2015年10月7日 星期三

Carl Schmitt《政治的概念》。 A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought






卡爾施米特的政治的概念
[德]卡尔·施米特著:《政治的概念》,刘宗坤等译,上海人民出版社2004年

政治的概念》由下述標紅的各篇/書所組成:

译者: 刘宗坤
作者: (德)施米特
出版社: 上海人民出版社
出版年: 2004-
本书共收入影响深远的论著6篇,另有3篇附录共计9篇论著,6篇论著按出版年代先后顺序排列分别为“政治的神学”、“罗马天主教与政治形式”、“政治的概 念”、“合法性与正当性”、“游击队理论”、“政治的神学续篇”。本书的出版为国内学界提供了研究施米特的政治法学,进入西方政治思想史的纵深并对其审慎 思索的机会。
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政治的浪漫派
译者: 冯克利/刘锋
作者: (德)施米特
出版社: 上海人民出版社
出版年: 2004-08-01
《政治浪漫派》一书由《政治的浪漫派》和《当今议会制的思想史状况》两部分组成。前一部分主要阐述施米特对德国浪漫主义的基本看法,他从德国知识分子的现 实处境出发,讨论浪漫派在思想史上的位置,阐明了浪漫派对现实社会生活的基本看法,并表明了它的本质是一种关于政治的趣味。《当今议会制的思想史状况》同 样是从现实问题入手,揭示自由民主的议会制在思想史上的形而上学基础。总得来说,本书着力在思想史的脉络里整理弥漫整个欧洲的浪漫主义精神以及自由民主的 议会制度。是一本不可多得的思想史力作。

宪法学说
作者: [ 德 ]卡尔·施米特
出版社: 上海人民出版社
出版年: 2005-07-01
民主共和究竟意味着什么?共和革命远不是仅仅为了制订一部成文宪法,它意味着一个政治统一体(民族国家)在特定政治处境中对自身的生存方式作出了新的政治 决断,或者说为如何在新的政治生存处境中形成新的政治统一体重新作出了一次决断──随后的制宪(制订具体的宪法法规),不过是这个政治统一体自觉选择的政 治行动。


论断与概念
译者: 朱雁兵
作者: 卡尔·施米特
出版社: 上海人民出版社
出版年: 2006-08-01
内容提要:
本书是《施米特文集》的第四集。与马克思一样,施米特不仅能针对现实历史的政治问题搞大学问,也是写实际政论的高手。《论断与概念》涉及的范围非常广泛, 包括公法(宪法和国际法)、政治思想史、国际和国内政治。施米特的政治斗争是从凡尔赛和约和魏玛宪法这两大事件开始的。正如《论断与概念》的标题所示,施 米特的政论立足于德国作为新兴民族国家的政治处境——在国际公法方面,德国受到凡尔赛和约和日内瓦协议等不平等国际条约的扼制,在国内公法方面,则面临因 魏玛宪政设计中的缺陷导致的国家分裂危机。
施米特生前自编过文集《论断与概念》,这本书论涉的范围要广泛得多,涉及公法(宪法和国际法)、政治思想史、国际和国内政治。施米特的政论从凡 尔赛协约和魏玛宪法这两大事件开始,立足于德国作为新兴民族国家的现代处境,从作为现代性问题的“德国问题”出发,纵横捭阖,针对国内政治思想的混乱、尤 其针对帝国主义对德国的压迫,展开了思想上的政治斗争。


目录:
中译本说明
第三版说明

1 政治神化论(1923)
2 现代民主制概念及其国家概念的关系(1924)
3 作为国际政治客体的莱因兰(1925)
4 现状与和平(1925)
5 日内瓦国际联盟的两张面孔(1926)
6 评梅内克的《国家理由观念》(1926)
7 议会主义与现代大众民主的对立(1926)
8 政治的概念(1927)
9 1849年柯特斯在柏林(1927)
10 民主与财政(1927)
11 国际联盟与欧洲(1928)
12 莱因地区的国际法问题(1928)
13 法西斯主义国家的本质和形成(1929)
14 无名的柯特斯(1929)
15 中立化与非政治化的时代(1929)
16 国家伦理与多元主义国家(1930)
17 转向总体国家(1931)
18 国家内政中立概念之不同涵义和功能概观(1931)
19 现代帝国主义的国际法形式(1932)
20 在莱比锡宪法法院审理普鲁士邦起诉民国政府案时的最后陈辞(1932)
21 总体国家在德国的进一步发展(1933)
22 帝国、国家、联邦(1933)
23 领袖守护法律(1934)
24 论普遍互助公约的内在逻辑(1935)
25 国际联盟的第七次变化(1936)
26 关于立法授权问题最近发展的比较性概观(1936)
27 论宪法史的新课题(1936)
28 总体敌人,总体战争,总体国家(1937)
29 海盗行为的概念(1937)
30 战争概念与敌人概念的关系(1938)
31 新的“哀哉,中立者”(1938)
32 国际法上的中立与民族的总体(1938)
33 论当今法律体制的两个大的“二元对立”(1939)
34 中立与中立化(1939)
35 以大空间对抗普世主义(1939)
36 国际法中的帝国概念(1939)
从囹圄获救——1945-1947年间的体验
与施普朗格的交谈(1945年夏)
答曼海姆的广播讲话(1945/1946年东)
浅说托克维尔的历史编纂(1946年夏)
两座坟茔(1946年8月25日)
从囹圄获救(1946年夏)
牢房的智慧(1947年4月)
花甲之年咏(1948年7月11日)
人名索引


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Wikipedia 的卡爾施米特相當不錯 (為我這初學者而言)


