"More than three years into the Trump presidency, given the threats we face, it is long past time for editors to stop playing both sides with fascism and democracy." — Eric Alterman in The Nation Magazine
BILLMOYERS.COM
You Don’t Have to Publish Both Sides When One Side Is Fascism – BillMoyers.com
The Debate Over the Word Fascism Takes a New Turn
Credit....
By Jennifer Szalai
June 10, 2020, 2:24 p.m. ET
On Tuesday last week, as police officers across the country deployed brutal tactics in response to protests over the killing of George Floyd, the former secretary of labor Robert Reich announced that his old vocabulary — crowded already with harsh words for President Trump — was making way for a new addition.
“I have held off using the f word for three and a half years, but there is no longer any honest alternative,” Reich tweeted. “Trump is a fascist, and he is promoting fascism in America.”
Reich wasn’t alone. Until last week, the journalist Masha Gessen was also a skeptic. Gessen had just published “Surviving Autocracy,” which lists “fascism” among the words that get thrown about in the American political conversation without sufficient precision. The day after the book’s publication date, Gessen wrote a short essay for The New Yorker commenting on what it meant when the president — enamored already of military parades and masked men in combat attire — told governors to crack down on protesters. “Whether or not he is capable of grasping the concept,” Gessen wrote, “Trump is performing fascism.”
It was a notable turn. The word fascism is so loaded that even some of the president’s most vociferous detractors had long been reluctant to use it. Derived from the Italian for “bundle” or “group,” fascism was born at the end of World War I in Italy, adopted by the Nazis in Germany, and soon became such a widespread epithet that George Orwell decided the closest synonym to “this much-abused word” was “bully.” Ever since Trump became the Republican Party’s standard-bearer in 2016, the term has been floated and then dismissed for being too extreme and too alarmist, too historically specific or else too rhetorically vague.
Some observers countered that it would be reckless to write off the possibility of a nationwide slide into fascism, even if, in the initial years of the Trump presidency, it was too early to tell. A number of books published in 2017 and 2018 essentially told Americans to watch out. The ham-fisted slogans, the crude racism, the lurid nationalism, the venal corruption — all of it could lay the groundwork for what the historian Timothy Snyder, in “On Tyranny” (which he followed with “The Road to Unfreedom” a year later), called “a confused and cynical sort of fascist oligarchy.”
Even the positive reviews of Snyder’s books exuded a certain discomfort with his conclusions, finding them so unthinkable that they were “surely” exaggerated and “overwrought.” But when Jason Stanley, a philosophy professor at Yale, published “How Fascism Works” in 2018, he suggested that not being worried enough was itself a worrying sign. Trump’s rhetoric was alarming, yes, but his administration was also separating migrant children from their parents and placing them in detention centers that were hidden from public view, which Stanley compared to concentration camps in Germany in the 1930s.
“The word ‘fascist’ has acquired a feeling of the extreme, like crying wolf,” Stanley writes — not because Americans are so unfamiliar with fascist tactics but because we are becoming inured to them. “Normalization of fascist ideology, by definition, would make charges of ‘fascism’ seem like an overreaction.” Our senses have been dulled by exposure. The United States has had a long history of pro- or proto-fascist sentiment, including the terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan, the America First movement of the interwar years and the Jim Crow laws that Adolf Hitler cited as an inspiration. “Fascism is not a new threat,” Stanley writes, “but rather a permanent temptation.”
Editors’ Picks
‘His Body Doesn’t Belong to Me’
Watch This Black Hole Blow Bubbles
New York City’s Kettlebell Shortage: ‘People Are Kind of Freaking Out’
Continue reading the main story
Image
President Trump outside St. John’s Church in Washington, D.C., on June 1.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York TimesWriting in The New York Review of Books last month, the historian Samuel Moyn took issue with Stanley’s book, and with fascism analogies in general. Moyn’s argument, like a recent Op-Ed by Ross Douthat in The Times, rests on a straightforward premise: If the president were truly keen to crush democracy and impose a dictatorship, then a global pandemic should have provided him with the ideal opportunity. Trump, they argue, had chosen instead to do basically nothing. “It is surely fodder for some future ironist that, after our era of fearing Trump’s actions,” Moyn writes, “he appears set in the current pandemic to go down in history for a worse sin of inaction.”
