寫
了他們當時如何控制所有的廣播電台——那個時代最強大的大眾傳播工具，以及蘇聯的傀儡如何以驚人的速度騷擾破壞從青年團體、福利機構到學校、教堂和反對黨
派的所有獨立機構，並最終封禁了它們。
在這個過程中，為了滿足蘇聯的領土野心，數以百萬計的德國人、波蘭人、烏克蘭人和匈牙利人被無情地趕出他們世代居住的家園。另有數百萬人被認定為敵 人，被毆打、監禁或是送到西伯利亞服苦役。對於偏執多疑的斯大林來說，完全控制這些國家的經濟和文化生活還不夠。為了更徹底地施行恐怖統治，他甚至還對每 個衛星政權的共產黨領導人加以清算，指控他們犯下叛國罪，在他們做出屈辱的供述時把他們示眾立威。
既然現在有更多的檔案可供查閱，一些目擊者也仍然健在，可以回顧這些恐怖經歷，重新提起這段骯髒的歷史也是一件好事。然而，在大半個世紀之後，我們為什麼要去閱讀如此龐大的細節呢？
阿普勒鮑姆在《鐵幕》的序言中說，我們需要記住“在歷史上，有些政治制度渴求徹底的控制權”，這種控制不僅是針對國家機關，也是針對人性本身。她認 為我們應該研究極權主義的運作方式，因為“我們說不準手機、互聯網和衛星圖像會不會最終在某些地方變成控制工具”。雖然弗拉基米爾·普京有可能做出她所說 的那些事情來，但本世紀直到現在為止，技術已經變成了一種值得歡迎的防暴政工具。
跟當前現實之間關聯更大的，是阿普勒鮑姆在《鐵幕》中提到但卻沒有展開的一些主題。在書的開篇，她堅稱美國和英國承諾過讓東歐實現民主，但很快就把 他們拋給了蘇聯。這倒是事實，但是西方當時有什麼選擇呢？在1945年時，歐洲的大門是為斯大林敞開的，因為美國人很快就重新部署到跟日本的戰鬥中，並熱 切希望在太平洋戰爭中爭取到斯大林的支持。當時本來該如何預見到蘇聯的殖民統治呢？或者我們現在應該對古巴、朝鮮、敘利亞或者中國採取何種有利於自由的干 預措施？在這些方面阿普勒鮑姆沒有進行深入思考。
同樣，她也幾乎沒有觸及一些歷史學家的不同看法。這些學者認為，引發斯大林強硬回應的不是西方的綏靖政策，而是西方對蘇聯的敵視。他們指責美國引發 了冷戰，激怒斯大林採取了欠成熟的防禦對策。對於這種“修正主義”理論，阿普勒鮑姆的證據提供了有力的反證，但她一直沒有在這個方面真正展開。
書中最明顯的缺失，是對蘇聯暴政統治東歐的動機缺乏持續的檢視。俄國人想要什麼呢？是想報復德國及其盟國嗎？是想讓他們補償蘇聯在戰爭中失去的大量 生命和遭受的苦難，並向勝利者繳納戰利品嗎？統治鄰國是一種狂妄的防禦政策，避免再有像拿破崙和希特拉那樣覬覦莫斯科的征服者出現嗎？還是俄羅斯帝國希望 吞併波蘭一半以上的領土，平定難以控制的烏克蘭，收服波羅的海諸國和相鄰的巴爾幹領土這一野心的復蘇呢？
斯大林的瘋狂暴政是阿普勒鮑姆最感興趣的地方，它加劇了蘇聯國內的戰後恐怖統治，同時又被斯大林在東歐的黨羽盲目模仿，直到1953年斯大林逝世。 然而，斯大林的繼任者們也同樣熱切地維護這種統治。為什麼呢？阿普勒鮑姆聲稱，斯大林之前曾推遲了蘇聯點燃國際共產主義革命的夢想，1944年紅軍向西推 進時，他“準備重新啟動這個計劃”。但是，這樣的信口之辭 ——以及值得商榷的假設 —— 就是她用來解釋蘇聯政策的全部依據了。