卡爾·施米特Carl Schmitt1888年7月11日1985年4月7日)是德國著名法學家和政治思想家。他的政治思想對20世紀政治哲學神學思想產生了重大影響,其中以決斷論為著;並提出了許多國家法學上的重要概念,例如制度性保障、實質法治國及法律與主權的關係。
施米特於1888年生於威斯特伐里亞普勒騰貝格的一個天主教家庭。
1916年,施米特於史特拉斯堡大學取得教授資格論文。
施米特與著名社會學家馬克斯·韋伯曾有所來往,其著作《羅馬天主教與政治形式》係受韋伯之《新教倫理與資本主義精神》之影響而寫就。
1924年,施米特於耶拿舉辦的德意志國家法教師協會(VVDStRL)年會發表《帝國憲法第四十八條下的帝國總統專政》(Die Diktatur des Reichspräsidenten nach Art. 48 der Reichsverfassung)。
1933年,施米特擔任柏林大學教授,同年加入納粹黨,並於其後被封為桂冠法學家(Kronjurist)。1936年後,施米特因其政治行止在納粹執政前後之差異而漸受部份政黨高層質疑,且受到黨衞軍機關報的攻擊,然而在戈林的斡旋下終保其性命。戰後,施米特因其納粹背景被剝奪於西德任教之權利。
1985年,施米特逝世於普勒騰貝格,並葬於其故鄉。

[編輯] 思想

[編輯] 決斷論

決斷論(Dezisionismus)是施米特的公法學理論中的一個重要概念,其理論之發展來自對法規範及其實踐間之斷裂的思考,並在之後推展至對霍布斯《利維坦》與歐洲國家理論之研究上。霍布斯之「權威,而非真理制定法」一言經常為施米特所引述以表彰其決斷論意涵。在《憲法學說》(Verfassungslehre)中,施米特認同西耶士(Sieyes)的「民族制憲權」學說[1],認為一個政治共同體的存在狀態是由其人民(Nation)全體所做出的政治性決斷。這種決斷所產生的結果就是一個政治共同體的政治秩序,即絕對的憲法(Verfassung),而非相對的「憲法法」(或稱「憲律」,Verfassungsgesetz)。

[編輯] 國民法治國

法治國(Rechtsstaat)為十九世紀德國國家法學 說中之主要思想。法治國的理念原型起源於十七至十八世紀,德國市民階層逐漸壯大的時期,後由德國法學家莫爾(Robert von Mohl)於其行政法著作中確立。如同理性的法(Recht)相對於自然之強力(Macht),法治國乃相對於絕對主義的強權國家 (Machtsstaat)。施米特主張法治國的實質為國民法治國(bürgerliche Rechtsstaat),即市民階層、資產階級的法治國。其具備兩個基本要素,即對國民的基本權利的保障以及對政府機構的權力分立的規定。這兩個要素為德國資產階級在對抗君主的鬥爭中發展出來,並成為現代多數國民法治國國家的內涵。

[編輯] 施米特著作年表

[編輯] 論文

  • 1912,《法律與裁判:法實踐問題研究》(Gesetz und Urteil. Eine Untersuchung zum Problem der Rechtspraxis
  • 1914,《國家的價值與個人的意義》(Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen
  • 1917/8,《法與權力》(Recht und Macht
  • 1925,《作為國際政治客體的萊因蘭》(Die Rheinlande als Objekt internationaler Politik
  • 1926,《法官的獨立性、私有財產的保障、法律面前的平等》(Unabhängigkeit der Richter, Gewährleistung des Privateigentums, Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz
  • 1931,《轉向總體國家》(Die Wendung zum totalen Staat
  • 1933,《作為民族社會主義法之基礎概念的領袖制》(Führertum als Grundbegriff des nationalsozialistischen Rechts
  • 1934,《領袖守護法律》(Der Führer schützt das Recht
  • 1935,《法治國概念爭論的意義為何?》(Was bedeutet der Streit um den Rechtsstaat?
  • 1943/44,《歐洲法學的基礎》(Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft

[編輯] 專著

  • 1910,《論保障與保障模式:一個術語學上的研究》(Über Schuld und Schuldarten. Eine terminologische Untersuchung
  • 1916,《多伯勒的長篇敘事詩〈北極光〉:三論其詩作的要素、精神和現實性》(Theodor Däublers ‚Nordlicht': Drei Studien über die Elemente, den Geist und die Aktualität des Werkes
  • 1917/8,《教會的可見性:經院學的思考》(Die Sichtbarkeit der Kirche: Eine scholastische Erwagung
  • 1919,《政治的浪漫派》(Politische Romantik
  • 1921,《論專政》(Die Diktatur. Von den Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf
  • 1922,《政治神學:主權學說四論》(Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität

《政治神學》書影
  • 1923,《羅馬天主教與政治形式》(Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form
  • 1927,《政治的概念》(Der Begriff des Politischen
  • 1928,《憲法學說》(Verfassungslehre
  • 1931,《憲法的守護者》(Der Hüter der Verfassung
  • 1932,《合法性與正當性》(Legalität und Legitimität
  • 1933,《國家、運動、人民:政治統一體的三個肢體》(Staat, Bewegung, Volk. Die Dreigliederung der politischen Einheit
  • 1934,《國家架構與第二帝國的崩潰:市民戰勝士兵》(Staatsgefuge und Zusammenbruch des zweiten Reiches - Der Sieg des Burgers uber den Soldaten
  • 1934,《論法學思維的三種模式》(Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens
  • 1938,《托馬斯‧霍布斯國家學說中的利維坦:一個政治符號的意義和失敗》(Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols
  • 1939,《禁止外部空間權力干涉的國際法大空間秩序》(Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung und Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte. Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht
  • 1940,《論斷與概念:1923-1939年與魏瑪、日內瓦、凡爾賽鬥爭中》(Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar – Genf – Versailles 1923 – 1939
  • 1942,《陸地與海洋:一個世界史的觀察》(Land und Meer. Eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung
  • 1948,《從囹圄獲救》(Ex Captivitate Salus
  • 1950,《歐洲公法中之國際法的大地之法》(Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum
  • 1950,《四論整個歐洲對柯特的解釋》(Donoso Cortes in gesamteuropaischer Interpretation: Vier Aufsatze
  • 1956,《哈姆雷特或者赫庫芭:時間突破戲劇》(Hamlet oder Hekuba - Der Einbruch der Zeit in das Spiel
  • 1958,《憲法法文集:1924-1954年》(Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924 – 1954
  • 1963,《游擊隊理論:政治的概念附識》(Theorie des Partisanen. Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen
  • 1967,《價值的僭政》(Die Tyrannei der Werte
  • 1970,《政治神學續篇:取消所有政治神學的傳說》(Politische Theologie II. Die Legende von der Erledigung jeder Politischen Theologie

