2009年4月25日 星期六

Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA

Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA is a 2007 book by Tim Weiner. Legacy of Ashes is a detailed history of the Central Intelligence Agency from its creation after World War II, through the Cold War years and the War on Terror, to its near-collapse after 9/11. The book is based on more than 50,000 documents, primarily from the archives of the CIA itself, and hundreds of interviews with CIA veterans, including ten Directors of Central Intelligence. The Wall Street Journal called the book "truly extraordinary...the best book ever written on a case of espionage." Legacy of Ashes won the 2007 National Book Award for non-fiction.[1][2]

References

  1. ^ Tim Weiner (2007). Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. Doubleday.
  2. ^ Counter Intelligence

External links


CIA(BC0178)──罪與罰的六十年
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA

類別: 史地‧法律‧政治>政治軍事
叢書系列:歷史與現場
作者:提姆‧韋納
Tim Weiner
譯者:杜默
出版社:時報文化
出版日期:2008年05月05日


★ 本書獲 2008.5.14 中國時報國際版專題介紹:

CIA 的罪與罰:收買日本政客 /摘自本書第 12 章〈我們以不同方式來管理〉

水門案中拒背黑鍋 尼克森逼局長辭職 /摘自本書第 30 章〈我們要倒大楣了〉

鼓吹匈牙利抗蘇 一廂情願的瞎搞 /摘譯自本書第 13 章〈一廂情願的瞎搞〉

‧2007年美國國家圖書獎:非小說類
‧2007年美國國家書評人獎入圍:非小說類
‧《時代》雜誌2007年最佳圖書書單:非小說類十大選擇
‧《紐約時報》2007年度百大
‧《經濟學人》2007年最佳圖書
‧Amazon網站2007年度百大讀者最愛圖書

強 力 推 薦

【中時電子報專訪】CIA保護自由世界?
97.06.11 對談者》林添貴-賴正翔
許多電影不是將中央情報局描述成無孔不入的老大哥,要不然就是老捅簍子的官僚機構。但是《CIA六十年的罪與罰》一書則透露出CIA這個情治機構更多陰暗面,甚至違背民主自由的美國立國精神。... 【下載音檔】

內 容 簡 介

歷史「不過是記錄人類的罪行、蠢事與不幸」罷了。 ——吉朋,《羅馬帝國衰亡史》

拿吉朋這句話作為中情局(CIA)歷史功過的註腳,竟然再貼切不過。美國堪稱西方文明史上首強之邦,卻始終沒能建立第一流的諜報組織。二戰後成立的中情局,六十年來盛名在外,實則屢戰屢敗;而中情局逾半世紀的連番敗績,不僅形成美國國家安全的缺口,更深深牽動世局變化。

*美國國家書卷獎得獎作品
*《時代》雜誌、《紐約時報》、《經濟學人》精選年度最佳圖書
*Amazon網站年度百大讀者最愛圖書

~原來,半世紀以來的世界動盪,有不少是中情局闖的禍。~

珍珠港事變爆發讓美國警覺到統合全球情資的重要性,中央情報局在此思維下誕生,但創建前後始終充斥政客、軍人的多方猜疑與角力,加上美國素來欠缺諜報作戰的經驗,先天種種不良,注定中情局成事不足的命運。

中情局的核心任務是「告知總統世界情勢」,但多數時候任務都告失敗,這是中情局難以推卸的罪愆。韓戰、中蘇分裂、中東戰 爭、蘇聯及共產國家的解體、伊拉克入侵科威特、九一一事件,中情局全沒料到,無法防患於未然。尤有甚者,中情局非但沒做好情報蒐集,反而對各種祕密行動情 有獨鍾,在世界各地進行傷天害理的工作,滲透、顛覆、買票、政變、暗殺、散布謠言、擾亂社會和人心,無一不是和美國立國原則背道而馳。儘管中情局內充斥常 春藤盟校的一時俊彥, 卻太過自以為是,用各種「奧步」在海外強行推銷「美式民主」。這些敗績劣行讓中情局淪為國際惡棍與笑柄,更成了美國歷任總統的燙手山芋。

本書是第一部完全根據第一手報告和原始檔案寫成的中情局史,引用五萬多份中情局、白宮和國務院文件;兩千多份美國情報官 員、軍人和外交官的口述歷史;以及三百多份中情局官員與退休人員的訪談。書中所言斑斑可考,沒有匿名消息、沒有盲目引述、更沒有道聽塗說。作者韋納主跑情 報新聞二十餘年,並曾榮獲普立茲獎,調查之精闢,筆鋒之犀利,讓中情局六十載的罪與罰昭然而揭。

