《秩序的起源》(The Origins of Political Order) /訪談 Francis Fukuyama (2011)

  Francis Fukuyama的《歷史的終結與最後的人》、《信任》、《秩序的起源》等書都有漢譯.

政治秩序的起源

副標題:從前人類時代到法國大革命
原作名: The Origins of Political Order
作者 : [美]弗朗西斯·福山
譯者 : 毛俊傑
出版社:廣西師範大學出版社
出版年: 2012-10-20
頁數: 576
定價: 68.00元

內容簡介 · · · · · ·

成功的現代自由民主制，將強大的國家、法治和負責制政府三種機制結合在穩定的平衡中。 那麼，這三種機構最初來自何方？ 是什麼力量驅使它們誕生？ 又在何等條件下得到發展？ 建立的順序如何？ 彼此間有何關係？
當代最重要的政治思想家之一弗朗西斯•福山，為我們提供了一幅今日政治機構是如何從歷史中發展出來的全面畫卷。 《政治秩序的起源》（第一卷），把對政治秩序的探討向前延伸到人類的靈長目祖先，然後依次講述人類部落社會的出現，第一個現代國家在中國的生長，法治在印度和中東的開始，一直到法國大革命前夕問責制政府在歐洲的發展。 《政治秩序的起源》是一次嚴密的嘗試，力圖通過多學科的綜合研究，形成對人類歷史的概覽，建立一個理解政治制度演化的宏大框架。
本書第二卷將延伸到當代，敬請期待。

作者簡介 · · · · · ·

弗朗西斯·福山Francis Fukuyama 日裔美籍學者，哈佛大學政治學博士，現任美國斯坦福大學弗里曼·斯伯格里國際問題研究所奧利弗·諾梅里尼高級研究員，此前曾任教於約翰·霍普金斯大學尼茲 高等國際研究院、喬治·梅森大學公共政策學院，曾任美國國務院政策企劃局副局長、蘭德公司研究員。 著有《歷史的終結與最後的人》、《信任》、《十字路口上的美國》等。 現居加利福尼亞。

目錄 · · · · · ·

序言/ 001
第一部分國家之前

第1 章政治的必需/ 003
第2 章自然狀態/ 026
第3 章表親的專橫/ 048
第4 章部落社會的財產、正義、戰爭/ 063
第5 章“利維坦”的降臨/ 079
第二部分國家建設

第6 章中國的部落制/ 097
第7 章戰爭和中國國家的興起/ 109
第8 章偉大的漢朝制度/ 125
第9 章政治衰退和家族政府的複闢/ 135
第10 章印度的彎路/ 146
第11 章瓦爾納和迦提/ 158
第12 章印度政體的弱點/ 171
第13 章奴隸制與穆斯林走出部落制/ 185
第14 章馬穆魯克挽救伊斯蘭教/ 198
第15 章奧斯曼帝國的運作和衰退/ 210
第16 章基督教打破家庭觀念/ 225
第三部分法治

第17 章法治的起源/ 241
第18 章教會變為國家/ 257
第19 章國家變為教會/ 271
第20 章 東方專制主義/ 286
第21 章 “坐寇” / 299
第四部分負責制政府

第22 章 政治負責制的興起/ 315
第23 章 尋租者/ 329
第24 章 家族化跨越大西洋/ 347
第25 章 易北河以東/ 365
第26 章 更完美的專制主義/ 378
第27 章 徵稅和代表權/ 394
第28 章 負責製或專制主義？ / 413
第五部分 邁向政治發展理論第

29 章 政治發展和政治衰敗/ 429
第30 章 政治發展的過去和現在/ 449
註釋/ 475
參考文獻/ 553
致謝/ 575

2011.6.15
與弗朗西斯•福山共進午餐Lunch with the FT: Francis Fukuyama作者：英國《金融時報》首席經濟評論員馬丁•沃爾夫

