The University of Iowa has created the first interactive map of Wittgenstein's Tractatus to provide a way of looking at the book's overall structure, as well as parallel access to the earlier versions of the text in the Prototractatus. Go and explore!
Wittgenstein came to believe that words did not provide a picture of life. They were more like tools—like handles.
When Wittgenstein returned to philosophy, the idea that drove him beyond all others was that the nature of language had been misunderstood by philosophers.
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回憶維特根斯坦
原作名: Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir 作者 :[美]諾爾曼·馬爾康姆譯者 : 李步樓 / 賀紹甲出版社:商務印書館出版年1984
這本小書有點意思
本書由三部分構成：馮·賴特寫的“傳略”，馬爾康姆寫的“回憶”，馬爾康姆收到的維特根斯坦來信的全文以及註釋。馬爾康姆是維特根斯坦的學生和摯友。這部書對研究維特根斯坦的生活和思想有重要的幫助。
目錄
第二版前言（馬爾康姆）
傳略（馮·賴特）
回憶（馬爾康姆）
維特根斯坦致馬爾康姆的信
Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung by Ludwig Wittgenstein維根斯坦
張申府譯，登北京《哲學評論》，1929??
《邏輯哲學論》郭英譯，北京 商務印書館，1962
《明理論》牟宗三譯，台北學生書局，1987
《哲學探討》郭英譯，台北 海國書局，1987再版
邏輯哲學論 郭英譯 北京:商務 1962
名理論 牟宗三譯 台北:學生 1987
lOGISCH-PHILOSOPHISCHE ABHANDLUNG by Luwig Wittgenstein, 1922
Subject:
Tractatus Motto
Wittgenstein places a motto at the very beginning of the Tractatus
Kurnberger wrote:
Motto:...and whatever a man knows, whatever is not mere rumbling and roaring that he has heard, can be said in three words.
郭譯: ......人所知道的一切不僅僅是狂風怒號和咆哮的東西 都可以用三句話來說完
牟譯: .......而不管是什麼 凡人所知的 不管是什麼 凡不只是其所聽得的隆隆聲與咆哮聲 大皆可以三言說之
Anybody know the three words in question?
rumble, luggage
**...A less recent but possibly related conversation took place during the viva voce exam Ludwig Wittgenstein was given by Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore in Cambridge in 1929. Wittgenstein was formally presenting his “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,” an already well-known work he had written in 1921, as his doctoral thesis. Russell and Moore were respectfully suggesting that they didn’t quite understand proposition 5.4541 when they were abruptly cut off by the irritable Wittgenstein. “I don’t expect you to understand!” (I am relying on local legend here; Ray Monk’s biography of Wittgenstein has him, in a more clubbable way, slapping them on the back and bringing proceedings cheerfully to a close with the words, “Don’t worry, I know you’ll never understand it.”)
I have always thought of Wittgenstein’s line as (a) admittedly, a little tetchy (or in the Monk version condescending) but (b) expressing enviable self-confidence and (c) impressively devoid of deference (I’ve even tried to emulate it once or twice, but it never comes out quite right). But if autism can be defined, at one level, by a lack of understanding (verbal or otherwise), it is at least plausible that Wittgenstein is making (or at least implying) a broadly philosophical proposition here, rather than commenting, acerbically, on the limitations of these particular interlocutors. He could be read as saying:
Thank you, gentlemen, for raising the issue of understanding here. The fact is, I don’t expect people in general to understand what I have written. And it is not just because I have written something, in places, particularly cryptic and elliptical and therefore hard to understand, or even because it is largely a meta-discourse and therefore senseless, but rather because, in my view, it is not given to us to achieve full understanding of what another person says. Therefore I don’t expect you to understand this problem of misunderstanding either.
If Wittgenstein was making a statement along these lines, then it would provide an illuminating perspective in which to read the “Tractatus.” The persistent theme within it of “propositions which say nothing,” which we tend to package up under the heading of “the mystical,” would have to be rethought. Rather than clinging to a clear-cut divide between all these propositions ─ over here, the well-formed and intelligible (scientific) and over there, the hazy, dubious and mystical (aesthetic or ethical) ─ we might have to concede that, given the way humans interact with one another, there is always a potential mystery concealed within the most elementary statement. And it is harder than you think it is going to be to eliminate, entirely, the residue of obscurity, the possibility of misunderstanding lurking at the core of every sentence. Sometimes Wittgenstein thinks he has solved the problem, at others not (“The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem,” he writes in “Tractatus.”) What do we make of those dense, elegiac and perhaps incomprehensible final lines, sometimes translated as “Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must remain silent”? Positioned as it is right at the end of the book (like “the rest is silence” at the end of “Hamlet”), proposition number 7 is apt to be associated with death or the afterlife. But translating it yet again into the sort of terms a psychologist would readily grasp, perhaps Wittgenstein is also hinting: “I am autistic” or “I am mindblind.” Or, to put it another way, autism is not some exotic anomaly but rather a constant.
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/beyond-understanding/
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