[編輯] 有關施米特之著作

[編輯] 紐倫堡大審時期文獻

  • 2000,《紐倫堡的回答》(Antworten in Nurnberg),Helmut Quaritsch 編

[編輯] 書信集

  • 1999,《雲格爾-施米特書簡,1930-1983》(Ernst Junger - Carl Schmitt Briefe 1930-1983),Helmut Kiesel 編

[編輯] 日記

  • 1991,《語匯:1947-1951筆記》(Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951),Eberhard Freiherr von Medem 編
  • 2003,《卡爾‧施米特:日記》(Carl Schmitt: Tagebücher),Ernst Hüsmert 編

[編輯] 傳記

  • 1983,《卡爾·施米特-帝國的理論家》(Carl Schmitt, Theorist for the Reich),Joseph W. Bendersky
  • 1993,《卡爾·施米特傳》(Carl Schmitt. Eine Biographie),Paul Noack
  • 2009,《卡爾·施米特傳-興與衰》(Carl Schmitt – Aufstieg und Fall. Eine Biographie.),Reinhard Mehring

[編輯] 論文集

  • 1995,《國家-大空間-法》(Staat – Großraum – Nomos),Günter Maschke 編
  • 2007,《決斷論的國家:國際論辯中的卡爾·施米特》(Der Staat des Dezisionismus: Carl Schmitt in der internationalen Debatte),Rüdiger Voigt 編
  • 2007,《施米特與政治的現代性》(Carl Schmitt and the Modernity of Politics),劉小楓
  • 2008,《施米特與政治法學》(Carl Schmitt and the Jurisprudence as Politics),劉小楓 編

[編輯] 研究書

  • 1981,《政治的新浪漫主義:卡爾·史密特政治哲學之研究》,吳庚
  • 2001,《政治性的自主權:施米特與列寧的政治現實主義》(The Autonomy of the Political: Carl Schmitt's and Lenin's Political Realism),Eckard Bolsinger
  • 2003,《危險的心靈:戰後歐洲思潮中的卡爾·施米特》(A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought),Jan-Werner Müller

[編輯] 評論

  • 普林斯頓大學教授揚-維爾納·米勒(Jan-Werner Müller)著有《危險的心靈:戰後歐洲思潮中的卡爾·施米特》(A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought)一書,對二戰後,施米特其人及其思想之影響予以評論。
  • 海因里希·邁爾(Heinrich Meier)曾評論施米特及哲學學者列奧·施特勞斯思想間之關聯,主張施米特及施特勞斯間存在所謂的「隱匿對話」。




