2014年6月28日 星期六

傅高義:從歷史記憶和相互認知出發,避免中日沖突;James C. Abegglen日本之經營 2004



【新日本前景】
I S B N:9861851364
作 者:詹姆斯阿貝格蘭
精平裝: 平裝本
出版社:高寶國際有限公司
出版日: 97/01/30


  泡沫經濟瓦解後,日本經濟進入蕭條不振的十年黑暗期,近年卻可見到經濟復甦的氣象。
  日本企業如何跨過經濟蕭條的谷底?今後又將如何發展?
  現今經濟不景氣的台灣,是否能從日本的經驗中學習到復活的秘訣?
  讓日本企業研究先驅帶領你一起探索日本經濟復甦的真相。

  首部探討日本式經營的名著《日本式經營》的作者,在剖析過去幾十年日本企業的發展歷程外,更對未來的方向提出他的建議。本書可謂跨越半個世紀集日本企業研究之大成的精心鉅作!
  泡沫經濟崩解後,支撐日本高度經濟成長的「終身僱用制」、「年功序列制」也隨之瓦解?「失去的十年」對日本發展真正的意義是什麼?「日本式經營」的成敗繫乎一個「人」字?
  還在讀市面上老掉牙的日本經濟沒落論嗎?本書將帶領您走向日本經濟研究的另一個新境地。
東京大學經濟學部教授、神戶大學經營學部教授上一致好評推薦!!
日本神戶大學MBA研究所課程專業選書

  何謂21世紀日本企業應維持並活用的「日本式經營優勢」?
  日立、三菱電機、東芝、NEC、富士通、三洋電機、夏普、松下電器、SONY,這些百年企業,為何能夠歷久不衰?
   人們對日本、日本經濟、日本企業總是有著許多誤解,但其中最根深蒂固的就是認為日本的制度僵硬。但反觀過去五十年當中日本的國民所得、生產、財富發生的 巨大變化,想當然爾,經濟發展要發展到如此大的規模、生活水準如此提昇,發展中國家的勞力密集、低附加價值的產業要發展到需要高度設備投資水準的高附加價 值高科技產業,勢必是要經過大幅度經濟結構的轉變的。
  對日本經濟基礎造成深刻影響的各種轉變當中,變化最劇烈也最明顯的就是:日本從人 口快速成長的年輕社會,轉變成人口快速減少的高齡化社會。之前,日本普遍有人口過剩、人口密度高、住宅、農業、娛樂用地不足等印象。但諷刺的是,人口減少 的情況反而變成了日本現在最嚴重的問題。人口減少可能引發經濟成長率下滑、勞動力不足、研發及製造業等企業活力降低、年金負擔壓力沈重、醫療費用增加等一 連串的問題。
  日本在面臨著人口高齡化、人口減少等社會結構變化的同時,經濟逐漸走出低迷,重拾原有的活力。這意味著許多企業在「失去的 十年」當中,成功地完成了為因應新商業環境的「企業再造工程」,本書以分析五家企業的經營模式,做為研究的主體。這五家企業分別是日本電氣(NEC)、住 友電氣工業、住友化學、東洋螺縈(TORAY)和富士製鐵(一九七○年和八幡製鐵合併,現為新日本製鐵);皆是跨越纖維、化學到電子等廣泛技術領域的企 業。
  而在日本飛特族(英文free 自由與德文arbeiter 勞工的拼合,是在80年代後期出現於日本社會的新字彙,指從學校畢業後沒有固定工作,靠打工來維持生計的年輕人。)越來越多的趨勢下,日本企業對於員工的 重視程度,仍維持一貫的傳統,這點由不言而喻的「終身僱用制度」中可見一班,日本企業對員工許下終身承諾,代表著對員工人生的義務。
  作者除了剖析過去幾十年日本企業的發展歷程外,更對未來的方向提出他的建議。本書可謂跨越半個世紀集日本企業研究之大成的精心鉅作!現在日本企業面臨的是無限可能的未來!
  而日本和中國之間存在著密切的互補關係。中國擁有低成本勞力和具發展潛力的市場,需要日本的資本和技術。因此日本的發展也與我們今後息息相關。
本書特色
1.作者的「日本式經營」率先將日本式企業管理介紹給世界,與之後的傅高義的「日本第一」並列為研究日本式管理的名著。作者在「日本式經營」出版數十年後,再次針對日本,特別是經歷「失落的十年」之日本,提出其精闢見解,實是從事管理工作的大眾之必讀好書。
2. 作者利用長達半世紀對日本企業進行調查,並輔以最新的數據檢驗日本企業的經營管理環境。藉由其羅列之眾多資料,可輕而易舉地了解日本經濟與企業的發展過程。如作者般花費50年的長時間對日本企業進行研究之書籍並不多見,是一本相當值得參考的好書。
作者簡介
詹姆斯.阿貝格蘭(James C. Abegglen)
   出生於一九二五年。於芝加哥大學在學中進美國海軍服役並學習日語後不久從軍參戰。戰後,以一名美國戰略轟炸調查團的成員首度來到日本。之後重返芝加哥大 學攻得人類學及臨床心理學的博士學位。曾任福特財團的研究員並隨哈佛大學埃德溫.賴肖爾(Edwin Oldfather Reischauer)等教授從事研究工作。於一九五五年再度訪問日本各地工廠,調查日本企業經營模式並整理著成書《日本的經營》。是首先提出日本式經營 代表制度「終身僱用」一詞的研究者、五九年轉戰到經營顧問業界,服務於亞瑟里托(Arthur D. Little)及麥肯錫(Mckinsey)等顧問公司後,於六五年參與成立波士頓顧問集團(BCG),主要負責日本地區業務,並擔任日本分公司的首任代 表。雖然曾因擔任巴黎辦公室的負責人一度離開日本,但自一九八二年起開始定居日本。現除了經營顧問公司,同時擔任上智大學教授一職。於一九九七年取得日本 國籍後定居於日本東京。
日文版翻譯 山岡洋一
  翻譯家。出生於一九四九年。以政經領域的翻譯作品獲得高度評價。主要著書有《何謂翻譯──做為職業的翻譯工作》,編撰的書有《經濟.金融英和實用辭典》,翻譯作品有《軟性力量》、《誰說大象不會跳舞》等。
譯者簡介
柳芝伊
  1975年生,政大企管系畢業後赴日本國立橫濱大學研究所進修。喜愛閱讀、翻譯工作和生活中的一切美好事物。現為專職譯者,旅居海外。