《鐵幕》在史實方面給人留下了深刻印象，但現在事情已經過去了這麼久，少記錄一些事實，多進行一些分析會更好。共產黨在東歐遭到最終失敗的原因分散 在從頭到尾的整本書中，但作者幾乎沒有進行任何解釋。阿普勒鮑姆展示了共產主義政權為人民提供的消費品有多麼貧乏，他們如何以工人的名義進行統治卻又疏遠 了工人。為什麼呢？共產主義與該地區根深蒂固的民族主義之間的衝突難道不需要大篇幅討論嗎？阿普勒鮑姆淋漓盡致地描述了令羅馬天主教領袖和共產主義政權的 其他反對者感到苦惱的道德困境，一些人進行了公開反對，一些人不情不願地參與合作，很多人只是採取消極姿態。但是，我們應該如何評價他們的選擇呢？
《鐵幕》並不是完整的“鐵幕”歷史，因為阿普勒鮑姆決定把它結束在1956年，就在波蘭和匈牙利公然違抗蘇聯命令的時候。在那之後，克里姆林宮又進 行了30年的努力，希望維護所有共產主義政權的穩定並進行改革，但東歐國家仍然很難駕馭，只是懼於蘇聯的武力才維繫下來。在這些國家殖民給蘇聯經濟帶來了 巨大負擔，西方民主制度和經濟成就的誘惑在鐵幕上腐蝕了孔洞。最後，當米哈伊爾·戈爾巴喬夫(Mikhail Gorbachev)拒絕靠開槍來維持成本高昂的帝國時，鐵幕徹底瓦解了，同時也拖垮了作為核心的蘇聯。
遠在這個高潮出現之前，阿普勒鮑姆就得出了正確的結論，即極權主義的魔力無法長期維持。但她沒有歸納出原因以及防止其他極權主義威脅的可能方法。相反，她給我們提供了一份真實而傷感的記錄，以告慰那些在瘋狂極權的道路上被屠殺、折磨和鎮壓的數以百萬計的人。
在莫斯科受訓的特工隨着蘇聯坦克進入波蘭、匈牙利、羅馬尼亞、保加利亞、捷克斯洛伐克和東德境內，西方世界當時知曉此事，而且一直加以詳細的記載。 特工們不僅着手把這些國家變成蘇聯的友好勢力國，而且也開始建立一道可以有效回應俄國人指示的獨裁統治警戒線。1945年，納粹剛剛投降不久，溫斯頓·丘 吉爾(Winston Churchill)就警告說，一道鐵幕已經在歐洲的心臟地帶降下（他首先在給杜魯門總統[President Truman]的一封信里使用這個比喻說法，整整一年之後，他才在密蘇里州富爾頓公開用這個詞）。匈牙利的“小斯大林”馬加什·拉科西(Matyas Rakosi)做過另外一個恰當的比喻，也非常出名，他說這個地區政治、經濟、文化和社會上的反對勢力會“像薩拉米香腸切成片”那樣被摧毀。
在這個過程中，為了滿足蘇聯的領土野心，數以百萬計的德國人、波蘭人、烏克蘭人和匈牙利人被無情地趕出他們世代居住的家園。另有數百萬人被認定為敵 人，被毆打、監禁或是送到西伯利亞服苦役。對於偏執多疑的斯大林來說，完全控制這些國家的經濟和文化生活還不夠。為了更徹底地施行恐怖統治，他甚至還對每 個衛星政權的共產黨領導人加以清算，指控他們犯下叛國罪，在他們做出屈辱的供述時把他們示眾立威。
既然現在有更多的檔案可供查閱，一些目擊者也仍然健在，可以回顧這些恐怖經歷，重新提起這段骯髒的歷史也是一件好事。然而，在大半個世紀之後，我們為什麼要去閱讀如此龐大的細節呢？
阿普勒鮑姆在《鐵幕》的序言中說，我們需要記住“在歷史上，有些政治制度渴求徹底的控制權”，這種控制不僅是針對國家機關，也是針對人性本身。她認 為我們應該研究極權主義的運作方式，因為“我們說不準手機、互聯網和衛星圖像會不會最終在某些地方變成控制工具”。雖然弗拉基米爾·普京有可能做出她所說 的那些事情來，但本世紀直到現在為止，技術已經變成了一種值得歡迎的防暴政工具。