Carl Schmitt in China

Schmitt by Muller Chinese trans
The ideas of Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), a man known as ‘the crown jurist of the Third Reich’, have enjoyed enormous currency among mainland Chinese scholars since the 2000s. The role of prominent academics such as Liu Xiaofeng 刘小枫, Gan Yang 甘阳 and Wang Shaoguang 王绍光 in promoting Schmitt’s ideas, and the fact that his theories on the state help legitimise one-party rule, have ensured that China’s ‘Schmittian’ discourse has been both fashionable and profitable (the usually heavy hand of the censors touches only ever so lightly on articles and books inspired by Schmitt).
Schmitt joined the German National Socialist, Nazi, party in 1933 when Adolf Hitler became Reichskanzler of the Third Reich and enthusiastically participated in the purge of Jews and Jewish influence from German public life. The anti-liberal and anti-Semitic Schmitt was a keen advocate of National Socialist rule and he sought to become the Third Reich’s official legal theorist. By late 1936, however, articles in the Schutzstaffel (SS) newspaper Das Schwarze Korps accused him of opportunism and Catholic recidivism. Despite the protection of Herman Göring, Schmitt’s more lofty ambitions were frustrated and thereafter he concentrated on teaching and writing.
Schmitt’s stark view of politics has attracted much criticism and debate in Euro-American scholarship. Thinkers on the left are ambivalent about his legacy, although despite the odeur of his Nazi past, he remains popular among theory-seeking academics. They see Schmitt’s ideas as deeply flawed while acknowledging his acuity and studying his writings for the insights they offer into the limitations of liberal politics, even as they impotently argue from the lofty sidelines of contemporary real-world governmentality.
In China, the reception of Schmitt’s ideas has been more straightforward; after all, even Adolf Hitler has enjoyed a measure of uncontested popularity in post-Mao China. Mainland scholars who seek to strengthen the one-party system have found in Schmitt’s writings useful arguments to bolster the role of the state, and that of the paramount leader (or Sino-demiurge), in maintaining national unity and order.
To date, Schmitt’s Chinese intellectual avatars have neglected a few key concepts in the meister’s oeuvre that could serve well the party-state’s ambitions under Big Daddy Xi Jinping. We think in particular of Schmitt’s views of Grossraum (‘Big Area’), or spheres of influence. Inspired by his understanding of the Monroe Doctrine propounded by the US in support of its uncontested hegemony in the ‘New World’, Schmitt’s Grossraum was to justify the German Reich’s European footprint and legalise its dominion. As China promotes its Community of Shared Destiny 命运共同体 in Asia and the Pacific (see our 2014Yearbook on this theme), the concept of spheres of influence is enjoying a renewed purchase on the thinking of some international relations thinkers. See, for instance, the Australian scholar Michael Wesley’s unsettling analysis in Restless Continent: Wealth, Rivalry and Asia’s New Geopolitics (Black Ink, 2015).
During her time at the Australian Centre on China in the World in late 2013, the legal specialist Flora Sapio presented a seminar on the subject of Schmitt in China, and she kindly responded to our request to write a substantial essay on this important ‘statist’ trend in mainland intellectual culture for The China Story.
Flora Sapio is a visiting fellow at the Australian Centre on China in the World. Her research is focused on criminal justice and legal philosophy. She is the author of Sovereign Power and the Law in China (Brill, 2010); co-editor of The Politics of Law and Stability in China(Edward Elgar, 2014); and, Detention and its Reforms in China (forthcoming, Ashgate, 2016). — The Editors
___________________
We set up an ideal form [eidos],
which we take to be a goal [telos],
and we then act in such a way
as to make it become fact. [1]
The Schmittian intellectual likes to play Russian roulette but with an intriguing new twist: she believes that a single round has been placed in the revolver but she also knows this may not be the case. In fact, the only one who knows the truth is the Sovereign, a figure whose will the Schmittian cannot fathom. The Sovereign decides who plays the game and how many times. If the Schmittian turns downs this offer that can’t be refused, she would be declared an enemy and shot. Given how this intellectual predicament, masquerading as a position, commits one to always comply with the Diktat of the Sovereign, we must ask ourselves: why have several prominent Chinese intellectuals elected Herr Professor Carl Schmitt, Crown Jurist of the Third Reich, to be their intellectual patron saint?
Fulfilling a dream of wealth and power has been a feature of Chinese history and intellectual life since the late-nineteenth century. Chinese dreams, whether they be those dreamt up around the time of the 1919 May Fourth Movement, or the visions conjured up almost a century later by party-state-army leader Xi Jinping, involve a conviction that China is endowed with a distinctive national essence 国粹. The national essence is to China what the soul is to man. Just as (religious) man seeks to ascend to heaven by cultivating and purifying his soul, China can become wealthy and powerful if its national essence is enhanced and cleansed of polluting influences. The New Enlightenment Movement which emerged following the ideological thaw of the late 1970s saw traditionalism and feudalism being accused of holding China back. In the 1980s, Chinese intellectuals argued over how to revive the nation’s true nature, with many recommending an eclectic combination of Western values, theories and models in the process.[2] The Movement would witness a reversal of fortunes after the 1989 Beijing Massacre. Powerful nationalist sentiments followed in the 1990s, fuelled in part by the state and in part by a reaction to the inequalities of market reform, coupled with the public’s response to external events.
Telling Friend from Enemy 
刘小枫
Liu Xiaofeng
It is against this fast-changing backdrop that China’s Carl Schmitt fever must be situated. It would be wrong to see the ‘invisible hand’ of the State at work behind the fad.[3] The reception of Carl Schmitt by Chinese intellectuals, some of whom are key members of the New Left, was possible only because of the work undertaken by the influential scholar Liu Xiaofeng 刘小枫 (currently a professor at Renmin University in Beijing) to translate, comment on and promote Schmitt’s opera omnia. The holder of a theology doctorate from the University of Basel, Liu argued in his PhD thesis for Christianity to be separated from both its ‘Western’ and ecclesiastical dimensions, thereby allowing Christian thought to be treated purely as an object of academic research. Christian thought, so conceived, could thus be put in dialogue with other disciplines and contribute, among other things, to the modernisation of Chinese society. Liu related the development of Christianity to the development of nations and their identities, reflecting Max Weber’s argument in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, a book that was widely read in Chinese translation and highly influential in 1980s’ mainland intellectual circles.