日本の経営 〔新訳版〕

日本の経営 〔新訳版〕
By ジェームス・C・アベグレン

価格: ¥ 2,310 1500円以上は送料無料 詳細
ポイント: 23pt
内容(「BOOK」データベースより)
1958年に発表された本書は、終身雇用・年功序列・企業内労働組合の三本柱を軸とする「日本的経営」の特徴や利点を欧米に初めて紹介し、その後の海外の 日本研究者にとってバイブル的存在となった。また、本文中のLifetime Commitmentの訳語として、「終身雇用」という言葉が初めて用いられたことでも知られている。日本の企業経営を考えるうえで基本文献となる名著、 待望の復刊。

内容(「MARC」データベースより)
終身雇用・年功序列・企業内労働組合の3本柱を軸とする「日本的経営」の特徴や利点を欧米に初めて紹介し、日本の企業経営を考えるうえで基本文献となった歴史的著作。1958年ダイヤモンド社刊が新訳で復活。

著者略歴 (「BOOK著者紹介情報」より)
アベグレン,ジェームス・C.
1925年生まれ。シカゴ大学在学中に海兵隊に入隊して日本語を学んだのち従軍。終戦後、アメリカ戦略爆撃調査団の一員として初来日。その後シカゴ大学に 戻って人類学と臨床心理学の博士号を取得。フォード財団の研究員となり、ハーバード大学でライシャワー教授らに師事したのち55年に再来日。このとき日本 各地の工場を訪問し、日本企業の経営を調査した結果をまとめたのが本書である。59年に経営コンサルティング業界へ転じ、アーサー・D・リトル、マッキン ゼーなどを経て、65年ボストン・コンサルティング・グループ(BCG)の設立に参加。BCGでは主に日本事業を担当し、日本支社初代代表をつとめる。パ リ事務所の責任者になって日本を離れた時期もあるが、82年からは日本に住みつづけ、コンサルティング会社を経営するとともに、上智大学で教鞭をとった。 97年には日本国籍を取得。東京都在住

山岡 洋一
翻訳家。1949年生まれ。政治経済分野の翻訳で高い評価を得る(本データはこの書籍が刊行された当時に掲載されていたものです)

