Panasonic: The Largest Corporate Restructuring in History

People ride an escalator past a Panasonic advertisement in Tokyo. STORY HIGHLIGHTS Panasonic and Sharp together forecast $15.2bn of net losses for the year Reckoning for past strategic mistakes, in the form of billions of investment write-offs Investments in flatscreen TVs and solar panels have proved to be disastrous (Financial Times) -- You know that Japanese companies are worried when they stop complaining about the yen. In earnings presentations this week by Panasonic and Sharp, which together forecast $15.2bn of net losses for the year, the profit-squeezing effects of the currency's prolonged appreciation were barely mentioned. Instead, investors were treated to a reckoning for past strategic mistakes, in the form of billions of dollars in investment write-offs. "I am truly sorry," said Takashi Okuda, Sharp's president since June. For years, Japanese consumer electronics groups have been investing both too little and too much. In the 1980s, when the Japanese were beating up on formerly dominant US manufacturers, Americans marvelled at how much money they devoted to research and development and building newer, better factories, taking it as an object lesson in the value of long-term thinking. But now it is Japan that is being outspent. Since 2000, South Korea's Samsung -- now the world's biggest electronics company by sales -- has allocated an average of 12 per cent of sales to capital investment, about double the ratio at Panasonic, Sony and Sharp. When the Japanese have invested, it has often been in the wrong areas -- products such as flatscreen TVs and solar panels, which foreign rivals can make just as well at less cost. Sharp, a century-old company that started out making mechanical pencils, is the most troubled of Japan's big consumer electronics groups. The Y450bn ($5.6bn) net loss it projected this week would be its second record deficit in two years, and last year its ratio of net debt to earnings before interest, taxes and other deductions more than doubled, from 1.7 times to 4.4 times. On Friday Standard & Poor's slashed its credit rating for Panasonic's long-term debt by two levels, from A- to BBB, while Fitch downgraded Sharp's credit rating to B-. Fitch said it "does not foresee any meaningful operational turnaround in [Sharp's] core business over the short- to medium-term". Sharp is trying to turn its focus from TVs and solar panels to small LCD displays for smartphones and tablet computers Sharp was granted temporary relief in September when it secured Y360bn in emergency loans from its Japanese banks, which analysts say should give it sufficient operating funds until at least next June, when the loans come due. Negotiations with Hon Hai of Taiwan over a Y67bn investment, tentatively agreed in March, have stalled, and the company is furiously trying to free up cash on its own -- by cutting jobs and wages, selling overseas factories and mortgaging offices in Japan. None of this is a long-term solution, however. Sharp is trying to turn its focus from TVs and solar panels to small LCD displays for smartphones and tablet computers, but even there it has experienced production delays and is losing ground to rivals, says Toshihiro Uomoto, a credit analyst at Nomura. "Sharp's problems go beyond just temporary funding issues, and extend to doubts over the sustainability of its business." At Panasonic, most of this week's Y765bn net-loss forecast was owed to write-offs of tax credits and past investments. Revenues are also falling, however: it cut its annual sales forecast by 10 per cent, to Y7.3tn, and its projection for operating profit by nearly half to Y140bn. Takashi Watanabe, an analyst at Goldman Sachs, says Japan's biggest consumer electronics company has enough profitable businesses that eliminating or shrinking the dud ones could turn it round. Kazuhiro Tsuga, Panasonic's new president, has declared that each division will be judged on its own earnings power -- a change at what has long been a collectively minded company. Sceptics, though, will note that the company, which has 320,000 workers, has been through several big restructurings before, without hitting on conclusive profit formula. Sony bucked the trend this week by sticking with its forecast for a narrow profit for the financial year to March, in spite of a Y15bn net loss in the quarter to September, blamed on restructuring costs. Like Panasonic and Sharp, Sony is shrinking its TV-making business, and says it will focus on imaging technology, video games and smartphones, an area it has strengthened since buying out Ericsson's share of their mobile phone joint venture last year. Shiro Mikoshiba, an equities analyst at Nomura, says the smartphone push looks promising on its own, but could be risky for a company that makes digital cameras, game consoles, portable music players and notebook computers -- all products that multipurpose smartphones are increasingly replacing. "We see a strong possibility of a vicious cycle in the company's product strategy," Mr Mikoshiba says. 20090201 〔本報訊〕日本松下電器Panasonic，今日發布獲利預警，並宣布裁員1萬5千人，並將關閉全球27家工廠。