Liu argued that in China Christianity took root in a unique way and was independent of missionary evangelisation. Liu’s sinicisation of Christian theology enabled the development of a Sino-Christian discourse in mainland intellectual circles focused on solving ‘Chinese problems’.[4] This was, and remains, a discourse that engages with such issues as economic development, social justice, social stability and most important of all, the political legitimacy of Communist Party rule.
Liu calls himself a ‘cultural Christian’, meaning a Christian without church affiliation: one who conducts research on theological arguments and concepts for the benefit of his nation. It is no surprise then that by understanding research in these terms, Liu soon developed a fervid interest in Carl Schmitt. To Carl Schmitt, the state has a theological origin — it must be conceived of as a divine-like entity if it is to hold back chaos and disorder so as to secure peace and prosperity. Schmitt’s thesis also implies that all modern political concepts originate in theology, which in turn makes theology amenable to being treated as a form of statecraft.[5] From the outset, Liu showed himself highly receptive to these Schmittian ideas. We must also note the ease with which the writings of Carl Schmitt succeeded in China. Unlike Chinese scholarship based on Western liberal-democratic models, which was and remains prone to censorship, Chinese aficionados of Schmitt’s ‘friend-enemy’ distinction and his critique of parliamentary democracy were unimpeded in their pursuits.
As a conservative Catholic, Schmitt understood politics (which he termed ‘the Political’, in an attempt to capture its essence) as based ultimately in the friend-enemy distinction. For Chinese intellectuals who had been brought up on Maoist rhetoric,[6] and were familiar with the adaptation of this dyad of friend-enemy 敌我 for post-Maoist political use,[7] Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction had a powerful resonance. This was a distinction that could be used to name any pair of antagonists, as long as the attributes of the named antagonists could be demonstrated to be so thoroughly incommensurable as to make them want to destroy each other, in order for each to preserve its own identity.
The friend-enemy distinction was a central feature of Schmitt’s political and constitutional theory: it grounded his critique of parliamentary democracy as well as his ideas about ‘the state of exception’ and sovereignty. Liberal democracies, Schmitt held, were trapped in false political categories: they ignored the crucial distinction between friend and enemy and therefore exposed themselves to the risk of capture by the interests of wealthy individuals and factions, who would use the state for their own goals rather than for the greater good of the people. According to Schmitt, liberal polities pretended that the government and the people were subject to the demands of reliable legal norms but the pretence was shattered whenever an internal or external enemy threatened the nation and national security. Reliance on parliamentary debates and legal procedures, he argued, posed the risk of throwing a country into chaos because they hampered the adoption of an effective and immediate response.
Schmitt held that sovereignty resides not in the rule of law but in the person or the institution who, in a time of extreme crisis, has the authority to suspend the law in order to restore normality. The authority to declare a state of emergency or Ausnahmezustand thus has unquestioned legitimacy, regardless of whether it takes the form of an actual (written) constitution or an implicit (unwritten) one. Yet how can a sovereign power that exists above and outside the law enjoy any legitimacy? Wouldn’t such a power be self-referential and premised on sheer violence? According to Schmitt, the legitimacy of such a power can be defended if one delinks the concepts of liberalism and democracy. He held that the two were substantially distinct and set about redefining the latter.
Schmitt argued that a polity founded on the sways of popular opinion could hardly be legitimate. He appealed instead to ideas about equality and the will of the people.[8] For Schmitt, political equality meant a relationship of co-belonging between the ruler and the ruled. As long as both ruler and ruled were members of the same group, or ‘friends’ holding identical views about who the enemy was, a polity was democratic. Schmitt held that where the will of the people mirrored the sovereign’s decision, rule was, indeed, by the people. Such a popular will need not be formed or expressed in terms of universal suffrage: the demands made at a public rally were sufficient to convey a popular will at work.[9]
Schmitt’s eclectic definition of the popular will led him to conceive of democracy as a democratic dictatorship. This way of thinking was very attractive to intellectuals who favoured statist and nationalist solutions to political problems and issues of international relations.[10]
Schmitt by Liu XiaofengWhy Schmitt? 
The reasons for Chinese intellectuals’ fascination with Carl Schmitt are straightforward. The related concepts of ‘friend and enemy’, ‘state of exception’ and ‘decisionism’ are simple and usable. Policy advisors and policy-makers can easily apply these concepts in their analysis of situations. Schmitt’s vocabulary can also lend theoretical weight to the articulation of reform proposals, to serve as a source of inspiration or to furnish building blocks in the construction of pro-state arguments in political science and constitutionalism. Moreover, Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction complements and provides justification for the many narratives of nationalism and cultural exceptionalism that have become influential in Chinese scholarship in recent years. These narratives are by no means unique to China but we must note that they are at odds with the universalist and internationalist aspects of Chinese Communism as state doctrine. The gist of the Chinese Schmittian argument is that the world is not politically homogeneous but a pluriverse where radically different political systems exist in mutual antagonism. China, accordingly, is not only entitled to but must find and defend its own path to power and prosperity.
The Chinese Schmittian argument justifies the party-state’s view that Western parliamentary democracy, thick versions of the rule of law, civil society, and the values and institutions of Western constitutionalism are all unsuitable for China. Schmitt’s argument allows those who hold this view to say that such ideas belong to an ‘alien’ liberal cosmopolitanism that is ultimately damaging for the Chinese way of life. In 2013, a state directive dubbed ‘Document 9’, outlined these ideas as posing a serious threat to China’s ‘ideological sphere.’[11]
Carl Schmitt’s views have now become influential in mainland Chinese scholarship and he is frequently quoted as a foreign authority in arguments mounted against ‘liberalism’ and Western or US-inspired models of economic and political development. But the fact that Schmitt’s philosophy premises politics on exclusion and even the physical elimination of the enemy (should such an elimination be deemed necessary to the achievement of an ideological goal), is something never raised in Chinese intellectual discourse. The friend-enemy distinction encourages a stark form of binary thinking. The category of friend, however substantively defined, can be conceived only by projecting its opposite. ‘Friend’ acquires meaning through knowing what ‘enemy’ means. The attributes used to define a ‘friend’ can, as Schmitt pointed out, be drawn from diverse sources. Religion, language, ethnicity, culture, social status, ideology, gender or indeed anything else can serve as the defining element of a given friend-enemy distinction.