Interview: James C. Abegglen


For nearly half a century he's been on the forefront of Western efforts to analyze the institutions of the Japanese economy. More importantly, if it weren't for him, the magazine you're now reading wouldn't be called J@pan Inc.
by Bradley Martin
James C. AbegglenJames C. Abegglen for nearly half a century has been in the forefront of Western efforts to analyze the institutions of the Japanese economy, both as a consultant (he represented Boston Consulting Group for many years, then started his own Asia Advisory Service K.K.) and as a scholar (until recently he was professor of business at Sophia University). In the process his name became closely associated with the popularization of the term that, slightly modified, has become the name of our magazine. We assigned former J@pan Inc contributing editor Bradley Martin, who is now Tokyo bureau chief for Asian Financial Intelligence (AFI.com), to interview Dr. Abegglen. Excerpts from the interview follow:
You look a good deal younger than your 74 years. How is your health?
I'm quite healthy, but not taking on new consulting projects, except those I can farm out. People call in and ask, but my wife says: "Don't do it!" I'm on the boards of Ferragamo, Nikkei Science -- a joint venture with Scientific American -- and Learning Technologies; an advisor to a Warburg Pincus equity fund, Broadview Associates -- the leading M&A firm in the IT field -- and Gemini Consulting. Also I am a trustee of International House of Japan.
How did you first come to Japan?
I was a Marine in the Pacific, wounded on Guam and Iwo Jima, and came to Japan in 1945 as a 20-year-old beat-up sergeant. I was here on an all-expenses-paid trip to work with the Strategic Bombing Survey. We were given the voter list and were supposed to find, or prove dead, every hundredth person on the voter list. It was a morale survey -- how people felt about government, war and the future of Japan. My district was Hiroshima. I spent a couple of months there in late 1945, and then went back to the United States, where I eventually got a Ph.D. in anthropology and clinical psychology from the University of Chicago.
Did you practice as a clinical psychologist?
No. It came a little too close to trying to play God, I felt. I came back to Japan in 1955 as a Ford Foundation area fellow and have been here off and on since then, for a total of 25 or 30 years. The time of that Ford grant was when I did the work on the book The Japanese Factory. In that book I coined, in both languages, the term "lifetime employment" -- shushin koyo in Japanese. The book was very popular in Japanese, not so popular in English. Looking back, I see that the term was a na�e one. I should have said career employment, since it doesn't normally last for a lifetime.
If you count post-retirement jobs, including amakudari [high government officials' "descent from heaven" sinecures] employment, it just about does last a lifetime for some Japanese.
Of course in the US we have amanobori -- you go from Wall Street up to the Treasury, just the opposite from Japan, where you go from the government down into the private sector.
You also were instrumental in popularizing the term "Japan Inc."
I used it first in a speech in the mid-1960s in Washington. American audiences at the time, first, didn't care very much about Japan and, second, knew nothing. I was trying to convey the nature of Japanese corporations as having a common financial and personnel policy yet competing among themselves, like units in Alfred Sloan's General Motors. So I used that term -- which I think I had read in the Asahi Evening News; research later found that someone had used it in the 1930s in Fortune magazine. It got picked up by a guy named Kaplan, who was in the US Commerce Department. He did a book on government-business relations in Japan. We at Boston Consulting Group contributed the book's case studies. The term became popular partly because of the Kaplan book.
It became popular also because it provided a simplistic description and, therefore, the public and reporters liked it. In their hands it veered from my attempt to convey a complex combination of cooperation and competition to a paranoid view of lockstep Japan: "It's all one big plot and they're winning, goddamn it! They're all marching together to a common drum and a common drummer and if we could find the bastard and shoot him we'd solve the problem." Unfortunately, you can't prevent such twisting of meaning. I'm intrigued by how much of the news coverage of Japan is done because of what the editors -- probably correctly -- think the readers want to hear. In the Financial Times and New York Times there have been no positive stories regarding Japan for years. I'm also interested in the underlying attitude in the United States generally toward Japan. There are brief periods of positive emphasis, but the prevailing attitude is usually negative to hostile.