跟當前現實之間關聯更大的，是阿普勒鮑姆在《鐵幕》中提到但卻沒有展開的一些主題。在書的開篇，她堅稱美國和英國承諾過讓東歐實現民主，但很快就把 他們拋給了蘇聯。這倒是事實，但是西方當時有什麼選擇呢？在1945年時，歐洲的大門是為斯大林敞開的，因為美國人很快就重新部署到跟日本的戰鬥中，並熱 切希望在太平洋戰爭中爭取到斯大林的支持。當時本來該如何預見到蘇聯的殖民統治呢？或者我們現在應該對古巴、朝鮮、敘利亞或者中國採取何種有利於自由的干 預措施？在這些方面阿普勒鮑姆沒有進行深入思考。
同樣，她也幾乎沒有觸及一些歷史學家的不同看法。這些學者認為，引發斯大林強硬回應的不是西方的綏靖政策，而是西方對蘇聯的敵視。他們指責美國引發 了冷戰，激怒斯大林採取了欠成熟的防禦對策。對於這種“修正主義”理論，阿普勒鮑姆的證據提供了有力的反證，但她一直沒有在這個方面真正展開。
書中最明顯的缺失，是對蘇聯暴政統治東歐的動機缺乏持續的檢視。俄國人想要什麼呢？是想報復德國及其盟國嗎？是想讓他們補償蘇聯在戰爭中失去的大量 生命和遭受的苦難，並向勝利者繳納戰利品嗎？統治鄰國是一種狂妄的防禦政策，避免再有像拿破崙和希特拉那樣覬覦莫斯科的征服者出現嗎？還是俄羅斯帝國希望 吞併波蘭一半以上的領土，平定難以控制的烏克蘭，收服波羅的海諸國和相鄰的巴爾幹領土這一野心的復蘇呢？
斯大林的瘋狂暴政是阿普勒鮑姆最感興趣的地方，它加劇了蘇聯國內的戰後恐怖統治，同時又被斯大林在東歐的黨羽盲目模仿，直到1953年斯大林逝世。 然而，斯大林的繼任者們也同樣熱切地維護這種統治。為什麼呢？阿普勒鮑姆聲稱，斯大林之前曾推遲了蘇聯點燃國際共產主義革命的夢想，1944年紅軍向西推 進時，他“準備重新啟動這個計劃”。但是，這樣的信口之辭 ——以及值得商榷的假設 —— 就是她用來解釋蘇聯政策的全部依據了。
《鐵幕》在史實方面給人留下了深刻印象，但現在事情已經過去了這麼久，少記錄一些事實，多進行一些分析會更好。共產黨在東歐遭到最終失敗的原因分散 在從頭到尾的整本書中，但作者幾乎沒有進行任何解釋。阿普勒鮑姆展示了共產主義政權為人民提供的消費品有多麼貧乏，他們如何以工人的名義進行統治卻又疏遠 了工人。為什麼呢？共產主義與該地區根深蒂固的民族主義之間的衝突難道不需要大篇幅討論嗎？阿普勒鮑姆淋漓盡致地描述了令羅馬天主教領袖和共產主義政權的 其他反對者感到苦惱的道德困境，一些人進行了公開反對，一些人不情不願地參與合作，很多人只是採取消極姿態。但是，我們應該如何評價他們的選擇呢？
《鐵幕》並不是完整的“鐵幕”歷史，因為阿普勒鮑姆決定把它結束在1956年，就在波蘭和匈牙利公然違抗蘇聯命令的時候。在那之後，克里姆林宮又進 行了30年的努力，希望維護所有共產主義政權的穩定並進行改革，但東歐國家仍然很難駕馭，只是懼於蘇聯的武力才維繫下來。在這些國家殖民給蘇聯經濟帶來了 巨大負擔，西方民主制度和經濟成就的誘惑在鐵幕上腐蝕了孔洞。最後，當米哈伊爾·戈爾巴喬夫(Mikhail Gorbachev)拒絕靠開槍來維持成本高昂的帝國時，鐵幕徹底瓦解了，同時也拖垮了作為核心的蘇聯。
遠在這個高潮出現之前，阿普勒鮑姆就得出了正確的結論，即極權主義的魔力無法長期維持。但她沒有歸納出原因以及防止其他極權主義威脅的可能方法。相反，她給我們提供了一份真實而傷感的記錄，以告慰那些在瘋狂極權的道路上被屠殺、折磨和鎮壓的數以百萬計的人。
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