Francis Fukuyama is late. We have agreed to meet at Roast, a quintessentially English restaurant in Borough Market, just five minutes from the Financial Times's London office. I arrive on time at 12.30pm and am shown to a relatively quiet table. After 10 minutes I become anxious. Maybe Professor ​​Fukuyama expected to meet me at the office. I call the FT reception and am relieved to learn he is not waiting for me. I sip the water and wait.弗朗西斯•福山(Francis Fukuyama)遲到了。我們約好在Roast餐廳見面，那是位於巴臘鮮貨市場(Borough Market)的一個典型的英國餐廳，離英國《金融時報》倫敦辦公室僅5分鐘路程。中午12:30，我準時到達，而後被引到一個較為安靜的位置上。 10分鐘後，我開始緊張起來。也許福山以為我們要在辦公室見面？我給英國《金融時報》前台打了個電話，得知他沒有在那裡等我，才鬆了一口氣，一邊喝著水，一邊等待。
Fukuyama, slight, short and dressed in a respectable grey suit and tie, arrives 20 minutes late, apologising profusely, saying his publicist had not realised how long it would take to reach the restaurant. The American writer and academic is in London to publicise his new book, The Origins of Political Order, about the development of political institutions throughout history. (This is such a large subject that Fukuyama is tackling it in two volumes with the first covering From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution.)20分鐘後，福山來了。他纖弱、瘦小，穿著一件得體的灰西裝，打著領帶，口中連連道歉，說他的公關人員沒有意識到來餐廳需要這麼長時間。這位美國作家兼學者來倫敦，是為了宣傳他的新書——《秩序的起源》(The Origins of Political Order)。這本書講述的是古往今來政治制度的發展歷程。 （這個話題太大了，福山分了兩卷來講，第一卷的時間範圍是史前時代到法國大革命。）
I have known Fukuyama, who is 58, for some time. In 2006, I delivered a series of lectures for him at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC, where he was Professor ​​of International Policy Economy before his move last year to Stanford University.福山現年58歲，我認識他有些年頭了。 2006年，在華盛頓特區的約翰斯•霍普金斯大學(Johns Hopkins University)，我為他客串講過一系列課程。那時，他是那裡的國際政策經濟學(International Policy Economy)教授。去年，他去了斯坦福大學(Stanford University).
We agree to forgo wine and starters and he chooses chicken and bacon pie while I have already picked the day's special, meat carved from a whole roasted lamb.
我們就放棄葡萄酒和頭盤達成了一致，他選了雞肉培根派，而我已經點了當日特供——去骨全烤小羔羊肉。
We start with the news of Dominique Strauss-Kahn's arrest, which has just broken. “Isn't that an amazing story?” Fukuyama says. “Even if it was an entrapment of some sort, the way he responded, if it's even remotely true, it's just unbelievable.”
我們的談話從剛剛爆出的多米尼克•斯特勞斯-卡恩(Dominique Strauss-Kahn)被捕的新聞開始。福山說：“這個故事真不可思議，不是嗎？即便真如他本人回應所暗示的，是某種陷阱，只要還有那麼一點點真實性，那就是不可想像的。”The food arrives quickly and I tuck into my excellent lamb while Fukuyama eats slowly as he thinks about his answers. (Later on he still has food in front of him long after I have finished but waves away the waiters who want to remove it.)
菜上得很快，我埋頭大吃我點的美味羔羊肉，而福山吃得很慢，邊吃邊思考怎麼回答問題。 （後來，我吃完很久以後，他面前還有食物，但當服務員過來想撤盤時，他揮揮手阻止了。）Fukuyama is best known for his book The End of History and the Last Man (1992) in which he stated that liberal democracy was the only way to run a modern state. I get the impression that his support for democracy is now much more conditional than he thought then.
福山最有名的一本書是《歷史的終結及最後之人》(The End of History and the Last Man)(1992)。他在書中指出，自由主義民主是治理現代國家的唯一方式。我有一種感覺，現在他對民主的支持，有著比以往嚴苛得多的前提條件。He says: “The way I feel right now is that it's an open question which system is going to do better in the next while – a high quality authoritarian one or a deadlocked, paralysed, democratic one, with lots of checks and balances? Over the long run, it will be easier to sustain a system with checks and balances, precisely because the checks and balances permit adaptation. You can get rid of a bad leader.
他說：“我現在的感覺是，下一段時期哪種制度會運行得更好——是高質量的威權制度，還是一個陷入僵局的、癱瘓的、有許多制約與平衡的民主制度，這是個有待討論的問題。從長期來看，有許多製約與平衡的製度更容易維持，這恰恰是因為製約與平衡允許（制度進行）調整。你可以擺脫一個不好的領袖。”“And, then I think that the normative dimension comes into play because an authoritarian state doesn't recognise ​​the dignity of its citizens. That makes me dislike the system but, more importantly, it's the weakness of the system because, at a certain point , the anger of people at being treated in this fashion will spill over.”
“然後，我又想到，引入規範的維度，是因為威權國家沒有認可其公民的尊嚴。這讓我厭惡這種制度，但更重要的是，這是這種制度的弱點——因為人民對於受到如此待遇的怒火，會在某個時點爆發。”
Nevertheless, he goes on, “in many ways, Asian government, not just China, but Singapore and in an earlier day, Japan and South Korea, had governments that looked more like a corporate board of governance because there's no downward accountability whatever. You don't have to deal with constituents ... You run the whole country like a corporation, and I think that's one of their advantages at the moment.”儘管如此，他繼續說道：“在許多方面，亞洲​​的政府——不僅是中國，也包括新加坡、以及早期的日本和韓國，看上去更像公司治理中的董事會，因為它們絲毫不需要向下負責。你不需要應付選民……你像經營公司一樣經營一個國家，而我認為這在現階段是他們的一個優勢。”
hc評: "at the moment.”的翻譯可能是錯的 Francis Fukuyama可能意指" (過去)當時"....

