Crude oil prices will struggle to find a bottom in the near term, as the market continues to be awash in oil in the face of lower-than-expected global demand, especially from emerging economies. But while prices are eventually expected to rise, there are signs that this may not be the typical boom-and-bust cycle the oil industry has experienced in the past, especially as shale oil occupies a growing role in the world’s oil supply.
Since hitting a peak in June, oil prices have skidded by about 60% to land at six-year lows and they have remained mired in the doldrums. On January 20, Brent crude for March delivery fell another 1.5% to $48.11 a barrel on the ICE Futures exchange in London, while on the New York Mercantile Exchange, crude oil futures for February delivery fell 5.3% to $46.13 from the prior trading day. Weighing on prices was China’s slowing economic growth and cuts in the International Monetary Fund’s global GDP forecast for this year and 2016. It could be a while before oil gets to firmer ground.
When prices recover, however, it will be not be the same old ballgame. “Rebalancing of the market does not equate to a return to the status quo ante,” the International Energy Agency said in its oil market report released on January 16. “It is clear that the market is undergoing a historic shift.” The agency pointed to two factors: the embrace of market forces by OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) to manage oil prices instead of resorting to production cuts, and the U.S. light tight (shale) oil“revolution.”
In November, Saudi Arabian oil minister Ali Al-Naimi told various news outlets that the 12 member-nations of OPEC will maintain the organization’s target output of 30 million barrels per day — about a third of total world production — even in the face of sliding oil prices. Historically, as one of the world’s largest oil producers, Saudi Arabia led the way in cuts to manage pricing. This time, it instead motioned for non-OPEC producers to step up. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, total global petroleum production was 92.2 million barrels per day in 2014 while total consumption was 91.4 million barrels per day.
“I think [the Saudis] realize that if they kept the price where it was, they would basically end up with very little market share.”–Franklin Allen
Franklin Allen, a professor of finance at Wharton and at Imperial College in London, said the Saudis’ change in strategy has added to the sell-off in oil. “They are willing to keep pumping oil even though the price is dropping dramatically,” he says. “I think they realize that if they kept the price where it was, they would basically end up with very little market share.”
Indeed, in an interview with USA Today published on January 11, Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal confirmed the same. When his country cut production in the past, it ended up losing market share as other nations took up the slack. Getting both OPEC and non-OPEC nations to honor a commitment to decrease production has not worked. “We can’t trust all OPEC countries, and can’t trust non-OPEC countries,” he said. “So it’s not on the table because the others will cheat. The past has proven that.”
OPEC’s clout has been steadily changing since 1973, when its Arab nation members imposed an oil embargo against the U.S. and certain other countries for supporting Israel in the Arab-Israeli war, leading to the famously long lines of cars at American gas stations and double-digit inflation. Today, OPEC produces 40% of the world’s crude oil and its exports represent 60% of petroleum traded internationally, according to the EIA.
But the rise of shale oil is having an impact. In the week ending January 9, U.S. crude oil production rose to a record 9.2 million barrels per day, the EIA said.
“Since the Arab oil boycott in 1973, OPEC has been a dominant force in determining the price of oil. There have been numerous instances of a short-term ‘glut’ in oil and in every instance, prices have reverted to normal,” saysHoward Pack, Wharton professor emeritus of business economics and public policy, who has written several books on Arab economies. “This time may indeed be different. Several forces are at work that suggest a more permanent downward adjustment of energy prices .”
Pack points to a “significant” change in oil supplies from the emergence of shale oil due to fracking, a technology that pumps liquids into wells at high pressure to break apart rock formations and release oil or gas. “This has reduced U.S. demand for imported oil, and American exports of oil have added substantially to world supply,” he says. “Simultaneously, there has been a slowing growth, or actual decline, in gross domestic product in the other two major markets for oil, the EU and China. In neither region are the prospects for higher growth rates very favorable.”
The question now is how much pressure low oil prices will exert on shale and other oil producers, even to run them out of business. While Saudi Arabia can withstand low oil prices, other countries will have difficulty because oil revenues are used to fund social programs and other government activities. Indeed, the Russian ruble has already taken a big tumble.