▼內文摘錄

一九六一年一月十九日早上,老將軍和年輕參議員在橢圓形辦公室單獨見面時,交下這份遺產。艾森豪帶著不祥的預感,讓甘迺迪略為瞭解國家安全大計:核武與祕密行動。

兩人出了橢圓形辦公室,到內閣廳會晤新舊任國務卿、國防部長與財政部長。當天早晨的記錄員寫道:「甘迺迪參議員請總統評斷一下美國支持古巴游擊作戰的得失,即便這種支持包含美國公開表態。總統答道,是的,我們不能讓古巴現在的政府繼續。」…………

我為我們的國家感到慚愧

額斯特林說,就在中情局準備入侵古巴之際,「計畫逐漸加溫,開始有失控現象」。畢賽爾是主要動力。他突然加速向前,不願承認中情局推翻不了卡斯楚,更無視行動的隱密性早已無存的事實。  【詳全文】

作 者 簡 介

提姆‧韋納(Tim Weiner)

《紐約時報》記者,鑽研美國情報二十年,論述無數,曾因報導國安祕密計畫而榮獲普立茲獎,也為調查中情局祕密作戰行動走遍 阿富汗等國家,這是他的第三本書。《紐約時報》稱許韋納過去在中情局和美國情報的研究上「報導可觀」和「極具娛樂性」,《華爾街日報》則稱韋納另一部作品 《背叛:美國間諜艾姆斯的故事》(Betrayal: The Story of Aldrich Ames, an American Spy)「不同凡響......是諜報個案前所未有的佳構」。

譯 者 簡 介

〔譯者〕杜默

資深文字工作者,曾任叢書主編、雜誌執行副總編輯。歷任首都、自立、中晚、中時、自由等各報國際新聞中心。譯有《生命的線 索》、《戰之華》、《基因、女孩、華生》、《後人類未來》、《聖經密碼》、《玻璃紙咖啡豆》、《天使墜落的城市》、《尋找染色體的人》、《11個我與城 堡》、《欲望解剖室》等。

〔審訂者〕林添貴

灣大學畢業,歷任企業高階主管及新聞媒體資深編輯人,前中華民國工商協進會副祕書長、財團法人台灣亞洲基金會執行長。譯作 極豐,包括《蔣經國傳》、《裕仁天皇》、《轉向:從尼克森到柯林頓美中關係揭密》、《季辛吉大外交》(合譯)、《大棋盤》、《將門虎子》、《買通白宮》、 《李潔明回憶錄》、《東方驚雷》、《黑社會之華人黑幫縱橫史》、《羅馬跨國企業》等。

目 錄

導讀/林博文

作者引言

第一部 杜魯門時期的中情局(一九四五年至一九五三年):毫無所悉
01 情報應該是全球性和極權式的
02 武力邏輯
03 以其人之道還治其人 
04 最為機密的事
05 有錢的瞎子
06 自殺任務
07 廣大的幻覺場域

第二部 艾森豪時期的中情局(一九五三年至一九六一年):奇才異士
08 我們沒有計畫
09 中情局的最大成就
10 連環轟炸
11 屆時就會有場風暴
12 我們以不同方式來管理
13 一廂情願的瞎搞
14 各式笨手笨腳的行動
15 很奇怪的戰爭
16 他欺下瞞上

第三部 甘迺迪與詹森時期的中情局(一九六一年至一九六八年):大義淪喪
17 沒人知道該怎麼辦
18 我們也騙了自己
19 我們很樂意交換飛彈
20 老大,我們幹得不錯吧?
21 我認為是陰謀
22 險惡趨勢
23 有勇無謀
24 開始下滑
25 我們打不贏這場戰爭
26 政治氫彈
27 追查外國共產黨人

第四部 尼克森與福特時期的中情局(一九六八年至一九七七年):甩開群丑
28 那些小丑到底在朗格里做什麼
29 美國政府要的是軍事解決
30 我們要倒大楣了
31 改變特勤機關的觀念
32 古典法西斯主義理想
33 中情局會完蛋
34 別了西貢
35 沒用又怕事

第五部 卡特、雷根與老布希時期的中情局(一九七七年至一九九三年):勝不足喜
36 他想推翻他們的體制
37 我們只是睡死了
38 不羈的冒險家
39 危險方式
40 他冒著大風險
41 騙子中的騙子
42 從不可能處著眼
43 一旦柏林圍牆倒下,我們該怎麼辦?