 Turning to China, Fukuyama says: “One of the advantages of their form of authoritarianism is that they concluded after Mao that they would never again allow a single individual to exert that kind of domination over their system, and that's why they have term limits. That's why all of the decisions have to be taken collectively. But, in the end, that system is also going to have its inefficiencies.”話題轉到中國，福山說：“中國威權制度的優勢之一，在於他們在毛澤東之後得出一個結論，即絕不再允許任何個人對制度握有如此的主宰權，這就是為什麼他們有了任期限制。這就是為什麼所有的決策都必須是集體決策。但是，最終，那種制度也會失去效率。”
Yet it soon becomes clear that he does not think much of the US political system either. “Just look at the way that interest groups in the United States have a veto on the simplest kinds of reforms,” he says. “We allow mortgage interest deduction regardless of how expensive the house is. Why is that the case? Because we have a rea​​l estate industry that says, 'Don't even think about changing this.' ”然而很快我就發現，他也並不認為美國的政治制度很好。 “只要看一看美國那些利益集團對哪怕程度最低的一點改革都予以否決的情形就知道了。我們允許貸款利息扣減，而不管房價已經多麼高。為什麼會這樣？因為我們的房地產業說：'改變這個？想都不要想。'”
The question he asks in the new book is how the modern state emerged. Fukuyama defines such states by three characteristics: formal bureaucratic institutions; the rule of law; and accountability. He ignores the west's classical antiquity and starts, instead, with the emergence of the Chinese bureaucratic state. Why did he do that?他在新書中提出的問題是，現代國家是怎樣產生的。福山用三個特徵來定義現代國家：正式的官僚制度、法治和問責制。他忽略了西方古典主義的古代時期，轉而從中國官僚國家的產生說起？理由何在？
“The problem with the classic eurocentric approach is that the archetype that we had been using, the history of England, is a weird experience. I don't think that it should be regarded as a model.”“傳統的歐洲中心論的切入點存在一個問題，即我們一直在採用的範型——英國歷史，是一段奇怪的經歷。我認為它不應當被視為典型。”
So what makes China's history unique? “It's not unique,”​​ he replies. “Everybody eventually gets to this form of modern bureaucratic state. But the Chinese invented a civil service exam already in the third century BC.” They got to the modern state first.
那麼中國歷史的獨特之處從何而來呢？ “它不獨特，”福山回答說。 “每個國家都會逐漸到達這種現代官僚國家形式。但中國早在公元前3世紀就發明了官員選拔考試。”他們率先進入了現代國家。
Fast forward. What explains the west's primacy over the past two centuries? Was that an accident of relatively recent history, as revisionist historians argue, or did it reflect longer-term advantages? He is in the latter, more traditional school. “The invention of the scientific method, its institutionalisation in universities, the creation of an ongoing system for exploring nature and then commercialising the results of those things. It's an intersection of ideas and social institutions that gels in Europe, sometime in the 17th and 18th centuries.”
快進一下。那過去兩百年間西方國家的領先地位又如何解釋呢？這是較近期歷史的一個意外（如歷史修正派的觀點），還是反應了一些長遠的優越性？福山支持更傳統的後一個學派。 “科學方法的發明、及其在大學的製度化、探索自然隨後對結果進行商業化的製度的發明與發展。這都是思想與社會體制的一種交匯——於17、18世紀的某一段時期在歐洲逐漸成形。”
So, I ask, now that China is catching up so fast, is it also going to contribute proportionately to the global stock of innovation?
於是我問道，鑑於現在中國正在快速趕上，那麼它對全球創新之庫的貢獻，是否也會同比例增長呢？