The friend-enemy distinction is a public distinction: it refers to friendship and enmity between groups rather than between individuals. (Private admiration for a member of a hostile group is always possible). The markers of identity, however, are relatively fluid because a political community is formed via the common identification of a perceived threat.[13] In other words, it is through singling out ‘outsiders’ that the community becomes meaningful as an ‘in-group’. This Schmittian way of defining a ‘people’ elides the necessity of a legal framework. A ‘people’, as a political community in the Schmittian sense, is primarily concerned about whether a different political community (or individuals capable of being formed into a community) poses a threat to their way of life. For Schmitt, the friend-enemy distinction is a purely political distinction and to be treated as entirely separate from ethics.[14] Since the key concern is the survival of the ‘in-group’ as a ‘people’ and a political community, Schmitt’s argument implies that the elimination of a perceived enemy can be justified as a practical necessity.[15] Hence, those who call themselves Schmittian intellectuals should be aware that Schmitt’s argument is framed around necessity. So long as a there is a necessary cause to defend, any number of deaths can be justified.
Moreover, necessity is premised on antagonism. The friend-enemy distinction grounds every aspect of Schmitt’s thinking about politics and constitutionalism. But this is precisely why Schmittian concepts have inspired some of the most effective analyses of Chinese politics and constitutionalism. Schmitt’s view of sovereignty as requiring the ruler to have the freedom to intervene as necessary for the good of the whole country is of a piece with the ‘statist intellectual trend’ 国家主义思潮 in Chinese scholarship of which Wang Shan 王山 and Wang Xiaodong 王小东 were and remain key proponents.
This movement led to the development of an argument around the importance of ‘state capacity’. In an influential 2001 work, the political scientists Wang Shaoguang 王绍光 and Hu Angang 胡鞍钢 presented ‘state capacity’ as the key to good governance and policy. They argued against democratic decision-making processes by outlining their adverse consequences. According to them, such processes can involve lengthy discussions, leading to delays in policy implementation or even to political and institutional paralysis. They saw ‘the capacity on the part of the state to transform its preference into reality’ as crucial for protecting the nation’s well-being.[16] Since then, there have been many academic publications in mainland China that present ‘state capacity’ with its corollaries of social control and performance-based legitimacy as a viable alternative to parliamentary democracy.
Quotable and Useful Ideas
王绍光
Wang Shaoguang
In a subsequent work provocatively titled Four Chapters on Democracy,[17] Wang Shaoguang pays implicit tribute to Carl Schmitt’s Four Chapters on the Concept Sovereignty. Like Schmitt, Wang rejects representative democracy on the pragmatic and utilitarian grounds that such a system is ultimately incapable of improving the welfare of the entire population. Echoing the Schmittian argument of parliamentarianism’s capture by interest groups, Wang argues that universal suffrage plays into the hands of those endowed with financial means, while reducing the have-nots to the role of passive spectators.
Wang also presents a Schmittian-inspired notion of ‘the people’ as the basis of a responsive democracy, arguing that countries with a strong assimilative capacity and steering capacity (that is, the people united under a strong leader) have a higher quality of democracy. Some of Wang’s vocabulary has come from democratic political theorist Robert Dahl, but it is Schmitt’s argument that underlies Wang’s explanations of responsive democracy and state effectiveness.[18]
The ‘state capacity’ argument advanced by Wang, Hu and others has enjoyed the attention of Western scholarship on contemporary China for a decade or more. It is frequently cited in academic publications about China’s economy, political economy and public administration.
In many of these published studies (in English and other European languages), ‘state capacity’ is treated as having afforded the Chinese government an effective means for accelerating China’s economic development. The evidence of China’s economic success, in turn, has also encouraged some academics to propose that an authoritarian government may be more efficient in delivering economic growth than a liberal-democratic one. It is baffling that among those who hold this view, some have also claimed to ‘support China’s transition to a more open society based on the rule of law and human rights’.[19] If by ‘more open’ they mean greater freedom of the liberal-democratic variety, then this goal is at odds with their argument that the Chinese Communist Party’s one-party system must be strengthened through a range of capacity-building initiatives.
Schmitt’s argument has also been very influential in mainland scholarship on constitutional theory. After Mao, the party-state needed — and to an extent still needs — a distinctively Chinese political ontology. This ontology — or way of conceptualizing and understanding the world — has to include a bipartite political system, in which an extensive party apparatus exists both inside and outside the law, wielding supreme power over the state. Furthermore, this party-state system has to be internally coherent: capable of self-perpetuation to enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of both the Chinese people and foreigners. Chinese legal academics such as Qiang Shigong 強世功, who view constitutionalism in these terms, began in the 2000s to defend their position by deploying the whole arsenal of Schmittian philosophy. The result was a trinity of concepts: ‘the state of exception’, ‘constituting and constituted power’ and ‘political representation by consensus’ (representing respectively the terms State, Movement and People as used by Schmitt in his 1933 work, Staat, Bewegung, Volk), which these academics hailed as the true essence of Chinese law.
When Schmitt is directly quoted, his influence is obvious. But there are scholars such as Cui Zhiyuan 崔之元 who have made tacit use of Schmitt in their theorising about governance and politics in China. Schmitt’s influence is evident in Cui’s understanding of China as a ‘mixed constitution’ involving ‘three political levels’.[20] Similarly, Chen Ruihong’s 陈瑞洪 notion of ‘virtuous unconstitutionality’;[21] Han Yuhai’s 韩毓海 doctrine of ‘constitutionalism in a proletarian state’;[22] Hu Angang’s 胡鞍钢 rebranding of the Politburo as a  ‘collective presidency’;[23] Qiang Shigong’s 强世功 model of ‘shared sovereignty under a party-state leader’,[24] are other prominent Schmittian-inspired arguments to have emerged in the last two decades. These theories belong to different areas of Chinese constitutional scholarship,[25] but they all recast the Schmittian sovereign in Chinese party-state garb. Specifically, each of these theories defends political representation by consensus, linking consensus to broad acceptance of the Diktat of the party-state. In one way or another, they also all present the ‘West’ and its political and legal institutions as unsuited for China.