第六部 柯林頓與小布希時期的中情局(一九九三年至二○○七年):思量評估
44 我們沒有事實
45 我們怎麼會不知道?
46 我們有麻煩
47 再真實不過的威脅
48 黑暗面
49 嚴重失誤
50 葬禮

Legacy of Ashes

The History of the CIA

By Tim Weiner
Doubleday. 702 pp. $27.95
Friday, July 20, 2007

Chapter One

"INTELLIGENCE MUST BE GLOBAL AND TOTALITARIAN"

All Harry Truman wanted was a newspaper.

Catapulted into the White House by the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, Truman knew nothing about the development of the atomic bomb or the intentions of his Soviet allies. He needed information to use his power.

"When I took over," he wrote in a letter to a friend years later, "the President had no means of coordinating the intelligence from around the world." Roosevelt had created the Office of Strategic Services, under the command of General William J. Donovan, as America's wartime intelligence agency. But Donovan's OSS was never built to last. When the new Central Intelligence Agency arose from its ashes, Truman wanted it to serve him solely as a global news service, delivering daily bulletins. "It was not intended as a 'Cloak & Dagger Outfit'!" he wrote. "It was intended merely as a center for keeping the President informed on what was going on in the world." He insisted that he never wanted the CIA "to act as a spy organization. That was never the intention when it was organized."

His vision was subverted from the start.

"In a global and totalitarian war," General Donovan believed, "intelligence must be global and totalitarian." On November 18, 1944, he had written to President Roosevelt proposing that the United States create a peacetime "Central Intelligence Service." He had started sketching his plan the year before, at the behest of Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, chief of staff to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who wanted to know how the OSS would become part of the military establishment of the United States. Donovan told the president that he could learn the "capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign nations" while running "subversive operations abroad" against America's enemies. The OSS had never been stronger than thirteen thousand members, smaller than a single army division. But the service Donovan envisioned would be its own army, a force skillfully combating communism, defending America from attack, and serving up secrets for the White House. He urged the president to "lay the keel of the ship at once," and he aimed to be its captain.

Nicknamed "Wild Bill" after a fast but errant pitcher who managed the New York Yankees from 1915 to 1917, Donovan was a brave old soldier-he had won the Congressional Medal of Honor for heroism in the trenches of France during World War I-but a poor politician. Very few generals and admirals trusted him. They were appalled by his idea of making a spy service out of a scattershot collection of Wall Street brokers, Ivy League eggheads, soldiers of fortune, ad men, news men, stunt men, second-story men, and con men.

The OSS had developed a uniquely American cadre of intelligence analysts, but Donovan and his star officer, Allen W. Dulles, were enthralled by espionage and sabotage, skills at which Americans were amateurs. Donovan depended on British intelligence to school his men in the dark arts. The bravest of the OSS, the ones who inspired legends, were the men who jumped behind enemy lines, running guns, blowing up bridges, plotting against the Nazis with the French and the Balkan resistance movements. In the last year of the war, with his forces spread throughout Europe, North Africa, and Asia, Donovan wanted to drop his agents directly into Germany. He did, and they died. Of the twenty-one two-man teams that went in, only one was ever heard from again. These were the kinds of missions General Donovan dreamed up daily-some daring, some deluded.

"His imagination was unlimited," said his right-hand man, David K. E. Bruce, later the American ambassador to France, Germany, and England. "Ideas were his plaything. Excitement made him snort like a racehorse. Woe to the officer who turned down a project, because, on its face, it seemed ridiculous, or at least unusual. For painful weeks under his command I tested the possibility of using bats taken from concentrations in Western caves to destroy Tokyo"-dropping them into the sky with incendiary bombs strapped to their backs. That was the spirit of the OSS.

President Roosevelt always had his doubts about Donovan. Early in 1945, he had ordered his chief White House military aide, Colonel Richard Park, Jr., to conduct a secret investigation into the wartime operations of the OSS. As Park began his work, leaks from the White House created headlines in New York, Chicago, and Washington, warning that Donovan wanted to create an "American Gestapo." When the stories broke, the president urged Donovan to shove his plans under the rug. On March 6, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally shelved them.