How do you think your 1985 book, Kaisha: The Japanese Corporation, has held up?
Kaisha was done in the context of high growth. At the corporate level, at least, the rules you follow to be successful under conditions of rapid growth are very different from those you follow in a mature economy. In high growth, lots of debt is used; it is cheaper than equity. In a mature economy, you have to bring that debt level down. It's not surprising that it's taking Japanese companies some years to make that transition.
Under high growth there have been 11 Japanese producers of trucks, buses, and cars. When growth halts, marginal producers go to the wall. In the case of autos, foreign companies have stepped in. As a Japanese citizen I'm very glad to see those foreign companies putting money in to reorganizing bankrupt companies -- Mazda, Mitsubishi Motors, Nissan. And they are bankrupt.
I'll probably do another book on the Japanese company: Where was it? Where is it? Where is it going to be?
In Kaisha you and your co-author, George Stalk, wrote about three industries that Japan had targeted as keys to the country's economic future: aerospace, "fifth-generation" computers, and pharmaceut- icals. How effective was that targeting?
They didn't make it in any of them. As for aerospace, I was doing a big project for an American company. It was difficult because the CEO was persuaded that what MITI wanted, it would get. We couldn't get him to see there's no way they can do the economically impossible. We must have spent $200,000 of client money trying to get that guy to understand that.
When and why did you become a Japanese citizen?
More than four years ago. I should have done it earlier. Japan has been very good to me both personally and professionally, so why not? It is where my life is. But I must say that I get some rather odd reactions when I cross immigration desks.
James C. AbegglenWas it hard to get citizenship?
It's not hard to do. The problem is renouncing US citizenship -- that is extremely hard to do. It cost me $15,000 in accountants' and lawyers' fees to do it carefully. You have to do it carefully because the American government has a rather negative view about these things.
Do you think your adopted country is in good shape?
Fairly. Put it this way: I don't think it's a situation like the Perry ships arriving, or MacArthur getting off the plane. Those bleak analyses serve the American ego very well. People say the Japanese have to reform their society. What's the problem -- average savings of $135,000 per family? The US savings rate is negative. The average US family is indebted to the extent of about a year's income. Private debt in the US -- corporate plus household -- comes to about 160 percent of gross domestic product, the same ratio as Japan's public debt. In Japan the problem is public, not private debt.

I would hope we would take the tax levels up eventually, but we're doing OK in the medium term. Subsidizing banks isn't new. They did a bit more of that here than other places. We're probably through the crisis. No meltdown. We're certainly through what looked like a banking disaster. More bankruptcies? Yeah. It won't be pretty. But it's what happens when you have a mature economy, transiting from very high growth.
Maybe the biggest problem here from my viewpoint is the relative weakness of the universities, not in terms of the quality of the institutions but in terms of graduate education: lack of facilities for graduate study, failure to attract students from abroad and fund them, lack of dormitories in a country that is expensive for foreigners. I taught at university here for a long time. We have very limited facilities and programs at the graduate level. To deal with this the government has to get the dead hand of the Monbusho [Ministry of Education] off the system.
Japan is as a whole the most civil, the healthiest country. Public health and secondary education are probably at the highest levels of any country in the world. That's not so bad. No arms exports, the largest foreign aid program in the world. That's not so bad. I would like to see Japan a little less deferential to the US. Encourage Asia to achieve more coherence in financial and trade policy -- turn more toward Asia, less toward the US. We're being terribly deferential to the United States on the military bases issue. There is a risk of stronger feeling.
The thing that's intriguing about the Japanese case as compared to the Anglo-Americans is that the Japanese are retaining manufacturing capacity -- at a cost, you could argue, but the fact is that one does need hardware. Services are no substitute. Japan is producing about 100 million tons of steel this year -- the same as in the 1970s. They're working at capacity. Everybody said it's a dying industry, but it isn't. I had a steel study done to my specifications, a general view of the five big blast-furnace producers. It's widely thought that three will still be around in four years -- Kawasaki, Shin Nippon, and Sumitomo will make it -- while two, Kobe and NKK, will go down. To survive, steel companies are swapping business lines. You get the benefits of merging without the agonies of putting companies together. That's a very Japanese style. In America, entire companies merge or are acquired; in Japan, the company survives.
You've got some very dynamic companies here in Japan, and the dynamic ones continue to perform very well. Take Canon. They're still out there. They're still at the front edge. The exchange rate went from 270 to 100 and Canon continued to export 80 percent of its product. Toyota is one of the great companies, Canon is another, Fuji Film is another. None of them, by the way, is keiretsu-connected. Meanwhile the old guard in the US are toppling: AT&T, P&G, Kodak.
The implications of the exchange rate for US manufacturing are really rather serious. In the US, you have to import. Unless you posit some sort of global monetary system, the US will continue to run massive deficits. My prediction is, you'll see a very weak dollar in a few years, and a strong yen.
So do you believe in the New Economy?
As a substitute, no, as an important supplement and extension, yes. Around 1900 to 1910, the US had 2,000 automobile producers. One of the things you can predict about the New Economy is that there's going to be a massive spate of bankruptcies of the dot-coms and Internet startups.
What about the perception that Japan is behind in high-tech?
That's not a real issue. In R&D expenditures for 1999 to 2000, the Innovation Index for the US Council on Competitiveness rated Japan first in the world. The US dropped from first to third, and by 2005 is expected to drop to sixth. The problem they've had here is that the PC is such a clumsy instrument for the Japanese language. Go to i-mode, and what might be called wireless information appliances, and Japan moves right to the top again. In April we go into the third-generation telephony system, where the US lags behind. At that point the Japanese keitai can be sold in Europe as well. Now it doesn't work outside Japan, but as the world goes to a standard system, they can begin competing with Nokia and the Americans. This game is only at the beginning point in world competition.
Photographs by Andrew Pothecary
http://www.japaninc.com/article.php?articleID=152