據《華爾街日報》報導，日本松下電器由於去年10至12月份，已出現虧損，松下電器預估，截至今年3月份，也將面臨虧損。為了因應商業形勢急劇惡化，松下 電器不得不關閉全球27家工廠（包括日本13廠），並計劃2010年3月前，裁員全球約1萬5,000人。此外，還會裁減高管薪水的1到2成。


據悉，松下虧損原因包括，電子產品銷售下降、日圓走強和平板電視等產品價格下降。










TOKYO -- Panasonic Corp. joined a growing list of Japanese electronics firms forecasting a huge loss for the current fiscal year and said it plans to cut about 15,000 jobs to combat a sharp slowdown in demand and to ease the burden of a strong yen.
The announcement by Panasonic, which is considered one of the standout performers within Japan's electronics industry, is further evidence of how grim the outlook is for the country's flagship manufacturing industries.
全球家電大廠Panasonic公司2日傳出2008會計年度的淨損將高達39億美元，股價應聲挫跌3.1%。日本其他消費電子業者的股價也因財報可能出現赤字而賣壓沉重，日立和NEC甚至跌至近30年谷底。
朝日新聞2日報導，Panasonic因銷售疲軟及組織調整費用升高，可能在5日公布第三季財報時，預測今年3月底止的本年度淨損3,500億日圓，為該公司七年來首度出現赤字。
朝日未引述消息來源，但預測Panasonic營利將不及1,000億日圓，遠遜於稍早預測的3,400億日圓。日本經濟新聞也報導，Panasonic本年度淨損可能達3,000億日圓（33億美元），營利將遽降九成至700億日圓。
Panasonic不願證實或否認媒體報導。該公司去年11月27日預估，本年度淨利300億日圓。Panasonic股價在東京證交所大跌3.1%，收1,065日圓，為1 月26日來最低。日經225指數2日跌幅為1.5%。
全球消費者因不景氣及金融風暴的影響而撙節開支，除Panasonic以外，日本許多大企業今年也都面臨鉅額虧損，股價紛紛下滑。
三菱電機2日說，本年度淨利可能下跌逾九成至100億日圓。這是三菱電機今年第二次下修財測，去年10月還預估淨利可達1,200億日圓，股價隨即大跌4.9%，收485日圓。
朝日新聞並指出，因為平面電視需求下滑，夏普公司6 日可能公布1956年股票上市以來的首次淨損。
夏普股價重挫4.6%，收646日圓，為去年12月30日來最低。
日立公司則因1月30日大幅修正原先預估的年度淨利150億日圓，改為淨損7,000億日圓，並宣布裁員7,000人，2日股價暴跌17%，收244日圓，為逾28年來最低。

Panasonic: The Largest Corporate Restructuring in History (Hardcover)

by Francis McInerney (Author) "ON JUNE 6, 1995, TWO MANAGERS FROM MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC Industrial, one of Japan's largest companies, visited Sean White and me in our offices in New..." (more)

本書中國翻譯本[ 走出松下幸之助 ]刪減 錯誤過多

Editorial Reviews

Review
An enthralling story of regeneration. If a brand has a noble history, in skillful hands it can have a glorious future. -- Sir Martin Sorrell, CEO of WPP Group

Brings clear insight and a cross-industry perspective to make sense out of what many only make nonsense. -- Jeffrey D Montgomery, GMT Communications Partners III LLP

Francis McInerney asks the really big questions - and answers them with, in essence, a really simple formula. -- Robert Crozier, Publisher, Forbes Global

Panasonic puts a Rembrandt portrait face on the Japanese corporation, with depth of character, extraordinarily subtle nuances, and brilliant detail. -- Dan Burstein, author of Yen!

Transformation is no guarantee of success. However, if you understand the drivers, it may work. For readers, a fascinating experience. -- Ben Verwaayen, CEO BT Group

Product Description

Panasonic is not about any ordinary restructuring. It is about a company of $72 billion in sales, employing 293,000 people around the world, the tenth largest industrial company not in oil or autos, whose thousands of products are so universally used that it may have more customers than any firm in history. Panasonic is so big that it is one of the few companies which has a product in just about every home and business in the developed world, has operations in almost every country in the world, and has a vast scope of markets--making everything from flat panel TVs to car audio and satellite navigation systems, even entire building systems and home interiors. Panasonic’s breadth and size combined made reorganizing the company incomparably more difficult than even the task that faced IBM’s incoming CEO in 1992.