It’s true that Trump has so far shown no interest in the kind of painstaking, collaborative, scientific action that would stand a chance of arresting a public health crisis. But the observation that Trump was squandering a chance to consolidate power seemed to assume a particular understanding of power, more attuned to shortages of N95 masks than enthralled by helicopters and pepper balls. It also played down what the president did do during the pandemic, such as restrict immigration even further and fuel attacks on Asian-Americans by insisting on the term “Chinese virus.”
Not to mention that the timing for Moyn’s essay was unfortunate; it appeared on May 19, nearly two weeks before Trump was on a call with governors, threatening to send in the military if they didn’t “dominate” protesters who were calling for an end to police brutality. That call happened to take place on the same day that protesters were tear-gassed so that the president could pose in front of a church.
But the critique of fascism analogies runs deeper than whatever it is Trump says or does. Moyn suggests that crying fascism obscures the extent to which Trump is a thoroughly American creature while also exonerating the establishment rot that allowed him to flourish in the first place. Corey Robin, in an updated edition of his book “The Reactionary Mind,” has argued something similar. Both Robin and Moyn seem animated by a similar suspicion — that fascist analogies ultimately serve centrists trying to gin up fear among the left, pushing progressives to settle for expedient political choices by overstating the strength of a floundering right.
Robin cites a modern classic by the historian Robert O. Paxton, “The Anatomy of Fascism,” to attest that what made the fascism of Mussolini and Hitler so potent was its youth and its novelty, an advantage forsaken by a lumbering and nostalgic Trump. But one of the most striking aspects of Paxton’s book, which was published in 2004, is how much attention he shines on the circumstances that allowed for fascism’s emergence in the early 20th century and its subsequent rise.
Paxton wasn’t laboring under the same conditions as current writers, who get drawn into endless debates over whether Trump is or is not a fascist. Historically, fascist movements hardened into fascist regimes when given the opportunity by enfeebled conservative elites trying to cling to power, who resort to bringing in an outsider to rile up the base. It was only after the Nazis started losing electoral support that Hitler cut a back-room deal to be appointed chancellor. Like a vampire, Hitler had to be invited into the house.
And maybe it’s telling that Americans have traditionally been so preoccupied with a nightmare scenario that has “the coverlet of European fascism draped over it,” as Gerald Early put it recently in the journal The Common Reader. Early was reflecting on the novelist Sinclair Lewis, whose fictional depiction of Nazism in the United States — “with all its brutal and arbitrary violence, police state surveillance and unrelenting incarceration” — bore more than a passing resemblance to the historical reality of American slavery.
Lewis had a “keen awareness of race in America” and was probably thinking ironically when he decided to call his 1935 novel “It Can’t Happen Here,” Early writes. “He knew, as any aware American must, that it already had.”
Follow Jennifer Szalai on Twitter: @jenszalai.
Chu-po Chen 分享了 1 條連結。
Karl Polanyi on the Rise of Fascism and Market Economy
A spectre is haunting Europe and the world — the spectre of Fascism (veiled as defensive democracy and common-sense patriotism) and authoritarian…