傅高義:從歷史記憶和相互認知出發,避免中日沖突

發佈時間: 2014-06-27 10:00 作者: 傅高義|譯者:盧昊字號:   點擊: 2323次
( 共識網配圖)

  【內容提要】中日關係的難題集中在日本所稱“尖閣列島”和中國所稱“釣魚島”的領土爭議上。中日之間發生意外和衝突的危險確實存在。一旦意外情況發生,中日要再次和解,可能要推遲數十年,甚至更長時間。這對於中日以及世界其他國家都是不利的。要避免中日關係衝突,應該啟動改善中日關係的艱難進程,深切希望中日兩國和平共處,相互合作。日本應避免採取富有挑釁性的舉動,中國則不以武力施壓。高級別的領導人會晤和中日兩國民眾之間的交流應當不斷進行。

  【關鍵詞】中日關係/中日沖突/釣魚島/領土爭端/相互認知

  中日兩國能否尋找到方法降低衝突風險,阻止可能持續數十年的敵對延續下去?在新的時代,兩國能否同時作為強大的現代化國家而和平共處?

  如果不能直面源自日本率先實現現代化的19世紀末、目前仍未解決的歷史問題所激發出的強烈情緒,現在兩國間圍繞領土爭端並因安倍首相參拜靖國神社而進一步升級的緊張局勢是無法被化解的。很多中國人由於本國曾被小小的島國日本超越而一直深感恥辱,也因為遭受日本侵略帶來的深重苦難而憤怒,這種憤怒幫助毛澤東在1949年統一了中國。日本依然在努力,希望將對本國歷史的驕傲,與因過去給鄰國帶來劫難而做出的追悔結合在一起。現在,中國領導人要應對尚未解決的中日曆史問題,以及關於日本軍國主義復甦的憂慮,而日本領導人則面對著一個反日情緒上升、經濟和軍事規模已經超過日本,且還在快速發展的中國。

  目前,中日關係的難題集中在島嶼領土爭議,即日本所稱的“尖閣列島”或中國所稱的“釣魚島”上。發生意外和衝突的危險確實存在。一旦意外情況發生,中日之間要再次和解可能要推遲數十年,甚至更長時間。這對於日本、中國以及世界其他國家都是不利的。一些理由可以解釋為什麼這些荒涼的島礁成為緊張局勢的焦點:周邊海域的海洋資源有一定價值,兩國漁民為滿足全球漁業市場的需求,已將本國近海捕撈殆盡,轉而將目標投向遠洋,因此就產生了利益爭奪。在中國大陸聯手台灣、方便艦船進出太平洋的背景下,這些島礁的地理位置具有了軍事戰略價值。但是,這些理由都不足以解釋北京和東京之間情緒化的、充斥著歷史記憶因素的相互反應。