Meanwhile, BP, Schlumberger, Apache, as well as merger partners Baker Hughes and Halliburton, are among several oil companies cutting back on production and laying off workers as lower prices are starting to take their toll. Various shale oil producers in Texas have already reduced output, according to a January 19 story in The New York Times. “I think it will certainly have some effect,” Allen says. How much low prices will impact the shale oil industry remains to be seen since it is the first time producers have seen a major downturn. “These are very uncertain issues,” Allen adds.
How We Got Here
OPEC’s move to maintain production has to be seen in light of Saudi Arabia’s experience in the 1980s when it was the world’s main oil producer. “They took it upon themselves as a member of OPEC to cut production in an effort to support the price,” says Erik Gilje, a Wharton finance professor. But other nations did not follow suit and the Saudis lost share. That is why today the Saudis are willing to put up with short-term pain in the next six to 12 months to pressure other suppliers to cut, he adds.
After the oil embargo of 1973, oil production by the U.S. and non-OPEC countries grew while alternative energy projects also blossomed. “There was a significant ramp up of the North Sea oil production, a ramp up in Alaska and in many different places,” Gilje notes. These were oil “discoveries made in the 1970s but because of the long cycle time [in oil production], they didn’t end up coming to the market until later.”
“Several forces are at work that suggest a more permanent downward adjustment of energy prices.”–Howard Pack
Shale oil in particular has taken off. While the actual process of fracking has been going on for decades, it was only in the last few years that shale oil has become a global force due to technological innovation. Five years ago, total shale oil production in the U.S. was around 300,000 barrels a day, Gilje says. By 2013, it had risen to two million barrels a day. Today, output has at least doubled to between four million and five million barrels a day, he adds. Two of the biggest producers of shale oil are the Eagle Ford Shale in Texas and Bakken Shale in North Dakota.
Historically, oil wells were drilled straight down or at a slight angle. Then horizontal drilling came along — drilling a mile or two down and then taking a 90-degree turn and drilling another mile or two over. Around early 2000, in an area called Barnett Shale in Texas, the technology was fine-tuned to combine horizontal drilling and fracking to boost the recovery of natural gas, a move that made the wells “very economically profitable,” Gilje says. “It was that combination that spawned the [shale] revolution, first in natural gas and then in oil.”
Shale oil producers are continuing to improve the technology. Gilje points to the experience in Eagle Ford, where a well drilled in 2011 doubled its production by 2014 in part by improving the spacing of the wells. Producers have been drilling fewer wells and getting more out of them. Such innovations make projections of shale oil production a bit more difficult to predict for investors. Indeed, a higher-than-expected U.S. shale oil production helped tank oil prices in past months because the market did not see it coming, he adds.
Shale oil is also cheaper and faster to produce, taking weeks and months instead of years for traditional oil wells. Gilje says there are areas where shale can be produced with a 10% after-tax rate of return if oil is at $40 a barrel. In contrast, traditional major offshore projects in Brazil and elsewhere need oil prices to be much higher to be viable.
However, Gilje notes that most big oil companies are hedged against low oil prices by one or two years. So even if oil prices have tanked, futures contracts could have locked in sale prices at $90 to $100 per barrel. “What that means is they can adjust their capital budget and adjust their assets over a time period to ensure their survival,” he says, acknowledging that some firms would be “in distress.”
Other countries can also produce shale oil, but the U.S. is in a uniquely advantageous position, Gilje says. The issue of property rights is not as cumbersome to overcome since U.S. landowners are compensated in royalty streams and upfront bonuses. The U.S. also has the infrastructure to produce and bring the oil to market, including access to water for fracking where development is occurring. In addition, the U.S. would have 20 to 30 companies innovating their own way in drilling with the result that the best technology is developed.
Compare that to Argentina’s Vaca Muerta, or Dead Cow, shale formation, potentially one of the most prolific on earth but with “all sorts of expropriation concerns, infrastructure issues, technology issues,” Gilje notes. “That project will take years.”