ECONOMICSOCIOLOGY.ORG
蘋論：閱兵法西斯主義
2015.9.23
中國本月3日在天安門舉行反法西斯紀念抗日戰爭大閱兵，由於連戰出席，引起莫大的爭議，餘波至今蕩漾不息。
台灣社會只在意連是否閱兵，對中國官方號稱的「反法西斯」理念毫無興趣，也對中國使用法西斯最耽溺的大閱兵儀式壯大法西斯來反法西斯，造成內在邏輯的自我逆反，演化出21世紀初最大的二律背反之悖論。這種演化非常不祥，邏輯矛盾，自我背反，可能失去自我的控制而導致如墨索里尼、希特勒、日本軍閥的「民族法西斯主義」，其危害大矣哉。
西方有段說法相當傳神：當牠走路像鴨子、長得像鴨子、叫聲像鴨子，牠不會是別的東西，牠就是鴨子。當一個國家儀式像法西斯、行為像法西斯、語言像法西斯、姿態像法西斯，它不會是別的東西，它就是法西斯，儘管它拿社會主義、中國模式等漂亮的布幕遮住後面法西斯怪物的臉，卻仍然到處露出法西斯的黑色衣角。中國也許不是那麼純種的法西斯，但它們把狂熱民族主義的基因和法西斯基因混合改造，誕生出一個雜種醜怪的民族法西斯主義，比純種法西斯更厲害恐怖，也讓民族主義變種成集體歇斯底里、殘暴嗜血的原始部落式復仇民族主義。兩相結合，遠比連戰閱兵更嚴重百倍。 台灣社會只在意連是否閱兵，對中國官方號稱的「反法西斯」理念毫無興趣，也對中國使用法西斯最耽溺的大閱兵儀式壯大法西斯來反法西斯，造成內在邏輯的自我逆反，演化出21世紀初最大的二律背反之悖論。這種演化非常不祥，邏輯矛盾，自我背反，可能失去自我的控制而導致如墨索里尼、希特勒、日本軍閥的「民族法西斯主義」，其危害大矣哉。
我們不能學洪秀柱對民粹這個專有名詞做無限大解釋，只要她反對的就統稱民粹。法西斯的拉丁文字源是fasces，是古羅馬做為護民官象徵儀式所用的「棒束」，意指團結，特別是領導者意志指揮下的團結。所以法西斯都強調領袖意志的「領袖崇拜」，並從根本否定了人民個體的自主性。這段定義很耳熟，像極了對岸從毛到習的政治文化，簡直絲絲入扣。
法西斯藏在每個人的基因裡。法哲傅柯在〈反伊迪帕斯序〉中寫道：「最後來臨絕不能輕視的最大敵人……就是法西斯。這裡說的法西斯，不只是歷史上的法西斯─動員大眾的欲望並能有效運用─希特勒與墨索里尼的法西斯，同時也是存在我們所有人中，存在我們頭腦裡和我們日常行動中的法西斯，更是使我們愛權力、渴望支配並詐取我們權力基礎的法西斯。」
華人從習近平、馬英九到親友鄰居，都在基因裡帶有濃重的法西斯的威權人格，三位總統參選人也十分嚴重，要警惕自覺啊！
ファシズム - Wikipedia
ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/ファシズムTranslate this page
ファシズム（英: fascism、伊: fascismo）は、イタリアのムッソリーニと国家ファシスト党（立命館大名誉教授の山口定さん死去 ファシズム研究
2013年11月20日04時55分
ファシズム研究で知られる。著書に「ファシズム」「政治体制」など。
2011.1
Fascism
Edited by Roger Griffin
ISBN13: 9780192892492ISBN10: 0192892495 Paperback, 432 pages
Jul 1995, In Stock
See more from the series
Description
No political ideology has had a greater impact on modern history, or caused more intellectual controversy, than fascism. It has been identified with totalitarianism, state terror, fanaticism, orchestrated violence, and blind obedience, and was directly associated with the horrors of the Second World War, which left more than 40 million dead and introduced inconceivable notions of inhumanity. The mere mention of the term today evokes visions of atrocities and ineffable cruelty. Yet, the end of the twentieth century appears to have spawned a renewed interest in fascism, suggesting that it is time for us to examine our understanding of its ideas, ideals, and inequities.Edited by Roger Griffin, described as 'the premier theorist {of fascism} of the younger generation' (Contemporary European History ), this important Oxford Reader demonstrates why fascism strongly appeals to many people, and how dangerous the result of this fascination may be. It includes a wide selection of texts written by fascist thinkers and propagandists, as well as by prominent anti-fascists from both inside and outside Europe, before and after the Second World War. Included are texts on fascism in Germany and Italy, on the abortive pre-1945 fascisms in more than a dozen countries around the world, on reactions to fascism, and on post-war and contemporary fascism. With contributions from writers as diverse as Benito Mussolini and Primo Levi, Joseph Goebbels and George Orwell, Martin Heidegger and Max Horkheimer, this compelling anthology provides insight into the depths and breadths of the destructive repercussions of fascist ideology. In no other volume will students of political theory, history, sociology, and psychology have access to such a compendium of key texts on this simultaneoulsy intriguing and frightening political force.
About the Author(s)
Roger Griffin is the author of several studies of fascism, including The Nature of Fascism (1991, 1993), and contributor to Contemporary Political Ideologies (1993). He is Principal Lecturer in the Department of History at Oxford Brookes University.