“This gets into the realm of ideas much more than is in my book. But one thing that's always struck me is that there is no high level of abstraction in the Chinese religion or Chinese thought. The idea that there are hidden forces, which are universal, like gravity, which apply throughout the universe, is very western. Chinese religion is particularistic. And I think to this day, if you think about high-level theory, it's still not coming from Asia.”
“這所涉及的思想領域遠遠超出了我書中所探討的範圍。但有一點一直讓我印象深刻——中國的宗教和思想中沒有高水平的抽象。存在像萬有引力這樣隱藏的、普遍的、放之四海而皆準的力量，這樣的想法是非常西式的。中國的宗教是具象的。並且我認為，直到今天，如果你想一想，會發現高水平的理論仍然不是來自亞洲。 ”
He has finally finished the pie. We decline pudding but order a double espresso for me and green tea for him as the table is swiftly cleared.
他終於吃完了他的派。我們謝絕了布丁，但因為桌子很快空了，我又點了一杯雙份意式濃縮咖啡，他點了一杯綠茶。
I note that the west increasingly has the inverse of the traditional Chinese view of intellectual authority. On many subjects – climate change, for example – we think the views of the vast mass of the people count for more than the weight of scientific opinion. Authority counts for almost nothing.我指出，在看待學術權威方面，西方與傳統中國的觀點越來越相左。在很多問題上（例如氣候變化問題），我們認為大多數人的意見比科學家的意見分量更重。權威幾乎一文不值。
He agrees. “That's actually a big problem in western public administration because I think good governance is a kind of aristocratic phenomenon. And, we don't like deference to experts and we don't like delegating authority to experts. Therefore, we ring them around with all of these rules, which limit their discretion, because we don't trust them. The disease has gone furthest in the United States.” His view seems to be that the world is caught between too little democracy in the east and too much in the west.他表示贊同。 “這實際上是西方公共管理中的一個大問題，因為我認為，良好的治理是某種貴族現象。而且，我們不喜歡遵從專家的意見，我們也不喜歡賦予專家權威。因此，我們用各種各樣的規則圈住他們，限制他們的決定權——因為我們不信任他們。這種病在美國為害最深。”他似乎認為，東方的民主太少，西方的民主太多，而世界受困於其中。
We turn to Fukuyama's forthcoming second volume, which will bring the story up to the present day. ​​“There are several issues that I want to deal with. One of them is the one we're talking about, the history of corruption in government. If you looked at public administration in the United States or in Britain, in the early 1800s, it was as bad as very many developing countries today, and [the former] have somehow evolved into much more impersonal forms of government. So, one thing I want to talk about is the whole history of how that happened.”
話題轉換到了即將出版的第二卷。在第二卷中，福山將討論當下的情況。 “有幾個問題是我想探討的。其中之一就是我們正在談論的政府腐敗的歷史。如果你觀察一下19世紀早期美國或英國的公共管理，就會發現和今天許多發展中國家的狀況一樣糟糕，然而（前者）已經以某種方式演化出了更加非人格化的政府形式。所以，我想談的一個問題就是這種現象發生的全部歷史。”
Another big development, I suggest, is the reaction against elites we had just been discussing, which is so strong in the US. “That's right, and it has a lot of different roots but it's certainly most profound in the United States. The Tea Party comes out of this tradition, started by Andrew Jackson. Andrew Jackson gets elected in 1828. He says, 'We won the election, why should we let these elites run the country?' You get the modern echoes of this with Sarah Palin, who is popular precisely because she didn't go to Harvard, and she's up against a president who did go to Harvard. Every single European country, including all of these squeaky clean Scandinavian ones, now have rightwing populist parties.我提出，另一個重大發展恐怕是我們剛才一直在談論的對精英的逆反，這一點在美國極為明顯。 “的確如此，而且這種現像有不同的根源，但在美國肯定最根深蒂固。'茶黨'(Tea Party)運動就起源於這種傳統，肇始於安德魯•傑克遜(Andrew Jackson)。安德魯•傑克遜1828年當選總統後，曾經說過，'我們贏得了大選，為什麼要讓那些精英治理國家？'從莎拉•佩林(Sarah Palin)身上就能看到這種觀念的現代版本。莎拉•佩林之所以受到歡迎，恰恰是因為她沒有上過哈佛(Harvard)，卻與一個上過哈佛的總統競爭。每一個歐洲國家，包括曾經純潔無瑕的斯堪的納維亞半島國家，現在都存在右翼的民粹主義政黨。