“The likelihood of significant, persistent price spikes that we’ve historically seen … is probably lower now because of this new stabilizing force in the market.”–Erik Gilje
Impact on Global Markets
One thing about shale oil production, though, is that while it is much quicker to put up, it also taps out much faster than traditional oil wells. “These wells decline much faster than standard oil fields due to fracking,” Gilje says. “If you drill a well today, depending on where it is, it would not be unreasonable to see 50% less production in a year.” Compare that to a 5% to 10% decline for Alaskan oil fields.
But because shale oil wells can be set up relatively quickly, the industry can react to market forces faster than traditional oil. If oil prices are high, shale oil can be ramped up quickly to take advantage of them, and vice versa. The result could be a smoothing out of oil price volatility. “The likelihood of significant, persistent price spikes that we’ve historically seen … is probably lower now because of this new stabilizing force in the market,” Gilje says.
To be sure, lower crude oil prices have translated to declining gasoline prices for consumers to below $2 a gallon in many cities, Gilje says. That in turn has helped drive consumer confidence in January to an 11-year high, according to the University of Michigan’s widely watched consumer sentiment index. “Certainly, it’s going to be a positive for anything where discretionary spending is important,” Gilje says, noting that sales of SUVs and trucks also ticked up as gasoline prices fell.
But the benefits of cheaper oil have not yet been enough to offset economic drags elsewhere. “Even with the sharp oil price decline — a net positive for global growth — the world economic outlook is still subdued, weighed down by underlying weakness elsewhere,” the IMF said in its January 20 “World Economic Outlook” report. Last week, the World Bank also cut its global GDP forecast for 2015 and 2016 to 3% and 3.3% from 3.4% and 3.5%, respectively, due to an economic slowdown in the eurozone, Japan, Brazil, Russia and China. It said that the immediate impact of lower crude oil prices added 0.1 percentage points to GDP.
“If the oil price dropped because of high supply and a weak OPEC, that would be unambiguously good news for oil importing countries,” notes Arthur van Benthem, Wharton professor of business economics and public policy. “But right now, the low oil price is also just a signal that the economies of these oil importers are fairly weak.”
The exception is the U.S., whose economy is chugging along nicely. Van Benthem suggests that Americans would gain more from lower gasoline prices than what the oil producers will lose, eventually resulting in a positive impact to the U.S. stock market. However, a persistent oil bust would be rough for Texas and North Dakota. “It may not be pretty in the upstream oil sector for a while,” van Benthem notes, meaning exploration and production.
Since the start of the year, U.S. equities have come under pressure as investors fretted over how low oil can go and worried about the health of the global economy. The Dow has lost 2.4% thus far this year, as has the S&P 500, while the Nasdaq declined 2.5%. Investors sought safety in U.S. Treasuries, driving prices up and yields down to below 2% on the benchmark 10-year note.
One downside to lower oil prices and low demand for energy in general is that investments in renewable energy look less attractive, van Benthem says. “But there is also a great opportunity to seize right now that would help the environment and government budgets,” he adds. “With low oil prices, it should be politically easier to cut wasteful subsidies on fossil fuels that are pervasive in many developing countries, especially in those countries that import oil.”
Van Benthem notes that globally, fossil fuels are subsidized six times more than renewables, citing data from the IEA. “That is probably the least known policy that harms the environment the most,” he says. “I would be thrilled if countries started cutting back on these subsidies as soon as possible.”
*****
The Prize was the basis for a six-hour documentary television series titled The Prize - The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power, narrated by Donald Sutherland. The series is said to have been seen by 20 million people in the United States.