Panasonic delves into how this great eleven-year restructuring (1995-2006) was accomplished without importing an outside CEO like Lou Gerstner. Panasonic was able to reorder a complex and tradition-bound organization in a country that is often thought, mistakenly, to deeply resist radical change, thus demonstrating how Japanese companies continue to adapt to the competitive forces roiling the markets around them.

See all Editorial Reviews

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 400 pages
• Publisher: Truman Talley Books; 1st edition (May 1, 2007)
• Language: English

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1.	on Page 10:
	"... • There was no brand we could point to-was it National, Panasonic, Quasar, NAIS, Technics, Ramsa, or what?-and no strategy for getting one. ..."
2.	on Page 66:
	"... Dick had decades of experience in the U.S. consumer electronics business, joining Matsushita from Quasar when Matsushita acquired Quasar in 1974. ..."

1.	on Page 72:
	"... This Matsushita customer had decided that the simplest way to further cut inventories and improve cash flow and quality was to allow the people on the line the flexibility to redesign the line at ..."
2.	on Page 76:
	"... They lower their devel- opment costs, improve manufacturability, and raise system-level quality. Suppliers that can adapt will do well. They can differenti- ate themselves on something other than price. ..."
3.	on Page 77:
	"... The Digital Revolution outlined our basic philosophy for dealing with these challenges: "A customer's entire experience of Mat- sushita defines quality. [The company] must raise the switching costs to its customers, ..."
4.	on Page 98:
	"... are: • Beating Japan (Dutton 1993), which describes the impact of falling information costs on whole nations. • The Total Quality Corporation (Dutton 1995), ..."
5.	on Page 166:
	"... With Atsushi Murayama, he oversaw the Corporate Management Quality Innovation Division, which comprised four committees to oversee all aspects of reorganization: • Corporate Culture • V Products • Supply ..."
6.	on Page 214:
	"... so many for profitability, and so many for inventory, environmental management, growth potential, and quality. The convolution of this mix naturally en- couraged managers to play the numbers game ..."
7.	on Page 230:
	"... rollouts as it has in PDP and with high-yield processes in automotive systems. Putting quality and speed to- gether were central to profitable growth, but Matsushita had too little of either. ..."
8.	on Page 253:
	"... quality brand with no clear image beyond category cost of entry; behind the times/outdated, no emotional tie with consumer or business ..."
9.	on Page 255:
	"... value Cautious Authority Life-enhancing Outdated Improving High-quality Boring Energetic Customer-focused Not a ..."
10.	on Page 258:
	"... The program also "raised the bar" in Bob Greenberg's words, driving a different quality of employee: "If you can't add value to someone's life, you shouldn't be working here.""' For the future, Greenberg told ..."