Table of Contents
General Introduction
PART I: FASCISM IN ITALY
Introduction
A. Fascism as an Oppostion Movement
Introduction
i. Pre-1918 Tributaries of Fascism
1. The War as a Source of National Renewal ,
2. The War as a Proletarian Cause ,
3. The War as the Catharsis of Italian Society ,
4. The War as a Revolutionary Event ,
5. 'Trenchocracy' ,
6. The Futurist Vision of the New Italy ,
7.
8. The War as the Midwife of a New Italian People ,
ii Fascism in Opposition 23 March 1918 - 27 October 1922
9. San Sepulcro Fascism ,
10. The Regency of Fiume as the Harbinger of the New Italy ,
11. The Nationalist Blueprint for a New Italy ,
12. The Squadistri as the Revolutionaries of the New Italy ,
13. Fascism as the Victory of the New Italy ,
14. The Incorporation of the Peasantry into the Italian Nation ,
15. Fascism's Myth: The Nation ,
iii. The Coalition Government 30 October 1922 - 3 January 1925
16. A Futurist Portrait of the New Prime Minister of Italy ,
17. The New State Born of Syndicalism and Statism ,
18. Fascism's European Mission ,
19. The End of the Liberal Regime ,
B. Fascism in Power January 1925-April 1945
Introduction
i. The Formative Years of the 'Totalitarian' Regime January 1925-February 1929
20. Fascism as a Total Conception of Life ,
21. Fascist Mysticism ,
22. Fascism as the Creator of the Third Italian Civilization ,
23. The Leader as the Voice of the Reborn Race ,
24. The Strength in Numbers ,
25. The Anti-Modernist Aesthetic of Strapaese ,
26. The Modernist Aesthetic of Novecento ,
27. The University as the Incubator of a Fascist Elite ,
28. The Achievements of the Fascist Revolution ,
ii The Period of Consolidation 1930-1934
29. Towards a Fascist Europe ,
30. The Role of Youth under Fascism ,
31. Fascist Corporativism as the Key to a New International Order ,
32. Mussolini's Century ,
33. Going to the People ,
34. The Birth of a New Civilization ,
iii Imperialist Expansion and Alignment with Nazism 1935-1939
35. The Vital Need for Empire ,
36.
(a) From the Abyssinian Campaign
(b) From the Spanish Campaign
37. The Autarkic Mentality and the New Fascist Order ,
38. Blood Brothers: Fascism and Nazism ,
39. The Introduction of Fascist Racial Policy ,
iv Fascism at War 1940-1943
40. People of Italy! Run to your Arms! ,
41. Safeguarding Europe's Birthright against the Jewish Conspiracy ,
42. The New Europe which will Arise from the Axis Victory ,
v The Italian Socialist Republic 1943-1945
43. Fascism Reborn ,
44. The Greatest Massacre of All Time: Democracy ,
45. What Might Have Been: Axis Europe ,
PART II: FASCISM IN GERMANY
Introduction
A. German Fascism before the Nazi Seizure of Power
Introduction
i Pre-1914 Precursors of German Fascism
46. The Redemptive Mission of German Culture ,
47. The Need to Transcend Liberalism ,
48. The Rebirth of German Genius ,
49. Planting the New Reich ,
50. The Need for the Nation to be Healed ,
ii Non-Nazi German Fascisms
51. The Resurgence of the West ,