The Prize (Part 1 of 8) - "Our Plan" - YouTube
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qspu35JG59Q
Dec 18, 2010 - Uploaded by WarCrime911Adapted from Daniel Yergin's book "The PRIZE: Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power" Originally from a ...- Titan:The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr.《洛克斐勒》
The Prize : The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power 1991
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Prize:_The_Epic_Quest_for_Oil,_Money,_and_Power
‧作者：丹尼爾．尤金Daniel Yergin
‧譯者：薛絢
‧定價:450元／頁數:688頁／ 已絕版
英文版：
【基本資料 ｜書摘 】
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序幕
邱吉爾幾乎是一夜之間改變了主意。年經的內政部長邱吉爾一向是「節儉派」的領導人物。這一派閣員反對為了在英德兩國海軍競賽中保持領先而增加軍事費用，因為這項競爭已經成為兩國之間敵意逐漸升高的主要導因。直到1911年夏天，邱吉爾還在強調，對德之戰並非不可避免，德國的意圖不一定是要侵略，這筆添置戰艦的錢不如用在內政的社會政策上。
不料，德皇威廉於1911年 7 月 1 日派出德艦「猛豹號」（Panther），駛向摩洛哥的大西洋岸港口阿加底爾（Agadir），意在抵擋法國在非洲的勢力擴張。僅是一艘砲艇在阿加底爾這個次要港口的停靠，卻引起重大的國際危機。德國的強化武力早已令歐洲的各鄰國不安，此一舉動更像是正面挑釁法英二國的世界地位。好在，戰爭的恐懼籠罩歐洲幾星期之後，緊張情勢於7月底解除了。但邱吉爾卻也一改先前對德國的看法，認定德國想要的是霸權，而戰爭事實上不可避免，只是遲早的問題罷了。
邱吉爾被任命為海軍大臣之後，便竭盡全力裝備英國武力，務必使象徵大英帝國威權的皇家海軍有在海上迎戰德軍的實力。當時他面臨一大爭議性的問題，也是對二十世紀有深遠影響的問題，即是：要不要把傳統上使用煤為燃料的英國海軍改成以石油為其動力資源。如果要改，英國海軍就不再能夠仰仗供給無虞的威爾斯煤產，而必須倚賴遙遠而且供應不穩定的波斯（即伊朗）。但是，速度更快、效率更高等戰略上的優點，使得邱吉爾斷然作下改用石油的決定。用一句他自己的話來解釋：因為「主動本身就是冒險的戰利品」。
在邱吉爾託付重任給石油八十年之後，經過了兩次世界大戰與長期冷戰，在1990年代之始，也是所謂較和平的新時代之始，石油再度成為世界衝突的焦點。1990年 8 月 2 日這天，伊拉克獨裁者哈珊入侵了鄰國科威特。目的除了要征服科威特這個主權國，也要奪取其財富。此舉若是成功了，伊拉克將在世界石油蘊藏集中地的阿拉伯世界與波斯灣稱霸，伊拉克的力量與石油控制權將迫使世界上其他各國聽命於哈珊。攫取科威特的資源之後，伊拉克將成為一個不可忽視的核武國家，甚至可能搖身一變，成為超級強權。其結果，將對國際勢力的平衡，產生重大影響。換言之，主動的本身，又再一次成為冒險的戰利品。