  兩國各有將近九成的民眾都對對方國家持負面看法。中國,電視台經常播放關於二戰中日本士兵暴行的影視節目,互聯網上則有很多對日本人的仇恨言論一些中國軍方將領公開放出自信言論,稱如果爆發戰爭,中方會成為勝利者。在日本,電視節目中敵視中國的言論稍少一些,但是中方飛機和艦船逼近日本、威脅尖閣列島(釣魚島),以及中國一些民眾由於憤怒而攻擊在華日本人、打砸日貨的報導畫面也會反復出現,刺激日本民眾加深恐懼和厭惡感日方的軍方高官們不會公開提及日本對中國的軍事優勢,但私下里他們相信,如果發生衝突,日本會取得勝利,而且必要的時候,美國也會向日本施以援手。

  中國領導人確實擔憂日本軍國主義會死灰復燃。美國人在二戰期間也和日本人打過仗,但和日本人之間建立最為緊密的聯繫不是源自發動侵略的日本軍人,而是二戰後與日本平民建立的私人交往。1958~1960年間,我首次訪日並居住在那裡,此後每年我都要訪日。我和其他1945年後在日本居住過的美國人都了解到日本人民是如何徹底拋棄了軍國主義的中國和日本打交道最密切的時候是二戰時期,而且中國媒體一直渲染這段歷史記憶。中國領導人警告日本不要復活軍國主義,但與此同時,中國增強軍備,對日本施壓,這使得日本更加堅信應該解除對擴張軍備的自我限制。

  上世紀80年代,由於鄧小平領導下的中國採取了積極行動,中日兩國間似乎可能建立起面向21世紀的和睦關係。鄧小平1978年訪日時曾說,中日之間有2500年的交往歷史,其中僅有50年是不幸的時期。他主張重新發展中日關係,使其達到前所未有的高度。在日本,鄧小平會見了天皇、福田赳夫首相和日本經濟界領袖,會談進行得相當順利。鄧小平後來說,天皇就二戰時日本的行為進行了道歉,表示不會讓這樣的事情重演。鄧小平在東京記者俱樂部演講時,現場聽眾的掌聲響亮而經久不息在日本,中國領導人還歷史第一次登上了高速列車。在鄧小平訪日後,日本經濟界的領袖們紛紛協助中國建設起電子、鋼鐵、汽車等工業的現代化工廠。為發展兩國關係,鄧小平將日本的小說、電影和電視劇帶回中國。在鄧小平主政時期,中日之間青年交流項目也得以啟動。

  鄧小平的努力在中日兩國都得到了非常積極的回應。在上世紀80年代,日本提供給中國的經濟援助遠超過其他所有國家給予中國的。日本企業幫助中國建立起現代化的工廠,日本遊客大量湧入中國,遍及日本各地的數百個地方團體與中國的地方團體結成姐妹友好關係。日方民間團體前往中國,就二戰時給中國帶來的苦難表示道歉。進入90年代,中國領導人大力開展愛國主義教育,而在中國,沒有比討論日本在二戰時的暴行更能夠刺激愛國主義情感的了。

  在中國,批評日本沒有詳細記述自己侵略歷史的聲音非常普遍,而且不僅在中國,在西方也有這樣的聲音。很多中國人擔憂,如果日本的年輕一代對日本過去侵略其他國家,給它們帶來苦難的歷史缺乏了解,會導致日本重新走​​上軍國主義之路。當日本青年們訪問中國時,中方東道主看到他們對日本過去製造的災難所知甚少,因而感到不滿。他們質問道:為什麼日本的教科書不向本國年輕人講授這些內容?為什麼日本的紀念館不能多展示一些過去戰爭的恐怖?為什麼日本人要去參拜那些頌揚美化自己戰爭歷史的紀念設施?不僅是中國人,連西方人也有疑問,為什麼日本不能像德國一樣繼續表達自己的懺悔。

  日本人清楚,在二戰結束後,當時蔣介石的國民政府簽署和約,放棄了對日賠款要求。而在上世紀80年代,相比其他國家,日本給予了中國更多的經濟援助。對於很多日本人來說,這是他們反省二戰歷史的一種方式。日本人不滿的是,現在很少有中國人知道日本的領導人和日本民眾在會見中國領導人時曾經道過歉,也很少知道日本在80年代時給予中國的巨大援助。很多日本年輕人則質疑說,為什麼他們要為了自己出生之前就 ​​發生了的事情道歉一些日本歷史學家在研究了有關日方暴行的中方文獻後堅稱,其中很多內容被誇大了。同時,中國卻對本國內戰和“文革”期間對自己人的殘酷行為採取了忽略態度。