11.	on Page 276:
	"... billions- in a month or two. This is a market where all the problems of col- lapsing price-performance, mass marketing, quality, and volume hit at once and in the same spot. ..."
12.	on Page 279:
	"... Under Ohtsubo, Sakamoto, and Morita, the company's PDP grand strategy was based on several things: • Specialize in PDPs, the high-quality end of the flat-panel display business. ..."
13.	on Page 281:
	"... this are complex and have a lot to do with the fragility of the chips and the disproportionate impact on quality ..."
14.	on Page 283:
	"... it did so without a significant drop in yield, allowing Matsushita to drive step function increases in volume at high quality. Indeed, yield rates are now far above those achieved by the competition. ..."
15.	on Page 284:
	"... This quality problem brings up the main challenge facing Mat- sushita in improving yield. In this business, getting to 95 percent is ..."
16.	on Page 296:
	"... the demand for which is rea- sonably well understood-where price-performance pressures are low, relatively, and where quality and logistics count for everything. What matters here are complex inventory and yield relationships ..."
17.	on Page 298:
	"... in stages is part of the problem. Hewlett-Packard learned years ago that as each test stage ap- proaches six sigma quality (99.9999 percent yield), there is no ..."
18.	on Page 300:
	"... issue. Most car factories run two shifts and each one takes four deliveries, meaning that PAS has to work its high-quality variable-lot system over eight deliveries a day. ..."
19.	on Page 309:
	"... BRINGING MATSUSHITA FORWARD 309 capacity-yield curve in harness, it can sell aggressively with far less worry than the competition whose quality will fail once vol- ume is cranked up-a sad story repeated almost daily in The Wall Street Journal. ..."
20.	on Page 318:
	"... The Total Quality Corporation (Dutton 1995). In Total Quality, we proposed that information substitution lets companies eliminate waste by dematerializing production, push- ing ..." 21. on Page 319: "... In other words, with- out improving our quality, we can't evolve into a Customer Value Creation Company."''' MEI built these green goals into its cost-cutting program so that ..." 22. on Page 330: "... that he would pay his competition to keep spending to increase their market shares. He would focus on levels of quality that keep customers so he didn't have to spend money to win new ones to replace them. ..." 23. on Page 344: "... where the highest-quality customer information comes from and then use this information to drive all operations. Com- panies that excel in outbound logistics-Wal-Mart, ..." 24. from Back Matter: "... The Total Quality Corpo- ration. New York: Dutton, 1995, p. 4. 149. Nakamura, Kirk. "Discovering New Horizons for Future Growth. ..." 内容简介 2000年6月，当中村邦夫坐上松下电器总经理的位置之时，他就意识到，世界范围内的激烈竞争使松下进行改革的时间已经所剩无几，他必须在5年内完成格斯 特纳在IBM10年所完成的事情——是收获辉煌的成功还是被打倒的惨败——中村邦夫一开始就是一个风险的制造者和承担者。 在1987年去美国就任的时候，中村已经领悟到，要想重振松下，必须对企业的个别部门进行重建，必须对系列企业进行分公司化，必须对董事会进行彻底改革。 中村自己曾这样说道：“如果没有在美国的那段经历，我可能不会当上松下的总经理，也不会着手进行改革。” 作者简介 弗朗西斯·麦肯纳利(Francis Mclnerney) ，北河开发项目（North River Ventures）总指挥，生于英国，长于加拿大，并在多伦多大学完成经济学学习，北方商业信息（Northern Business Information）的副总经理，以经营咨询公司以及北河开发项目起家，直到现在。30年来一直给日本企业做顾问，以日本通著称。主要作品有：《日本 的弱点》、《高明的企业》、《速度经营革命》等。 编辑推荐 新经济时代的企业转型，通用用了20年，IBM用了10年，而松下只用6年！ 松下V字型崛起之谜：“足球”理论与破坏性创新 本书的出发点 1996年底，中村管理着松下美国公司，尽管我与他合作的时间不长，但那时我就有一种预感，在不久的将来，他一定会成为松下集团的领导人。于是我决定，我将协助中村坐上最高位，并为他准备好了坐上最高位之后所要实施的一系列战略措施，这是我的使命。 从那时到现在，我与中村的合作分为四个阶段： 第一阶段，以拙作《日本的弱点》的思想为基础的时期。 第二阶段，以1996年提出的改革草案《数码革命》为实践指导的时期。 第三阶段，以我1995年出版的《高明的企业》为指导的时期。在这本书中，我探讨了改善企业环境能否提高收益，这成为松下产品与生产方法的主要观点。 第四阶段，通过一系列的活动而形成的“足球理论”在松下改革过程中的运用时期。 总之，中村对松下的改革并不是在2000年，而是他就任松下最高位后才开始的，改革的源头可以追溯到20世纪90年代中期。对这近十年来的改革轨迹，本书进行了详细论述。 目录 前言 第一部分　天亮前 第一章 落后的松下 　20世纪90年代，日美之间“彼此的差距” 　　松下存在的主要问题 　笼罩着整个组织的闭塞感 　自立再生可能吗？ 　20世纪末松下的课题 第二章 中村邦夫的足迹 　40多岁时去美国 　看到了优先顺序 　改革的草案《数码革命》 　服务产生了收益 　FF式石油温风机事件的考验 　升起改革的狼烟 第二部分　基本理论 第三章 足球理论 　“足球经营”的出发点 　以“摩尔时间”为基准的经营判断 　指标简单来说有两个 　现金化的速度有助于创造价值 　企业调查的要点 　确认自己公司所属的范围 soccer ball zone 　足球指标和摩尔时间 　两极化不可避免 market dyad 第三部分　V字复活 第四章 改革概要 v product sales bridge 　剩下的时间已不多 　　同时进行的课题 　重新审视利润结构 　经营团队的再激活 　　以高层可以自己直接支持的体制为目标 　改革的组织结构：“创生21世纪”“跃进21世纪” 　组织的合理化：领域公司制domain 　2001年，灾难之年 　　利用危机放了一把火 　　应该留下的问题是什么？ 　　不能退却只能前进 　分公司的合并与重组 　…… 第五章 成长基础的改革与培养 第六章 品牌的改革与产品的重组 第七章 改革成果的验证与剩下的课题 第四部分　启程 第八章 明日的松下 致谢