但是，利害關係牽涉之廣使得科威特之受侵略不為他國所接受。哈珊始料未及，聯合國對伊拉克實施了禁運，西方與阿拉伯世界組成了聯軍進駐沙烏地阿拉伯。美蘇兩國協同一致，軍事力量運用之迅速與龐大，都是史無前例的。在此之前的數年中，幾乎已經流行說石油不再「具有重要性」。甚至在1990年春天，伊拉克入侵科威特之前不過幾個月，美軍中央指揮部（Central Comnand）的高級官員還聽到石油已喪失戰略意義的訓詞。但是，科威特被侵，把這假象一掃而去。1991年初，等各種和平手段試圖勸離伊拉克都失敗之後，美國率領三十多個國家的聯軍，以五個星期的空襲，加上一百小時的地面戰鬥，把伊拉克逐出了科威特。即便是在這二十世紀將結束之時，石油仍舊是安全與繁榮不可或缺的保障，是文明的根本要素。
雖然石油的近代史始於十九世紀的後半葉，真正被石油完全轉變的是二十世紀。石油的故事可分三個主題來看。
第一主題是資本主義與現代企業的興起及發展。石油業是世上規模最大，無所不在的企業，在十九世紀末幾十年裡興起的大企業中獨占鰲頭。十九世紀結束時已獨霸美國石油業界的標準石油公司（Standard Oil〉，乃是全世界最早且最大的跨國企業之一。石油業在二十世紀的擴展，下起冒險投機的探鑽者、能言善道的創業人、作威作福的企業家，上至大財團的官僚與國營公司，在在顯現了事業經營、公司策略、技術轉換、市場發展，以至國家與國際經濟在20世紀的進化過程。石油史上歷來的交易與重大決策，多半經過極縝密的思慮，但也有時是誤打誤撞。總之，沒有任何其他事業能把風險與報酬的意義──以及機遇與命運的衝擊力──刻劃得如此透徹。
我們展望21世紀，可以料定一片電腦磁碟的神秘莫測將不亞於一桶石油，但石油工業仍將有牽一髮足以動全局的影響力。未發現到可替代的能源之前，石油對全球經濟仍有深遠影響﹔重大的油價變動可能帶動經濟成長，也可能造成通貨膨脹、引發經濟蕭條。在今天，相關話題除了刊在工商版又經常能登上報紙頭版的商品，唯有石油而已。一如從前，石油現在對個人、公司、整個國家而言仍是強大的致富原動力。
第二主題是石油身為一種商品而與國家策略和世界政治及強權密不可分。在第一次世界大戰的戰場上，憑著內燃機優於馬匹與燃煤的火車頭，石油奠定了成為國力重心的地位。對第二次世界大戰在遠東與歐洲的戰事而言，石油占有舉足輕重的地位。日本攫取東印度群島油源之時，為保護其側翼而偷襲珍珠港。希特勒入侵蘇聯的最主要戰略性目標之一就是要攻佔高加索油田。美國在石油方面的優勢則是致勝關鍵，到戰爭將結束時，德國和日本的油槽都空空如也。冷戰期間，一些跨國企業與開發中國家之間的油權之戰，乃是殖民地獨立和民族主義興起之際的重頭戲。1956年為歐洲舊帝國主義強權畫上句點的蘇彝士運河危機目的之一，也是為石油。「石油力量」的陰影籠罩了1970年代，把國際政壇上原先一些外圍國家，突然擠上有財有勢的地位，並且促使一向以石油為經濟成長基礎的工業大國驚惶失措。1990年代第一個後冷戰危機──伊拉克侵略科威待，其問題核心仍是石油。
然而，石油能成就人也能害人。伊朗國王享其福也受其禍。石油建設了墨西哥的經濟，卻又予以毀壞。世界第二大石油出口國蘇聯把1970與 80 年代的鉅額石油獲益，浪擲在強化軍事與一連串無益無利的國際性投資上。至於一度是世界最大產油國且目前仍是最大石油消耗者的美國，所用的油量有一半必須進口，因而削弱了其整體戰略地位，並且增加了已很沉重的貿易赤字負擔。一個強國而有如此處境是危險的。
冷戰結束後，新的世界秩序正在形成。經濟競爭、區域性的衝突、種族對抗外加現代化武器大量生產之助陣與煽動，有可能取代意識形態而成為國際（或國內）衝突的焦點，但不論這新的國際秩序如何演變，石油終將是攸關國家策略與國際政治的戰略性物資。