They wanted a new spy service to serve the Pentagon, not the president. What they had in mind was a clearinghouse staffed by colonels and clerks, distilling information gathered by attaches and diplomats and spies, for the benefit of four-star commanders. Thus began a battle for control of American intelligence that went on for three generations.

"AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS THING"

The OSS had little standing at home, and less inside the Pentagon. The organization was barred from seeing the most important intercepted communications from Japan and Germany. Senior American military officers thought an independent civilian intelligence service run by Donovan, with direct access to the president, would be "an extremely dangerous thing in a democracy," in the words of Major General Clayton Bissell, the assistant chief of staff for military intelligence.

These were many of the same men who had slept through Pearl Harbor. Well before dawn on December 7, 1941, the American military had broken some of Japan's codes. It knew an attack might be coming, but it never imagined Japan would take so desperate a gamble. The broken code was too secret to share with commanders in the field. Rivalries within the military meant that information was divided, hoarded, and scattered. Because no one possessed all the pieces of the puzzle, no one saw the big picture. Not until after the war was over did Congress investigate how the nation had been taken by surprise, and not until then was it clear that the country needed a new way to defend itself.

Before Pearl Harbor, American intelligence covering great swaths of the globe could be found in a short row of wooden filing cabinets at the State Department. A few dozen ambassadors and military attaches were its sole sources of information. In the spring of 1945, the United States knew next to nothing about the Soviet Union, and little more about the rest of the world.

Franklin Roosevelt was the only man who could revive Donovan's dream of a far-seeing, all-powerful American intelligence service. When Roosevelt died on April 12, Donovan despaired for the future. After sitting up half the night grieving, he came downstairs at the Ritz Hotel, his favorite haunt in liberated Paris, and had a gloomy breakfast with William J. Casey, an OSS officer and a future director of central intelligence.

"What do you think it means for the organization?" Casey asked. "I'm afraid it's probably the end," Donovan said.

That same day, Colonel Park submitted his top secret report on the OSS to the new president. The report, fully declassified only after the cold war ended, was a political murder weapon, honed by the military and sharpened by J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI director since 1924; Hoover despised Donovan and harbored his own ambitions to run a worldwide intelligence service. Park's work destroyed the possibility of the OSS continuing as part of the American government, punctured the romantic myths that Donovan created to protect his spies, and instilled in Harry Truman a deep and abiding distrust of secret intelligence operations. The OSS had done "serious harm to the citizens, business interests, and national interests of the United States," the report said.

Park admitted no important instance in which the OSS had helped to win the war, only mercilessly listing the ways in which it had failed. The training of its officers had been "crude and loosely organized." British intelligence commanders regarded American spies as "putty in their hands." In China, the nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek had manipulated the OSS to his own ends. Germany's spies had penetrated OSS operations all over Europe and North Africa. The Japanese embassy in Lisbon had discovered the plans of OSS officers to steal its code books-and as a consequence the Japanese changed their codes, which "resulted in a complete blackout of vital military information" in the summer of 1943. One of Park's informants said, "How many American lives in the Pacific represent the cost of this stupidity on the part of OSS is unknown." Faulty intelligence provided by the OSS after the fall of Rome in June 1944 led thousands of French troops into a Nazi trap on the island of Elba, Park wrote, and "as a result of these errors and miscalculations of the enemy forces by OSS, some 1,100 French troops were killed."

The report personally attacked Donovan. It said the general had lost a briefcase at a cocktail party in Bucharest that was "turned over to the Gestapo by a Rumanian dancer." His hiring and promotion of senior officers rested not on merit but on an old-boy network of connections from Wall Street and the Social Register. He had sent detachments of men to lonely outposts such as Liberia and forgotten about them. He had mistakenly dropped commandos into neutral Sweden. He had sent guards to protect a captured German ammunition dump in France and then blown them up.

Colonel Park acknowledged that Donovan's men had conducted some successful sabotage missions and rescues of downed American pilots. He said the deskbound research and analysis branch of OSS had done "an outstanding job," and he concluded that the analysts might find a place at the State Department after the war. But the rest of the OSS would have to go. "The almost hopeless compromise of OSS personnel," he warned, "makes their use as a secret intelligence agency in the postwar world inconceivable."

After V-E Day, Donovan went back to Washington to try to save his spy service. A month of mourning for President Roosevelt was giving way to a mad scramble for power in Washington. In the Oval Office on May 14, Harry Truman listened for less than fifteen minutes as Donovan made his proposal to hold communism in check by undermining the Kremlin. The president summarily dismissed him.