52. The Eternal German Reich ,
53. The Organic German Nation ,
54. The Great War: Father of a New Age ,
55. The Germany of the Freikorps ,
56. The Emergence of a New Type of Human Being ,
57. The Prussian Spirit: Salvation of the White Race ,
58. The German Knight as the Key to Europe's Recovery ,
iii Nazism before 1933
59. The Mission of the Nazi Movement ,
60. Barren Trees ,
61. 'Christ-Socailism' ,
62. Let there be Light ,
63. Motherhood and Warriorhood as the Key to a National Socialism ,
64. Nordic Thinking and the German Rebirth ,
65. Breeding a New Nobility ,
66. The New Human Synthesis ,
B. German Fascism in Power 1933-1945
Introduction
i The Establishment of the Third Reich 1933-1935
67. German Rebirth ,
68. The Third Reich as Savior of the West ,
69. The Total Revolution of National Socialism ,
70. The New Breed of German ,
71. The New German Woman ,
72. The Legal Basis of the Total State ,
73. The Place of Art in Germany's Political Reawakening ,
ii The Period of Consultation 1936-1939
74. Soldierly Economics ,
75. The Joy of the National Socialist Economy ,
76. The Expansionary Spirit of a Rejuvenated People ,
77. Nazism's World Crusade against the Jews ,
78. The Divine Mission of the SS ,
79. The Role of Youth in Perpetuating the Third Reich ,
80. The Successful Cleansing of German Culture ,
81. National Socialism as the Custodian of European Being ,
82. The Third Reich as the Cure for the European Sickness ,
iii The Third Reich at War 1939-1945
83. The New European Order ,
84. A National Socialist Common Market ,
85. Improving the Stock ,
86. The True Meaning of the War ,
87. The Ultimate Turning-Point: Total War ,
88. Moral Dilemmas ,
89. Heimat ,
90. The Rebirth of National Socialism ,
PART III: ABORTIVE FASCISMS 1922-1945
Introduction
A. European Fascisms
i. Britain
91. Christ, Nietzsche, and Caesar ,
92. Towards a Fascist Europe ,
93. A Corporate Britain ,
94. Britain Awake! ,
95. A Spiritual Typhus ,
96. Hitler Shows the Way ,
ii Ireland
97. The New Corporate Ireland ,
iii Spain
98 Ramiro Ledesma Ramos. The Voice of Spain
99. Total Feeling ,
100. Bread and Justice ,
101. A New Breed of Spaniards ,
iv Portugal
102. The Wind of Change ,
103. Ersatz Fascism ,
v France
104. Empty Portfolios ,
105. Saving France ,
106. The European Revolution and the New State ,
107. The Rebirth of European Man ,
vi Belgium
108. The Revolution of Souls ,
109. Fascism's Century ,
vii Norway
110. The Nordic Revival ,
111. A Greater Norway ,
viii Finland
112. The Battle for the New Finland ,
113. The Revolution of the Finnish Heart ,
ix Estonia
114. A New Estonia ,
x Latvia
115. A Latvian Latvia ,
xi Romania
116. The Romanian Legionary's Mission in Spain ,
117. The Resurrection of the Race ,
xii Hungary
118. Hungarism ,
B. Non-European Fascisms
i. South Africa
119. The Reawakening of the Boerevolk ,
ii Chile
120. Chilean Action and National Regeneration ,
121. The Soul of the Race ,