石油史的第三主題，闡明我們的社會怎樣變成了「碳氫化合社會」，我們又是如何變成「碳氫化合人」。最初的幾十年，石油業曾經為正走向工業化的世界提供一種「蠟油」（kerosene）蠟油使得黑夜縮短，可以工作的時間延長，因此被譽之為「新光明」（New light）。約翰‧洛克斐勒在十九世紀結束時成為全美國最富有的人，主要就是因為出售蠟油。那時候汽油只是幾乎沒有用處的副產品，有時候能賣到兩分錢一加侖。賣不掉的時候，就在夜晚倒入河裏。然而，正當白熱燈泡問世，石油業即將無用武之地的時候，汽油發動的內燃機又拉開了新紀元。石油業有了新市場，新的文明也誕生了。
到 20 世紀，石油加上天然氣的搭配，取代了煤而成為工業化世界的動力資源主幹。石油也成為戰後大規模都市郊區化發展趨勢的原動力。如今，我們太倚賴石油，以致不曾想過它對我們日常生活無所不在的重要性。石油已是都市社區維持生命必需的氧氣了，食衣住行都少不了它。如果全世界的油井突然乾涸，建築在石化與塑膠上的當代文明必將崩潰。
對石油倚賴的加重在以前多受到肯定，被視為人類進步的象徵。如今卻不然了。環保運動興起以來，工業化社會的基本信條都受到了批判﹔石油業在審查、批評、反對的對象之中名列前茅。廢氣污染、酸雨、臭氧層破壞，以及氣候異變的怪現象，都引起要求減少使用礦物燃料的聲浪。在我們向所熟知的世界裡有過光榮貢獻的石油，如今卻被指為將危害現在與未來的社會。
可是「碳氫化合人」無意放棄代步的汽車、郊外的住宅，以及生活上用慣了的種種便利。不論牽涉到什麼樣的環境問題，開發中國家也不甘願放棄享受石油為動力的經濟帶來的優惠。任憑誰提出降低全球石油消耗量的意見，都會因為未來人口鉅輻成長的影響而大打折扣。預計1990年代世界人口會增加十億，也就是說，在這十年結束時，人口會多出20 %，工業化世界的全球性環保措施，必須以這個巨大成長數字為依據。因此，環保與經濟發展之衝突，必將是 90 年代的棘手問題。
以上便是本書的三個故事重心。故事背景則涵蓋全世界。這個故事記載了觸及我們大家生活的重要事端，敘述了經濟與科技的強大威力，也描繪了商人政客的機敏狡詰。主角人物包括石油業的大亨企業家：洛克斐勒、戴特定（Henri Deterding）、谷本坎（Calouste Gulbenkian）、蓋堤（J. Paul Getty）、哈莫爾（Amand Hammer）、皮肯斯（T. Boone Pickens）等人。此外，同樣佔了相當分量的還有政治人物，如邱吉爾、希特勒、史達林、沙烏地的紹德國王（Ibn Saud）、伊朗的莫撒德（Mohammed Mossadegh）、艾森豪、艾登（Anthony Eden）、季辛吉、布希、哈珊。
二十世紀當得起「石油世紀」的稱號。石油的故事裏雖有許多衝突與糾結，卻因為過去發生的事能引起當今的共鳴，而眼前的事又能在往昔中找出迴響，總會有「一體」之感。這是個個人的故事、強大經濟力與科技轉變的故事，也是政治鬥爭的故事、國際衝突與風雲際會的故事。我希望藉著探討我們倚賴石油而造成的經濟、社會、政治、戰略等影響，能夠說明過去，了解現在，展望未來。
丹尼爾．尤金（Daniel Yergin）
不論在世局或石油工業的研究上，都是當今數一數二的權威。在《石油世紀》之前，他有過兩本著作﹕《粉碎的和平》（Shattered Peace）與《能源未來》（Energy Future : Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School）。前者已經是探討冷戰起源的經典鉅著﹔後者在歐美、日本也都廣受歡迎。
尤金是耶魯大學的碩士，劍橋大學的博士，並曾經於哈佛大學任教。目前，他是「劍橋能源研究公司」（Cambridge Energy Research Associates）的總裁。這個公司稱得上是當今全球頂尖的能源諮詢公司。