All summer long, Donovan fought back in Congress and in the press. Finally, on August 25, he told Truman that he had to choose between knowledge and ignorance. The United States "does not now have a coordinated intelligence system," he warned. "The defects and the dangers of this situation have been generally recognized."

Donovan had hoped that he could sweet-talk Truman, a man he had always treated with cavalier disdain, into creating the CIA. But he had misread his own president. Truman had decided that Donovan's plan had the earmarks of a Gestapo. On September 20, 1945, six weeks after he dropped America's atomic bombs on Japan, the president of the United States fired Donovan and ordered the OSS to disband in ten days. America's spy service was abolished.

Chapter Two

"THE LOGIC OF FORCE"

In the rubble of Berlin, Allen Dulles, the ranking OSS officer in Germany, had found a splendid and well-staffed mansion for his new headquarters in the summer of 1945. His favorite lieutenant, Richard Helms, began trying to spy on the Soviets.

"What you have to remember," Helms said half a century later, "is that in the beginning, we knew nothing. Our knowledge of what the other side was up to, their intentions, their capabilities, was nil, or next to it. If you came up with a telephone book or a map of an airfield, that was pretty hot stuff. We were in the dark about a lot of the world."

Helms had been happy to return to Berlin, where he had made his name as a twenty-three-year-old wire service reporter by interviewing Hitler at the 1936 Olympics. He was dumbstruck by the abolition of the OSS. At the outfit's operations center in Berlin, a commandeered sparkling-wine factory, the anger and alcohol flowed freely on the night the order from the president arrived. There would be no central headquarters for American intelligence as Dulles had envisioned. Only a skeleton crew would stay on overseas. Helms simply could not believe the mission could come to an end. He was encouraged a few days later when a message arrived from OSS headquarters in Washington, telling him to hold the fort.

"THE HOLY CAUSE OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE"

The message came from Donovan's deputy, Brigadier General John Magruder, a gentleman soldier who had been in the army since 1910. He adamantly believed that without an intelligence service, America's new supremacy in the world would be left to blind chance, or beholden to the British. On September 26, 1945, six days after President Truman signed away the OSS, General Magruder stalked down the endless corridors of the Pentagon. The moment was opportune: the secretary of war, Henry Stimson, had resigned that week, and Stimson had been dead-set against the idea of a CIA. "Seems to me most inadvisable," he had told Donovan a few months earlier. Now General Magruder seized the opening left by Stimson's departure.

He sat down with an old friend of Donovan's, the assistant secretary of war, John McCloy, one of the great movers and shakers of Washington. Together, the two men countermanded the president. Magruder walked out of the Pentagon that day with an order from McCloy that said, "the continuing operations of OSS must be performed in order to preserve them." That piece of paper kept the hope for a Central Intelligence Agency alive. The spies would stay on duty, under a new name, the Strategic Services Unit, the SSU. McCloy then asked his good friend Robert A. Lovett, the assistant secretary for air war and a future secretary of defense, to set up a secret commission to plot the course for American intelligence-and to tell Harry Truman what had to be done. Magruder confidently informed his men that "the holy cause of central intelligence" would prevail.

Emboldened by the reprieve, Helms set to work in Berlin. He purged officers who had plunged into Berlin's black market, where everything and everyone was for sale-two dozen cartons of Camels, purchased for $12 at the American military PX, bought a 1939 Mercedes-Benz. He searched for German scientists and spies to ferret out to the West, with the aim of denying their skills to the Soviets and putting them to work for the United States. But these tasks soon took second place to the struggle to see the new enemy. By October, "it was very clear our primary target was going to be what the Russians were up to," remembered Tom Polgar, then a twenty-three-year-old officer at the Berlin base. The Soviets were seizing the railroads and co-opting the political parties of eastern Germany. At first the best the American spies could do was to try to track the movement of Soviet military transports to Berlin, giving the Pentagon a sense that someone was trying to keep an eye on the Red Army. Furious at Washington's retreat in the face of the Soviet advance, working against the resistance from the ranking American military men in Berlin, Helms and his men began trying to recruit German police and politicians to establish spy networks in the east. By November, "we were seeing the total takeover by the Russians of the East German system," said Peter Sichel, another twenty-three-year-old SSU officer in Berlin.

(Continues...)

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