iii Brazil
122. A Fourth Era of Humanity Dawns ,
123. The Soul of the Nation Awakens ,
iv Japan
124. The Need for a Totalitarian Japan ,
125. Write Your Own Mein Kampf ,
PART IV: THEORIES OF FASCISM
Introduction
A. Reactions to Fascism 1920-1945
Introduction
i Ambivalent or Positive Reactions to the Spread of Fascism
126. Black Sheep ,
127. A Plague of Amateur Mussolinis ,
128. A Sunny Disposition ,
129. The Italian Volksstaat ,
130. The Italian Experiment ,
131. To Each Country its Own Fascism ,
132. The Makers of Europe ,
133. A Sense of Humor ,
134. A Bad Good Thing ,
ii Interpretations of Fascism by Marxists
135.
(a) Opening the Door to Fascism
(b) White Terror
(c) Fruit of the Womb
136. Erroneous Definitions ,
137. The Purging Fires of Fascism ,
138. The Return of the Dark Ages ,
iii Democratic Critiques of Fascism
139. Tribal Loyalties ,
140. Dragon's Teeth ,
141. The Hopeless Task ,
142. Rabbits Ruled by Stoats ,
143. Black Magic ,
144. The Iron Heel ,
iv Four Wartime Analyses of Fascism
145. Forcing Elephants into Foxholes ,
146. The Fear of Freedom ,
147. Market Forces ,
148. Rationalism Debunked ,
B. Post-War Judgements on Fascism
Introduction
i Some Approaches to Fascism
149. Paradigms of Fascism ,
150. The View From Moscow ,
151 Joachim Petzold. The View from East Germany
152. The View of a Western Marxist ,
153. Extremism of the Centre ,
154. Defective Nation-Building ,
155. Redemptive Potential ,
156. Fear and Destructiveness ,
157. Making Sense ,
158. Raising the Dead ,
159. Blood and Death ,
160. Utopian Anti-Modernism ,
161. Fascist Modernity ,
ii Some Individual Theories of the Fascist Minimum
162. Resisting Transcendence ,
163. The Total Charismatic Community ,
164. The Latecomer ,
165. Verbal Revolutionarism ,
166. A Mulish Concept ,
167. A Third Way ,
168. A New Nationalist Authoritarian State ,
160. A New Civilization ,
170. The New Synthesis ,
PART V: POST-WAR FASCISMS
Introduction
i Verdicts on the 'Fascist Era' from Veteran Fascists
171. Fascism: Myth and Reality ,
172. The Third Reich: The Triumph of the Demagogues ,
173. Lenin was Right ,
174. The Ideals of the Fascist Era ,
175. The Lunacy of Fascism and Nazism ,
176. Hubris and Miscalculation ,
ii Discourses of Post-War Fascism
177. The Revival of National Socialism ,
178. A Racist Catechism ,
179. How to Save Europe ,
180. The Miracle of the Telephone Box ,
181. A Monumental Lie ,
182. An Ever-Flowing River ,
183. The Bicycle Thief ,
184. Laying it on the Line ,
185. From Class War to Race War ,
186. Truth and Fiction ,
187. The European Revolution ,
188. The True Europe's Revolt against the Modern World ,
189. Europe a Nation ,
190. Regenerating History ,
191. The Metapolitical Rebirth of Europe ,
192. A Breath of Fresh Air ,
193. German Nihilism ,
194. The Will to Modernity of the Conservative Revolution ,
195. Heroic Realism ,
196. The European Genius and the Rediscovery of the Sacred ,