《石油世紀》自1991年1月在美國出版以來，不但在學界備受推崇，在美國暢銷排行榜上也名列前茅至今，歷久不衰。
▼ 目錄
序幕
第一部 古早歲月：英雄群像
第一章 石油頭腦：比塞的開端
．紅外套之外
．教授失蹤
．價格與品質
．德瑞克上校
．英雄成敗
．第一波熱潮
．破滅的肥皂泡
第二章 洛克斐勒登場
．天生企業家
．「大玩家」
．新計劃
．軟硬兼施
．新的威脅
．托辣斯
．「聰明的老梟」
．新市場
．全力收購
．建設功臣
第三章 諾貝爾與薩姆耳
．「胡桃木錢」
．俄羅斯石油的興起
．標準石油的強敵
．貝殼商人之子
．一八九二年之變
．一張桌子加兩張椅子
．激戰不休
．皇家荷蘭公司
．荷蘭阻力
第四章 紡錘頭的故事
．市場得失
．突破
．席根斯的夢
．大筆交易
．海灣石油：不聽命於人
．太陽石油：整體企業
．德州石油﹕「鹿皮喬」
．「怎能控制﹖」
第五章 屠龍記：標準石油解散
．控股公司
．繼承人：石油狂
．揭發運動
．愛達‧塔貝爾
．「托辣斯剋星」
．訴訟案
．解散
．科技解放
．贏家
第六章 皇家荷蘭與帝國俄羅斯
．蠻荒叢林
．殼牌興起
．皇家荷蘭公司有難
．實在的商人
．合作初步
．「英國荷蘭」公司
．戴特定之勝利
．薩姆耳讓步
．「前進美國！」
．俄羅斯動亂
．回到俄羅斯
第七章 波斯的蓽路藍縷
．達西先生
．俄羅斯與英國之爭
．第一步
．無錢逼死英雄漢
．「愛國者企業機構」
．蘇里曼寺
．德黑蘭革命爆發
．與時間賽跑
．英國波斯公司
第八章 英國搏命之賭
．「石油教父」
．海軍競賽
．邱吉爾登場
．要快！
．有請將軍
．殼牌威脅
．支援英波公司
．石油的勝戰
第二部 二十世紀開始：風雲全球
第九章 勝利的活血﹕第一次世界大戰
．出租汽車大隊
．坦克的由來
．空戰與海戰
．英波公司與殼牌之爭
．石油短缺
．能源沙皇
．破壞任務
．巴庫
．石油波濤
第十章 開放中東：土耳其石油公司
．百分之五先生
．第一目標
．克里孟梭的雜貨舖
．合併﹖
．邱吉爾再登場
．石油短缺與開放門戶
．堤戈爾老大
．伊拉克的費瑟
．策劃人
．「紅線協議」
第十一章 短缺與過剩﹕汽油陣仗
．「旅行的世紀」
．加油
．茶壺風暴
．上校與自由公債
．技術革新
．大亨
．又一波石油潮
．競爭再起
．合併風吹
第十二章 中南美洲上台
．墨西哥的黃金大道
．戈梅士將軍的委瑞內拉「花園」
．對決布爾什維克
．聯合陣線
．價格之戰
第十三章 熱油與羅斯福
．黑巨人
．無政府狀態
．改革家
．政府法案
．穩定局面
第十四章 協議‧要點‧備忘錄
．凱德門爵士
．石油業的問題
．敵乎友乎
．國家主義
．國王新條件
．墨西哥戰役
．深沉之創傷
第十五章 你聽過「阿拉伯石油」嗎﹖
．巴林的買主
．紹德國王
．不聽話的英國人
．談判
．科威特
．「百分之百」
．「藍線協議」
．大發現
第三部 第二次大戰：勝負的主宰
第十六章 戰爭與石油：日本之路
．「吾人該信任日本嗎﹖」
．亞洲新秩序
．「隔離」
．日美交手第一回合
．暴風雨前的寧靜
．山本五十六的賭局
．禁運
．「不能再忍受了」
．必敗之戰
．珍珠港
．一項大錯
第十七章 戰爭與石油：德國之路
．化學解決法
．備戰
．「我這些將軍不懂戰爭的經濟層面」
．布勞行動
．隆美爾與後勤官
．德式工業發展
．戰略空軍首要目標
．突出部之役
．「諸神的黃昏」
第十八章 失去石油的艦隊
．如何迎敵
．日本的目標
．「商船之役」﹕消耗戰
．「保住艇隊毫無意義」
．日本海軍之末日
．戰到底
．救護車
第十九章 失去石油的坦克
．石油沙皇：動員美國石油
．海上考驗﹕大西洋之役
．國內推動
．曲紆式的配給