To date, Western legal scholarship has properly examined neither these influential arguments nor their legal and political ramifications. But there are several scholars who have indicated the relevance of these arguments for China. For instance, Randall Pereenboom presents a useful account of the Chinese legal system as a pluriverse populated by different conceptions of the rule of law.[26] Michael Dowdle has argued, in sympathy with the New Left position, that liberal conceptions of constitutionalism are limited and that there is room for state power to be legitimated in other ways.[27] Larry Catà Backer has conceived the Party and the State as a unitary whole, a theoretical construct inspired by the reality of Chinese institutions, which allows for shuanggui 双规 detention on legal grounds.[28] These works can be read as putting the finger in the wound of some of our own contradictions. We may criticise the Chinese legal system from the purview of an idealised model of the Western legal system but at the same time we cannot avoid dealing with Chinese law as it is discussed and presented, and as it exists within the People’s Republic of China.
Several mainland intellectuals have pointed out that although Chinese Schmittians are fond of attacking the West, they don’t explain why they rely on a German political thinker to do so.[29] This criticism is useful, but it ignores how advocates of indigenous concepts and models, ‘Third Way’ proponents and Western-style liberals alike have yet to examine their uses of a logic that belongs more to Western metaphysics than to indigenous Chinese thought (Confucian or other forms of thinking derived from pre-Qin sources). This Western logic requires one to construct an ideal model of how a political system, a legal system, a society or truly any other entity should be, into which we then attempt to ‘fit’ reality, often without heeding the consequences of doing so.
At any rate, we can see that Schmittian concepts have become far more dominant than liberal ones in mainland legal scholarship. Political moderates such as He Baogang 何包钢[30] have sought to accommodate the arguments of both sides by proposing, for instance, that a constitutional court should have the power to decide on what constitutes a ‘state of exception’, on which the absolute authority of a Schmittian sovereignty is predicated. But such attempts at accommodation only reveal the weakness of the liberal position by comparison with the Schmittian one. Professor He reflects the quandary of those who seek to defend elements of a liberal democratic model (such as judicial independence) within an unaccommodating Schmittian friend-enemy paradigm.
Schmitt und Xi
Since Xi Jinping became China’s top leader in November 2012, the friend-enemy distinction so crucial to Carl Schmitt’s philosophy has found even wider applications in China, in both ‘Party theory’ and academic life. The selective revival of the Maoist rhetoric of struggle to launch a new mass line education campaign on 18 June 2013 is a good example of how the friend-enemy distinction has been adapted for present-day one-party rule.
To see the consequences of Schmittian reasoning, it is important that we consider the motivations behind Carl Schmitt’s privileging of the friend-enemy distinction and absolute sovereignty. Schmitt believed that he was theorising on behalf of the greater good. His philosophy can be rightly described as a political theology because it was inspired by the Biblical concept of kathechon [from the Greek τὸ κατέχον, ‘that what withholds’, or ὁ κατέχων, ‘the one who withholds’] — the power that restrains the advent of the Anti-Christ.[31] Schmitt transposed kathechon into a political register, defining it as the power that maintains the status quo.[32] This power can be exercised by an institution (such as the nation-state) or by the sovereign (whether as dictator or defender of the constitution). A logical consequence of Schmitt’s belief in the kathecon was the conflation of religious and political imagery. Forces which were against a given sovereignty were nothing less than evil enemies sowing the seeds of chaos and disorder. Accordingly, to protect one’s nation or sovereign was a sacred duty and the path to salvation.
We may fundamentally disagree with Chinese intellectuals who have opted to promote a Schmittian worldview. But if we are to defend intellectual pluralism, we must accept that people are free to choose their own point of view. In fact, the emergence of a Chinese Schmittian discourse in academic scholarship augments the current range of Schmittian-inspired arguments produced as much by scholars on the right as on the left in European and American settings.
We must also note that in China, as everywhere else, political differences of the left and right, or between the New Left and liberals, emerge out of and remain largely trapped in a common setting: what may be called a common political-theological paradigm, to use Schmitt’s vocabulary. Political differences are made meaningful in a common setting, out of which people receive and develop their mental schemes, their political vocabularies and the entire universe of concepts for thinking politics. The political-theological paradigm of one-party rule in the People’s Republic of China has ensured that Chinese intellectuals are bound to the mental schemes, vocabularies and concepts that this paradigm has allowed to be generated. What we must bear in mind is that Western ideas must also be accommodated into the paradigm.
Living in a country that has witnessed a rapid rise to economic wealth and global power over three decades, Schmittian intellectuals in today’s China have sought to marry a philosophy that emerged and developed in Germany from the 1920s to the 1940s with ideas about statehood that first became popular in China in the 1980s. This mix of Schmittian thinking and ‘statism’ has now become very influential in Chinese academic circles. But there doesn’t seem to be much concern about the destructive potential of Carl Schmitt’s philosophy.
_____________
Notes:
* The author would like to thank the editors of The China Story, in particular Gloria Davies, for their intellectual and stylistic contributions to this study. Subheadings have been added by the editors.
[1] François Jullien, A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004, p.1.
[2] On the New Enligthenment Movement, see Xu Jilin, ‘The Fate of an Enlightenment — Twenty Years in the Chinese Intellectual Sphere (1978–1998)’, Geremie R Barmé and Gloria Davies, trans, East Asian History, n.20 (2000): 169–186. More generally, and critically, see Zhang Xudong, ed., Whither China: Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, Part I.