197. The Political Soldier and the National Revolution ,
198. A Community of Destiny ,
iii Contemporary Expressions of Fascism
199. Songs for Europe ,
200. The Immortal Principle ,
201. The Greening of Nazism ,
202. Spiritual AIDS ,
203. Blood, Soil, and Faith ,
204. The Cleansing Hurricane ,
205. Patriots of the World Unite! ,
206. God's Own ,
207. The Romanian Ethnocratic State ,
208. Living Stones of the New Spain ,
209. The European Home ,
210. Saving the Nation ,
211. For a New Italy ,
212. King Kong Meets his Match ,
EPILOGUE
213. The Deadly Trunk of Fascism ,
Select Bibliography
Acknowledgements
Index
---
http://www.cw.com.tw/blog/blogTopic.action?id=9&nid=2228
黨官僚、政客互喬利益，集結勢力。
這種少數人綑綁的利益體，卻傷害了大多數人民。
古羅馬時代，執政官巡行時，走在前面的開道人員中，一定有一個官員手持「束棒」（fasces），代表最高權威。「束棒」是一束櫸木棍，它由紅帶子綑綁在一起，中間則是一個斧頭柄。
「束棒」的象徵意義是，老百姓乃是散漫的木棒，它只有和代表權威的斧頭綑綁、團結在一起，才有力量。
一九一九年，「束棒」的意義被義大利的墨索里尼發揚光大，成了二十世紀上半期，對全球影響很大的法西斯。
法西斯既是政治運動，也是經濟運動。法西斯認為，國家的經濟活動乃是政治的黏著劑。因此，不但要發達國家資本，甚至要透過政府的經濟角色，將散漫的社會綑綁起來。
於是，黨官僚及政客透過運作，分配經濟資源和公共契約給自己人的公司。透過利益結合，將大家綑綁在一起，遂被認為是一種正當的方法。這也是法西斯體制下，黨官僚及政客致力於「喬利益」的原因。
這種「國家社會主義」的政治，由於受到經濟利益影響，當然系統性的腐化橫行。而它的經濟受到政治的干擾，當然成本大、效率差。
在二十世紀上半葉，國際競爭還不嚴重，因此它能良好運作。只是到了二十世紀後期，國際競爭激烈，而且民主政治深化。這種喬利益的制度，在經濟上，因成本過大而難以為繼；而在政治上，則普遍被認為是貪腐。
但在以前的法西斯國家，這種喬利益的方法，的確是被當作政治的黏著劑。不但歐洲法西斯國家：義大利、西班牙如此，亞洲及拉丁美洲具有法西斯特性的國家也如此。
前幾年，我讀了當代反貪專家李維（Michael Levi），和尼爾肯（David Nelken）所編的論文集《政治的貪腐及貪腐政治》。他們指出，歐洲法西斯經濟裡，那種黨官僚及政客喬事情、抽佣金的方式，乃是近代政治最壞的傳統。它造成貪污的體制化。
這也是一九九○年代，全球反貪都把「喬事情、分利潤」換成「政治獻金」列為最大重點的原因。
因此，對法西斯經濟的運作模式，世人應加強反省。法西斯主義強調國家整體利益，以不自由、不民主的方式，選擇性地瓜分國家利益，靠著利益共享，把這些人綑綁在一起。
但任何人都知道，這種綑綁可以綁出很大的勢力，但綁不成一個國家。它所造成的貪腐、無效率，反而會傷害到沒有綁在一起的大多數人民。
法西斯的這種喬利益、綁利益的運作方式，乃是歐洲許多有法西斯傳統的國家，如義大利、西班牙、希臘等，每況愈下的主因。
二十世紀上半葉，法西斯的政治及經濟思想曾影響到許多後進國。當時的中華民國，即很多事都學法西斯，在經濟上影響極大。瓜分利益、喬國家的採購契約，即是法西斯時代的殘餘。這也是中華民國轉型最需要揚棄的壞習慣！
---
http://www.cw.com.tw/blog/blogTopic.action?id=9&nid=2228
法西斯式的貪腐經濟
作者：南方朔 2012/08/10
黨官僚、政客互喬利益，集結勢力。
這種少數人綑綁的利益體，卻傷害了大多數人民。
古羅馬時代，執政官巡行時，走在前面的開道人員中，一定有一個官員手持「束棒」（fasces），代表最高權威。「束棒」是一束櫸木棍，它由紅帶子綑綁在一起，中間則是一個斧頭柄。
「束棒」的象徵意義是，老百姓乃是散漫的木棒，它只有和代表權威的斧頭綑綁、團結在一起，才有力量。
一九一九年，「束棒」的意義被義大利的墨索里尼發揚光大，成了二十世紀上半期，對全球影響很大的法西斯。
法西斯既是政治運動，也是經濟運動。法西斯認為，國家的經濟活動乃是政治的黏著劑。因此，不但要發達國家資本，甚至要透過政府的經濟角色，將散漫的社會綑綁起來。
於是，黨官僚及政客透過運作，分配經濟資源和公共契約給自己人的公司。透過利益結合，將大家綑綁在一起，遂被認為是一種正當的方法。這也是法西斯體制下，黨官僚及政客致力於「喬利益」的原因。
這種「國家社會主義」的政治，由於受到經濟利益影響，當然系統性的腐化橫行。而它的經濟受到政治的干擾，當然成本大、效率差。
在二十世紀上半葉，國際競爭還不嚴重，因此它能良好運作。只是到了二十世紀後期，國際競爭激烈，而且民主政治深化。這種喬利益的制度，在經濟上，因成本過大而難以為繼；而在政治上，則普遍被認為是貪腐。
但在以前的法西斯國家，這種喬利益的方法，的確是被當作政治的黏著劑。不但歐洲法西斯國家：義大利、西班牙如此，亞洲及拉丁美洲具有法西斯特性的國家也如此。
前幾年，我讀了當代反貪專家李維（Michael Levi），和尼爾肯（David Nelken）所編的論文集《政治的貪腐及貪腐政治》。他們指出，歐洲法西斯經濟裡，那種黨官僚及政客喬事情、抽佣金的方式，乃是近代政治最壞的傳統。它造成貪污的體制化。
這也是一九九○年代，全球反貪都把「喬事情、分利潤」換成「政治獻金」列為最大重點的原因。
因此，對法西斯經濟的運作模式，世人應加強反省。法西斯主義強調國家整體利益，以不自由、不民主的方式，選擇性地瓜分國家利益，靠著利益共享，把這些人綑綁在一起。
但任何人都知道，這種綑綁可以綁出很大的勢力，但綁不成一個國家。它所造成的貪腐、無效率，反而會傷害到沒有綁在一起的大多數人民。
法西斯的這種喬利益、綁利益的運作方式，乃是歐洲許多有法西斯傳統的國家，如義大利、西班牙、希臘等，每況愈下的主因。
二十世紀上半葉，法西斯的政治及經濟思想曾影響到許多後進國。當時的中華民國，即很多事都學法西斯，在經濟上影響極大。瓜分利益、喬國家的採購契約，即是法西斯時代的殘餘。這也是中華民國轉型最需要揚棄的壞習慣！
沒有留言:
張貼留言