．革新
．巴頓的時機
第四部 碳氫化合時代：新角色與新危機
第二十章 英美的中東心結
．盟國之援
．「我們的油快用完了！」
．國營石油
．石油舌戰
．配額與卡特爾
．雙胞兄弟
．協議中止
第二十一章 戰後石油秩序
．阿美石油公司與「阿拉伯風險」
．擦掉紅線
．可以堆到月球的話
．科威特
．伊朗
．歐洲能源危機
．阿拉伯縱貫輸油管
．沙烏地：不遠而親密
．能源獨立之結束
第二十二章 五五平分交易法
．地主與佃戶
．石油新法
．中立地帶
．保羅‧蓋堤
．億萬富翁
．不可避免的退讓
．分水嶺
第二十三章 巴勒維國王
．最後機會
．老莫，老落伍
．Y計劃
．哈莫曼奇遇記
．英國佬不退
．拿出強硬態度
．老莫成敗
．重組財團公司
．石油卡特爾案
．成立合股公司
第二十四章 蘇彝士危機
．民族主義英雄
．納瑟行動
．不願被掐死
．歷史重演
．動武
．無油的煎熬
．油援計劃
．艾登爵士退場
．超級油輪對輸油管
．言歸於好
第二十五章 大象、馬泰‧阿封索
．恩利珂‧馬泰
．馬泰最大的一戰
．日本到中東
．不分國籍
．納瑟聲勢日隆
．裴瑞茲‧阿封索
．紅酋長
．競爭壓力
．阿拉伯石油會議
．萬妲‧亞卜隆斯基
第二十六章 石油輸出國組織誕生
．董事長作風
．組織誕生
．六○年代的油國組織
．新拓油源──更多的「大象」
．利比亞的暴利
．馬泰最後一戰
．新的競爭對手
．走鋼索──伊朗與沙烏地阿拉伯之爭
．獨立石油傻瓜
．國家安全與進口限額
．布朗斯維大迴轉
第二十七章 碳氫化合人
．石化與塑膠
．煤王讓位
．殺手霧的消失
．日本富強
．歐洲競爭
．追逐消費者
．美國新景觀
．危機復現
．煤業理事會的預言家
第五部 關鍵年代：世界霸權之爭
第二十八章 油國與油公司之爭
．英美撤退
．二十年過剩期結束
．環保衝擊
．阿拉斯加「大象」
．博士
．利比亞壓榨
．節節高升
．合夥
．關鍵年代
第二十九章 石油可以是武器了
．美國加入世界市場
．「狼來了」
．沙達特之賭
．費瑟變卦
．緊張不安的領袖
．石油壓力
．不再談判
．沙達特奇襲
．急援以色列
．禁運
．水門事件
．警戒
第三十章 禁運啟示錄
．估計損失
．油源恐慌
．政府困窘
．有難同當
．油價看俏
．結盟無情
．收起石油武器
第三十一章 告別採油權
．石油與世界經濟
．兩強對峙
．亞曼尼
．美國策略
．科威特﹕無優待
．委內瑞拉：溫和式
．沙烏地阿拉伯：主客兩便
第三十二章 調適
．各國反應
．猥褻的利潤
．美國能源政策
．另一波投資
．新油藏﹕阿拉斯加與墨西哥
．北海﹕最大的一賭
．「大難」
第三十三章 二度震撼：大恐慌
．反感與反對
．以亂制暴
．亂象當道
．血流成河
．「我疲倦了，需要休息」
．最後一人
．恐慌開始
．不可抗力
．市場遊戲
．危險年代
．卡特受困
．無招可使
．市場英雄
．世界危機
第三十四章 何梅尼與哈珊
．「消滅美國」
．攤販市場
．兩伊戰爭
．路途的終點
第三十五章 油公司的大合併
．治本之道
．卡特爾出擊
．海德公園的會
．石油企業轉型
．從雞蛋到石油
．新式石油戰
．布恩‧皮肯斯
．墨西哥週末
．來晚了三千萬年
．家務事
．大公司之死
．股東大贏
．新的安全保障
第三十六章 不同的問題：油價崩盤
．柴契爾夫人的決定
．油國組織的兩難
．市場佔有率
．三度石油震撼
．採取行動
．喬治、布希
．「我知道我是對的」
．「切腹」：十八元一桶
．「隨興所至」
．油價重建
．兩伊停火
結語 波灣戰爭之後
．伊拉克開戰
．波斯灣危機
．新的石油危機
．估算錯誤
．戰爭之母
．展望未來
．新秩序
．環保第三波
．石油世紀
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