“The other important part of this is not just about the development of western societies but about the rest, because in the 200 years from the end of volume one [of The Origins of Political Order], all of these well-developed institutions in the west run smack into the traditional institutions in every other part of the world. Understanding why some parts of that non-western world emerge from this collusion intact, and actually do well, like east Asia, and other parts [of the world] were completely undermined is very important.“其中另一個重要部分，不僅關於西方社會的發展，還關於其他地區的發展，因為在（《政治秩序的起源》一書）第一卷結束之後的200年中，所有這些在西方充分發展的制度，都與傳統制度在世界上的每一個角落產生了激烈的碰撞。為什麼非西方世界的一些地區能夠安然經受住這種碰撞，而且竟然狀況良好，比如東亞；而另一些地區卻體無完膚？理解這個問題是十分重要的。
“The Japanese, for example, who were early on the most successful in adapting to this collusion with the west, didn't do it simply by taking western institutions. They actually kept their own traditions.
“比如，早期而言，日本是在與西方制度的碰撞中調適得最成功的國家。日本並沒有簡單地接納西方制度，而是保留了很多自身的傳統。
“If you look at a country like Pakistan, which is the most dangerous place in the world right now, and you cut one level below the surface of these supposedly democratic institutions, what you see is this hierarchy of kinships, led by feudal lords that have serfs working on their territory. They run this country by patronage networks. That's why democracy has never worked well there, and so it's an extremely traditional country in that sense – one in which patronage and kinship are the story of politics.”“如果你看一下巴基斯坦這樣的國家，那裡現在是世界上最危險的地方，如果你透過看似民主的製度再向下挖掘一層，就會看到等級森嚴的宗族，由封建領主掌管，農奴們在他們的領地上勞作。他們靠庇蔭網絡治理國家。這就是民主在巴基斯坦從來沒有正常運作過的原因，所以巴基斯坦在這個意義上講是一個極為傳統的國家，是一個庇蔭網絡和宗族勢力決定政治的國家​​。”
I suggest that in sub-Saharan Africa it is also about states that don't have any historical roots. “It's worse than that”, he responds, “because the European colonialists, unlike in places like Hong Kong or India, did not give them strong institutions. They decided to do colonialism on the cheap. They set up the system of indirect rule, which empowers a lot of local strong men, and then they left after a relatively short period, and they also saddled the new countries with irrational borders.”我指出，撒哈拉沙漠以南的非洲國家，大概也都是沒有任何歷史根基的國家。他回答說：“比那還糟。歐洲殖民者並沒有像在香港和印度那樣給它們建立有力的製度，而只是進行成本低廉的殖民。他們建立了間接統治體制，培植了許多本土強勢人物，接著在相對較短的一段時間以後就抽身而去。他們還給這些國家強加了不合理的邊界。”
I turn to the big political event of the day: the Arab uprising. How optimistic is he about that? Not very, I assume.我又提到了當下的重大政治事件，阿拉伯世界的動盪。他對此持多麼​​樂觀的看法？我猜想不會特別樂觀。