  但是事實是,不僅中國人,而且西方人也認為,日本某個派別、個別領導人的道歉不足以體現一直延續下去的反省。為了維持與其他國家的友好關係,對於日本人而言,繼續對過去幾代日本人所製造的問題表示悔恨是明智之舉。

  所有國家的領導人都希望以自己的國家為驕傲。因自己的國家在19世紀現代化步履緩慢而羞恥的中國人,現在有足夠的理由因他們近年來非凡的經濟發展而自豪。因自己的國家在二戰中​​的暴行而羞恥的日本人,現在也可以因自己在戰後對和平的卓越貢獻而自豪——他們為世界各國的和平發展提供了援助,將自己的軍費壓低到國民生產總值的1%,維持小規模的軍事力量,拒絕發展核武器。

  所有國家的領導人都必須對外顯示自己的強力。對於習近平主席和安倍首相來說,他們都很難主動行動以爭取對方的合作。日本領導人堅信,對中國軟弱只會導致中方要求升級並繼續發展軍備,因此,堅決表示日本絕不會被脅迫。

  改善中日關係會非常艱難,但也沒有比現在更好的時候去啟動這一進程。習近平已經鞏固了執政權力基礎,他將在接下來的八年時間裡領導這個國家。安倍也是近年來第一位能夠連續執政至少三年甚至更長時間的日本首相。習近平和安倍都被認為是堅定的民族主義者,有著強大的支持基礎,可以在改善兩國關係方面採取難度更大的舉措。

  作為一個研究了中日兩國半個世紀、在兩國都結交了好朋友的人,我深切地希望這兩個偉大的國家可以和平共處、相互合作。我的建議是,如果兩國領導人希望改善關係,可以考慮以下的做法:

  (一)現在開始行動

  日本應當避免採取在中國看來富有挑釁性的舉動。日本的政治領袖們不應當參拜靖國神社,應當為日本過去侵略所製造的悲劇重申道歉。

  中國不以武力施壓、嘗試控制日本聲稱擁有主權的領土,並重申決心避免國內出現反日遊行。

  中日兩國代表應當尋求一種方案,使得雙方能夠體面地從關於尖閣列島(釣魚島)領土爭端的對峙中後退,並且確認雙方決心在稍後時間以和平的方式解決這些問題。

  中日雙方應當選定一小部分高級別的、在將來數年可能在各自政府扮演重要角色的領導人,這些領導人分別代表自己的國家,經常性地會面,就一系列廣泛議題進行全面的討論,以增強相互理解與合作。日本方面應選派代表主要政黨的領導人,這樣無論任何黨派執政,都可以保證這一聯繫不會中斷。

  (二)在以後幾年裡

  日本領導人應準備一份公開聲明(篇幅大約幾十頁),重點闡述他們戰後以來在和平方面的貢獻日本可以強調,他們放棄了戰爭行動,對發展中國家、聯合國和其他國際組織均提供了援助,將軍費限制在國民生產總值的1%以內,放棄生產核武器並拒絕向海外派遣軍隊參與軍事行動。日本還應當準備一份相似篇幅的聲明,總結日本自明治時代以來對亞洲其他國家產生的影響,包括對二戰時侵略中國台灣、朝鮮以及中國大陸,給當地造成的劫難進行客觀陳述。日本應增加學校關於明治時代以來歷史必修課的課時,為必修課所用的歷史教科書編撰教學指導,使得日本的學生們在了解日本戰前和戰後現代化的成就,以及對亞洲其他國家貢獻的同時,也能夠全面地理解來自亞洲其他國家的批評聲。

  中國應當減少本國電影、書刊和電視節目中會招致對日敵視情緒的文化表演,使民眾更多地了解日本自1978年以來對中國經濟發展提​​供的援助,宣傳日本自1945年以來作出的和平承諾。中國應當回到上世紀80年代鄧小平時代的做法,大規模地將日本文學、電影、電視節目和其他日本文化產品引介到國內。

  中日兩國民眾之間的交流項目應當得到廣泛的擴大。

  盧昊,中國社會科學院日本研究所博士後。

來源: 《日本學刊》 |來源日期:2014年1期|責任編輯:趙敏

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