[3] The study of European philosophy was not a priority of the Ninth Five Year Plan on Research in the Social Sciences and Philosophy 国家哲学社会科学研究九五规划重大课题, which covered the period from 1996 to 2000, and Liu Xiaofeng’s first publication on Carl Schmitt, a review of Renato Cristi’s book Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism, dates to 1997. See Liu Xiaofeng 刘小枫, ‘Shimite gushide youpai jiangfa: quanwei ziyouzhyi?’ 施米特故事的右派讲法: 权威自由主义? , 28 September 2005, online at:http://www.aisixiang.com/data/8911.html. On the Ninth Five Year Plan, see Guojia Zhexue Shehui Kexue Yanjiu Jiuwu (1996–2000) Guihua Bangongshi 国家哲学社会科学研究九五 (1996–2000) 规划办公室, Guojia Zhexue Shehui Kexue Yanjiu Jiuwu (1996–2000) Guihua 国家哲学社会科学研究九五 (1996–2000) 规划, Beijing 北京: Xuexi chubanshe 学习出版社, 1997.
[4] Liu Xiaofeng 刘小枫, ‘Xiandai yujing zhongde hanyu jidu shenxue’ 现代语境中的汉语基督神学, 2 April 2010, online at: http://www.aisixiang.com/data/32790.html. On Sino-Christian theology, see also Yang Huiling and Daniel HN Yeung, eds, Sino-Christian Studies in China,Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006; Pan-chiu Lai and Jason Lam, eds, Sino-Christian Theology: A Theological Qua Cultural Movement in Contemporary China,Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010; and, Alexander Chow, Theosis, Sino-Christian Theology and the Second Chinese Enlightenment: Heaven and Humanity in Unity, New York: Peter Lang, 2013. For a mainstream commentary on Chinese Schmittianism, see Mark Lilla, ‘Reading Strauss in Beijing’, The New Republic, 17 December 2010, online at:http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/79747/reading-leo-strauss-in-beijing-china-marx
[5] Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, George Schwab, trans, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005 p.36.
[6] Mao Zedong, ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People’, Selected Works of Chairman Mao Tsetung, Volume 5, edited by the Committee for Editing and Publishing the Works of Chairman Mao Tsetung, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1977, pp.348–421.
[7] For an exploration of its uses in the field of public security, see Michael Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics: A History, Durham: Duke University Press, 2005.
[8] Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the origin of the modern concept of sovereignty to proletarian class struggle, Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward, trans, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.
[9] Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Ellen Kennedy, trans, Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2000; and, Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, Jeffrey Seitzer, trans, Durham: Duke University Press, 2008.
[10] On the statist and nationalist intellectual trend, see  Xu Jilin 许纪霖, ‘Jin shinianlai Zhongguo guojiazhuyi sichaozhi pipan’ 近十年来中国国家主义思潮之批判, 5 July 2011, online at: http://www.aisixiang.com/data/41945.html
[11] ‘Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere. A Notice from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s General Office’, online at: http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.
[12] As, for instance, a relationship of agonism, where the Schmittian enemy becomes an adversary. In this context, see Chantal Mouffe, On the Political. London and New York: Routledge, 2005.
[13] Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, George Schwab, trans, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007, p.38.
[14] Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pp.25–27.
[15] Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pp.46–48.
[16] By which Wang and Hu mean: ‘the ratio between the actual degree of intervention that the state is capable of realizing and the scope of intervention that the state hopes to achieve.’ See Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, The Chinese Economy in Crisis: State Capacity and Tax Reform, New York: ME Sharpe, 2001, p.190.
[17] Wang Shaoguang 王绍光, Minzhu sijiang 民主四讲, Beijing 北京: Sanlian shudian 三联书店, 2008.
[18] Wang Shaoguang, ‘The Problem of State Weakness’, Journal of Democracy 14.1 (2003): 36-42. By the same author, see ‘Democracy and State Effectiveness’, in Natalia Dinello and Vladimir Popov, eds,  Political Institutions and Development: failed expectations and renewal hopes, London: Edward Elgar, 2007, pp.140-167.
[20] Cui Zhiyuan 崔之元, ‘A Mixed Constitution and a Tri-level Analysis of Chinese Politics’ 混合宪法与对中国政治的三层分析, 25 March 2008, online at:http://www.aisixiang.com/data/18117.html
[21] Chen Ruihong 陈瑞洪, ‘A World Cup for Studies of Constitutional Law: a Dialogue between Political and Constitutional Scholars on Constitutional Power’ 宪法学的知识界碑 — 政治学者和宪法学者关于制宪权的对话, 5 October 2010, online at:http://www.aisixiang.com/data/36400.html; and, also Xianfa yu zhuquan  宪法与主权, Beijing 北京: Falü chubanshe 法律出版社, 2007.
[22] Han Yuhai 韩毓海, ‘The Constitution and the Proletarian State’ 宪政与无产阶级国家 online at: http://www.globalview.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=34640.
[23] Hu Angang, China’s Collective Presidency, New York: Springer, 2014.
[24] Qiang Shigong 强世功, ‘The Unwritten Constitution in China’s Constitution’ 中国宪法中的不成文宪法, 19 June 2010, online at: http://www.aisixiang.com/data/related-34372.html.
[25] See also the special issue ‘The Basis for the Legitimacy of the Chinese Political System: Whence and Whither? Dialogues among Western and Chinese Scholars VII’, Modern China, vol.40, no.2 (March 2014).
[26] Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March Towards the Rule of Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
[27] Michael Dowdle, ‘Constitutional Listening’, Chicago Kent Law Review, vol.88, issue 1, (2012-2013): 115–156.
[28] Larry Catá Backer and Keren Wang, ‘The Emerging Structures of Socialist Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics: Extra Judicial Detention (Laojiao andShuanggui) and the Chinese Constitutional Order’, Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, vol.23, no.2 (2014): 251–341.
[29] Liu Yu 刘瑜, ‘Have you read your Schmitt today?’ 你今天施密特了吗?, Caijing, 30 August 2010, online at: http://blog.caijing.com.cn/expert_article-151338-10488.shtml option=com_content&view=article&id=189:2010-10-08-21-43-05&catid=29:works&Itemid=69&lang=en
[30] He Baogang 何包钢, ‘In Defence of Procedure: a liberal’s critique of Carl Schmitt’s theory of exception’ 保卫程序 一个自由主义者对卡尔施密特例外理论的批评, 26 December 2003,  online at: http://www.china-review.com/sao.asp?id=2559
[31] ‘Let no man deceive you by any means: for that day shall not come, except there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition; Who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; so that he as God sitteth in the temple of God, shewing himself that he is God. Remember ye not, that, when I was yet with you, I told you these things? And now ye know what withholdeth that he might be revealed in this time. For the mystery of iniquity doth already work: only he who know letteth will tell, until he be taken out of the way’. See, The Bible: New Testament, 2 Thessalonians 2: 3-8.
[32] For a simple illustration, see Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt, London: Verso, 2002, Chapter 17. An overview of debates about the role of the katechon and a genealogy of the concept in Carl Schmitt’s political theology can be found in Julia Hell, ‘Katechon: Carl Schmitt’s Imperial Theology and the Ruins of the Future’, The Germanic Review, vol.84, issue 4, (2009): 283-325.

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