“Well, first of all, I'm really delighted that it happened because you'll never get democracy unless you have popular mobilisation. Everybody thought that somehow Arabs could not do this and now they've shown that they can do this. But I think it just takes time to create institutions and, right now, the most outward-looking, democratic, tolerant, liberal people are poorly organised. They have no experience. Civil society was suppressed, so all of these things that support strong democratic institutions aren't there.”“首先，發生這樣的事，我真的很欣喜，因為除非通過民眾動員，否則你永遠也無法實現民主。所有人都認為，出於這樣或那樣的原因，阿拉伯人做不到這一點，然而現在他們顯示了自己能做到。不過我覺得把製度建立起來需要時間，現在這群最嚮往外部世界、崇尚民主、寬容、熱愛自由的人們組織性很差。他們沒有經驗。公民社會受到壓制，因此所有支撐強大民主制度的事物都不存在。”
China, however, is moving rapidly towards a modern economy and I ask Fukuyama how prosperity will affect its political order.然而中國正朝著現代經濟體的方向快速前進，我問福山，經濟繁榮會如何影響其政治秩序。
“I think that this is one of the big drivers of democracy that are missed by people that just look at the economic conditions,” he says. “If you are a poor peasant, all you're worried about is getting food on the table for your family. But as you get more educated, you can worry about things like, 'Does my government allow me to participate?' Your world outlook then changes. There's no reason why this shouldn't happen in China.”他說：“我認為它是民主的重要推動力之一，這一點往往被只觀察經濟狀況的人所忽視。如果你是個貧窮的農民，你考慮的事情就只有為家人掙到盤中餐而已。但在隨著接受的教育更多，你就會考慮諸如'我的政府​​是否允許我參與'之類的問題，你的世界觀也會隨之改變。沒有理由認為中國不會發生同樣的事。”
I am concerned we are running out of time but he reassures me that his publicist will come to collect him when our time is up. He ploughs on: “I think you're right that when you got a whole country of 800m college educated middle class people, you can't run this thing in a very paternalistic, top-down fashion. The big problem is these same people could be motivated by nationalism – there's a lot of other ways of mobilising people.”我擔心我們的時間快到了，但他讓我放心，說時間到了公關人員會過來接他。他繼續講道：“我認為你是對的，如果一個國家有8億接受過大學教育的中產階級，就不能以家長式的、自上而下的方式治理國家。重要的問題是，這同一群人也可能受到民族主義的鼓動——動員人民的方式還有很多。”
He adds a darker note: “What's scary is that the military have got this completely different narrative of the 20th century, that puts them at the centre of Chinese nationalism and Chinese identity, and they seem to be increasingly driving Chinese foreign policy.”他又用一種更晦暗的口氣補充道：“可怕的是軍方對20世紀有著完全不同的闡釋，使他們自身被置於中國民族主義和中國身份認同的中心位置，而且他們似乎在日益掌控著中國的外交政策。”
I respond by discussing the situation in the US, where you get populist politicians. Barack Obama is a rea​​sonable, rational, low-key sort of human being, I suggest, about as good as you could hope for. But, I say, it's not difficult to imagine somebody coming to power – particularly if the economy doesn't recover very well, which is quite likely – with a very different agenda.我又轉而開始討論美國的情況，美國的確存在民粹主義政客。我指出，巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)是一個理智、理性、低調的人，幾乎符合人們一切美好的期望。不過我說，想像一個政治主張截然不同的人當選也並不是很難，尤其是如果經濟復甦表現不佳的話，而這種可能性相當大。
“That's right”, he says. “But I do think Obama's going to get re-elected.” But, with that, it is time to wrap up. I leave and he heads off to meet his publicist.“沒錯，”他說。 “不過我確實認為奧巴馬能夠連任。”可惜談到這裡時間到了，我起身離開，他則去與公關人員會面。
Martin Wolf is the FT's chief economics commentator
馬丁•沃爾夫(Martin Wolf)是英國《金融時報》首席經濟評論員
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